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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is a glimpse via the rear-view mirror at some of the 
corporate law and governance developments, including the corporate 
jurisprudence of the Delaware Supreme Court, during my twelve-year 
term as Chief Justice of Delaware, which began in April of 1992 and 
ended in May of 2004.  I call this Article a “glimpse” because this pro-
ject has turned out to be broader than I originally envisaged. 
In fact, my original concept was to write about the Delaware Su-
preme Court corporate cases during that period.  But that idea turned 
out to be both too large and too small.  It was too large in the sense 
that there were too many subjects covered, even by the relatively small 
number of Supreme Court cases.  It was too small in the sense that 
many interesting corporate law and corporate governance topics that 
formed the environment of that period were not part of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence. 
In the final analysis, the breadth and depth necessary to do justice 
to a complete jurisprudential retrospective is not practicable in a sin-
gle law review article.  First, the breadth:  the reader will see that some 
of the important cases are not discussed exhaustively; some not at all.  
Next, the depth:  the depth of analysis required to scrutinize the hold-
ing and language of the Supreme Court in each case—and their im-
plications—is simply not practicable in an article. 
During this period there were important developments in “Corpo-
rate America.”  The 2001–2002 scandals, typified by Enron and 
WorldCom, which were not Delaware corporations, came to define 
what was wrong with corporate governance generally.  These events 
are aberrations and did not define Delaware corporate jurisprudence. 
Rather, Delaware corporate jurisprudence is authoritatively 
framed, in part, by a discrete number of decisions of the Delaware Su-
preme Court.  It is also framed, in part, by a plethora of Delaware 
Court of Chancery decisions, many of them excellent examples of ju-
risprudence.  If one looks at the entire landscape of the decisions of 
both courts over the 1992–2004 period, one can tease out themes and 
trends that have little or nothing to do with the 2001–2002 scandals 
and the resulting activity at a national level, including the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,1 SEC rulemaking, and listing requirements of the Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SROs), like the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).  To be sure, the federal regulatory landscape is changing, 
 
1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
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and these changes will play out extensively in the years ahead.  Some 
ripple effects of the federal dimension may influence Delaware juris-
prudence going forward.  Now, however, we can look at where the law 
has been and where it is presently.  Then we can make some educated 
guesses about what may happen in the years ahead. 
A.  History 
Eight years ago, Delaware celebrated the 100th anniversary of its 
current Constitution of 1897.  That constitution provides two major 
regimes that are relevant here:  it authorized legislation creating a 
general corporation law, and it revamped the judicial selection proc-
ess.2  The judicial selection process, which has been in effect and has 
remained essentially unchanged since then, provides for twelve-year 
terms for each Supreme Court justice and trial judge,3 appointment by 
the governor4 (today from a merit-selected list recommended by a bi-
partisan commission),5 and confirmation by the state senate.6  It also 
provides for a bipartisan judiciary.7 
The constitutional requirement of a bipartisan judiciary is unique 
to Delaware.  It mandates that in each court individually and in all 
Delaware constitutional courts collectively there may not be more 
than a bare majority of one major political party.8  This system has 
served well to provide Delaware with an independent and depoliti-
cized judiciary and has led, in my opinion, to Delaware’s international 
attractiveness as the incorporation domicile of choice. 
Shortly after the adoption of the 1897 constitution, the Delaware 
legislature adopted a general corporation law that generally mirrored 
 
2 DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Donna L. Culver, Corpo-
rations—Article IX, in THE DELAWARE CONSTITUTION OF 1897, at 157, 159-62 (Randy J. 
Holland et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the changes to the constitution that allowed for 
the enactment of a general corporation law). 
3 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
4 Id. 
5 This is a result of executive orders of a succession of governors, beginning over 
twenty-five years ago with Governor Pete du Pont.  See Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 4:8 Del. 
Reg. R. 1202, 1310 (Feb. 1, 2001) (noting, in 2001, that this had been the practice for 
over twenty years). 
6 DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.; see also Joseph T. Walsh & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Judiciary—Article IV, in 
THE DELAWARE CONSTITUTION OF 1897, supra note 2, at 121, 134-35 (describing the 
“political balance” requirement). 
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New Jersey’s.9  Many large national firms had incorporated in New Jer-
sey, but in the early part of the twentieth century, New Jersey engaged 
in a strong regulatory and taxation regime affecting corporations.  In 
part as a reaction to that regime, a major migration of corporate char-
ters from New Jersey to Delaware occurred.10 
There followed eight or nine decades of extensive litigation in 
Delaware of disputes involving internal corporate affairs.11  That litiga-
tion resulted in the body of Delaware judge-made law that shaped 
Delaware history and the landscape of corporation law in the United 
States.  The Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme 
Court have established a reputation for their extensive business exper-
tise and swift decision making, have amassed a vast amount of rich 
case law, and have earned international respect.  In 2005, for the 
fourth year in a row, Delaware was rated first in the nation among ju-
dicial systems for efficiency and fairness in civil litigation by a Harris 
Poll conducted for the United States Chamber of Commerce.12 
As of February 19, 2004, Delaware had over 615,000 business enti-
ties, including about 275,000 domestic corporations.13  Nearly sixty 
percent of the Fortune 500 companies and nearly the same propor-
tion of those listed on the New York Stock Exchange are Delaware 
corporations.14  In addition, seventy percent of initial public offerings 
in 2004 on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Ex-
change, and the NASDAQ were Delaware corporations.15 
 
9 See Maurice A. Hartnett, III, Delaware’s Charters and Prior Constitutions, in THE 
DELAWARE CONSTITUTION OF 1897, supra note 2, at 21, 38 (noting the enactment of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law in 1899); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 609 (2003) (stating that Delaware “copied” New Jersey’s corpo-
rate laws in order to encourage incorporation in Delaware). 
10 See Roe, supra note 9, at 609-10 (recounting the history of the competition for 
incorporation between New Jersey and Delaware in the early twentieth century). 
11 Cf. William T. Quillen et al., Trustees of Equity:  The Judges of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, in THE DELAWARE BAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 393, 398 (Helen L. Wins-
low et al. eds., 1994) (“The most dramatic change during Chancellor [Charles] Curtis’ 
term [from 1909–1921] was the advent of major corporate litigation.”); id. at 404 
(“The first half of the 1980s brought . . . a flood of corporate litigation.”). 
12 See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., 2005 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE LIABIL-
ITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY 40 (Mar. 8, 2005), at http://www.instituteforlegalreform. 
org/harris/pdf/HarrisPoll2005-FullReport.pdf (ranking Delaware first in 2005 and 
noting that Delaware was also ranked first in its 2002, 2003, and 2004 studies). 
13 Telephone Interview with Richard J. Geisenberger, Assistant Secretary of State 
of Delaware (Mar. 7, 2005). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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B.  Summary of Themes 
Delaware corporate jurisprudence is shaped both by Supreme 
Court and Chancery Court decisions.  In the years from 1992 to 2004, 
there were only slightly more than eighty Supreme Court decisions in 
the corporate area, including full opinions and orders.  Concepts of 
corporate governance are shaped not only by these courts’ jurispru-
dence, but also through academic discourse and counseling on best 
practices. 
The Delaware Supreme Court decisions during these twelve years 
clarified some areas of the corporate law and left others shrouded in 
ambiguity.  Most of the decisions were sound and advanced the law in 
a meaningful direction.  Others are the subject of valid criticism. 
Beyond the Supreme Court jurisprudence during this period is 
the overlay of Chancery decisions and other corporate governance de-
velopments.  My central focus, after looking back over this twelve-year 
landscape, is to observe that it was a period of significant develop-
ment.  This period was somewhat like the mid-1980s in that regard.  
But it was different, because the earlier era was characterized by the 
hostile takeover phenomenon, culminating in the watershed year of 
1985 when four major cases shaped the takeover jurisprudence for 
years to come.16 
During my twelve-year term as Chief Justice, the developments 
were not as sharply focused as the takeover period of the mid-1980s.  
But if I had to characterize in one sentence my observation of the 
1992–2004 period, it would bring to mind Dickens’s phrase about “the 
best of times . . . [and] the worst of times.”17  It was a rational period of 
some clarification and some residual ambiguity in Delaware jurispru-
dence, in a national atmosphere of tumultuous upheaval and a volun-
tary quest for best practices by many corporations.  As a consequence, 
some of the subthemes I have observed in reexamining the corporate 
jurisprudence of this period are as follows: 
• Corporate governance, with its emphasis on board struc-
ture and process, has emerged as the predominant focus 
of directors, their counselors, and courts. 
• Delaware judges have had a substantial role in shaping 
best practices in corporate governance. 
 
16 See infra Part III.A (discussing the impact of Unocal, Van Gorkom, Moran, and Rev-
lon). 
17 CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 1 (London, Oxford University Press 
1859). 
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• Standards of conduct for directors are defined by Dela-
ware statutory law and judge-made articulations of fiduci-
ary duties.  The expectations for director conduct evolve 
over time as business mores evolve, with courts applying 
the evolving expectations in a common law process in de-
ciding the proper standard of review to apply in specific 
circumstances. 
• The evolution of expectations means the directors them-
selves, as well as the courts, must focus on genuine proc-
esses, not mere rote, “check the box” drills. 
• Courts should not second-guess the business decisions of 
directors, and the Delaware courts have not done so.  
There has been no change in Delaware law of the time-
honored business judgment rule, which remains alive and 
well. 
• The fact that judicial review by Delaware courts of director 
conduct has resulted in some findings of wrongdoing and 
liability is primarily a function of intensified judicial focus 
on process and improved pleading by plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
• Improved pleading by plaintiffs’ lawyers has, in turn, been 
influenced by court decisions in this period.  For example, 
one significant development has been the Delaware 
courts’ strong suggestions that plaintiffs’ lawyers employ a 
books and records demand before bringing a derivative 
suit. 
• Two examples of areas of directors’ increased concern are 
the emergence of “good faith” as an issue and the ques-
tion of whether directors are held to a uniform standard 
or varying standards, according to individual expertise and 
experience.  The cases have not authoritatively resolved 
those concerns, but directors’ exposure to liability has not 
been ratcheted up significantly. 
• In order to understand the various levels of review, one 
must focus continuously on the fact that the business 
judgment rule does not allow a judicial determination of 
whether a business decision was objectively reasonable ; the 
rule is a rebuttable presumption that the decision was 
reached by a careful, good faith process and that the re-
sult was rational. 
• The standards of review in takeover cases and other areas 
outside the ordinary business judgment rule and the di-
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rectors’ oversight responsibility continue to be complex 
and in some instances difficult to apply. 
• As a result, deal making and deal protection devices con-
tinue to present a challenge for creative lawyering.  But it 
is not an unworkable challenge. 
• The dénouement of this twelve-year period in our juris-
prudence is the courts’ deepened reliance on independ-
ent directors and an expectation that directors will act 
thoughtfully and in good faith. 
• The goal is to promote good governance and avoid the 
need (or the temptation) for courts and regulators to sec-
ond-guess directors. 
• By encouraging sound structures and processes, good dis-
closure, and fair elections, the courts can continue to af-
ford directors wide discretion, because sound practices of 
internal corporate governance limit the potential for 
abuse. 
• Going forward, the Delaware judiciary will continue to 
face difficult corporate law disputes that I expect the 
courts will handle well and continue the clarification 
trend. 
These subthemes cannot be summarized by some overarching 
“sound bite,” but it is fair to alert the reader to four recurring and 
dominant notions that characterize this period in Delaware corporate 
jurisprudence: 
• Process matters. 
• Procedure matters:  many opinions turn on the proce-
dural posture of the case.  To the extent that the Supreme 
Court has reversed Chancery dismissals of cases with 
prejudice at the pleading stage, the Supreme Court estab-
lishes a precedent based on well-pleaded but sometimes 
extreme allegations.  This may facilitate the development 
of an important genre of Delaware decision making.  That 
is, an opinion that raises questions or teaches without im-
posing liability may provide guidance to the corporate 
world to conform to best practices without the downside 
of actually imposing personal liability. 
• Board governance is key, at least as an aspiration and 
sometimes with legal consequences. 
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• In addition, speeches and articles by Delaware judges are 
often helpful in guiding boards and their counsel in the 
direction of best practices. 
Common law decision making may raise some jurisprudential dif-
ficulties because most Chancery decisions are not appealed.  That may 
mean that some, perhaps many, burning issues of corporate law do 
now always make it to the Supreme Court in either a timely manner 
or, more commonly, in a posture that squarely poses the issue.  It re-
mains for history to judge whether the Supreme Court was able to 
strike the balance between (a) respecting the norms of common law 
decision making (i.e., deciding only the case before the court) and 
(b) the need to bring clarity to the corporate law and to give authori-
tative views on controversial issues. 
C.  Scope of This Article 
This project begins with the selection of the universe of Delaware 
Supreme Court corporate cases from 1992 to 2004.  The Supreme 
Court’s annual 700-plus case docket generally includes comparatively 
few corporate cases.  In fact, there were only about eighty-four corpo-
rate cases during those twelve years, depending upon how one defines 
what constitutes a corporate case.  The appendix to this article lists 
those cases in reverse chronological order.18 
The reader will note that most of the decisions are unanimous.  It 
is debatable whether the court’s goal of speaking with one voice is a 
worthy one.19  One could argue that more split decisions would have 
 
18 According to an analysis by Ashley Altschuler, Esquire, one of my former law 
clerks and presently an associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, I sat on about 3500 panels 
(three-justice or en banc) from 1992 until 2004, which included a wide variety of civil, 
corporate, criminal, and constitutional cases.  Of those, I authored 350 opinions and 
orders including full majority opinions, three concurring opinions, and, fortunately, 
only two dissenting opinions.  One dissent was a search and seizure case, Quarles v. 
State, 696 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1997), and the other was Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 
Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), which is discussed extensively in Part III.B. 
19 See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 127, 129 (1997) (“The Delaware supreme court . . . rarely issues separate opin-
ions.”); see also Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy, 
5 DEL. L. REV. 115, 118 (2002) (“The Delaware Supreme Court, which has long been 
recognized as the definitive authority on corporate law, rarely issues separate opinions.  
Even on deeply controversial issues, Delaware’s justices almost invariably speak with a 
single voice.” (footnotes omitted)); Adam D. Feldman, Comment, A Divided Court in 
More Ways Than One:  The Supreme Court of Delaware and Its Distinctive Model for Judicial 
Efficacy, 1997–2003, 67 ALB. L. REV. 849, 852-55 (2004) (proposing explanations for the 
Delaware “unanimity norm”). 
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resulted in sharper focus and more clarity.  Although I disagree with 
that view, I hope it is now a moot point.  One step the court did take 
during my term was having more en banc cases with oral argument, 
and fewer important decisions emanating from three-justice panels.20 
The Court of Chancery makes much of our corporate law.  The 
judges of that court perform prolifically and promptly in an extraor-
dinary manner on the ground, daily, as the world’s most respected 
business trial court.  My estimate is that the heavy caseload of that 
court consists of about 75% corporate or business cases, with the re-
mainder being other equally important equity cases.  About 85% to 
90% of the court’s final judgments in corporate cases are never ap-
pealed.  The low rate of appeal is due to several factors, including the 
extraordinarily high international respect for the expertise of that 
court; the fact that those judgments are mostly correct; the fact that 
they are usually affirmed on appeal anyway; the fact that many cases 
are decided by interlocutory order (on an injunction, for example); 
and the practical reality that business must move on from the answer 
provided by the Court of Chancery.21  This phenomenon is a high 
tribute to that court and is the chief reason that Delaware is the pre-
vailing corporate domicile of choice. 
The Delaware Supreme Court, of course, has the last word in cor-
porate jurisprudence.  As Justice Jackson said of the United States Su-
preme Court in a famous concurring opinion:  “We are not final be-
cause we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.”22  The Delaware Supreme Court is certainly “infallible” in the 
sense that it is the final word in corporate law.  It is the last word in 
 
20 About two-thirds of the Supreme Court’s cases are decided by three-justice pan-
els without oral argument.  Very few corporate cases fall in this category.  For many 
years, some important cases, including corporate cases, were decided by three-justice 
panels after oral argument.  That practice changed during my term—for the better, in 
my view.  The Supreme Court’s 2003 amendments to its Internal Operating Proce-
dures now express an expectation that most cases that meet the criteria for oral argu-
ment (importance, novelty, etc.) will be worthy of being heard en banc ab initio so that 
the court will be heard as speaking with one voice.  The procedure also avoids the inef-
ficiency and expense of two oral arguments if the three-justice panel decides that there 
should be a later, en banc oral argument.  It applies to all “important” cases, not just 
corporate cases.  See DEL. SUP. CT. INTERNAL OPERATING P. V(4) (listing some criteria 
used to decide whether oral argument will be heard in a case); DEL. SUP. CT. INTERNAL 
OPERATING P. VII (“The Motion Justice or the Chief Justice may order any matter 
meeting the criteria for oral argument set forth in IOP V(4) to be determined by the 
Court en Banc upon the briefs or upon oral argument.”). 
21 See E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 1447, 1448-49 (2004) (praising the Court of Chancery). 
22 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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each particular case presented to it, and it sets forth the authoritative 
precedent governing future cases.  Perhaps, however, it is not always 
doctrinally infallible—no court ever is. 
This Article offers some perspective on what has occurred in 
Delaware corporate jurisprudence over the past twelve years, for bet-
ter or for worse.  To turn on its head Mark Antony’s famous speech in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, I come to praise the court, not to bury it.23  
In praising it, however, I will not shy away from mentioning some of 
its doctrinal critics and some valid criticism.  But, as I have said at the 
outset:  (a) one needs to look beyond the universe of Supreme Court 
cases to the larger environment of corporate law and governance; and 
(b) this single Article cannot explore the many doctrinal issues pre-
sented in the cases decided in this twelve-year period.  Whether it is 
because of the inherent complexity of some issues or imprecise articu-
lation in some of the decisions, there are doctrinal anomalies and co-
nundrums that should be explored—if at all—in a full-length book. 
Of course, when critiquing the case law and forming an opinion 
about whether our jurisprudence has set forth the ideal set of stan-
dards of review, or otherwise questioning whether a particular deci-
sion was the “right” one, it is important to bear in mind the doctrine 
of stare decisis.  Over the years, the court has occasionally overruled, 
at least in part, some prior precedent.24  This has happened sometimes 
without explicit reference to the doctrine of stare decisis.  In Account 
v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,25 however, the court in 2001 reaffirmed the basic 
law validating stockholder rights plans (“poison pills”) established in 
 
23 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (“I come to bury Caesar, 
not to praise him.”). 
24 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253-54 (Del. 2000) (holding that the 
Supreme Court undertakes de novo review of a decision of the Court of Chancery dis-
missing a derivative action under Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1, and overruling 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), and its progeny, but only to the extent that 
they express an abuse of discretion scope of review); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983) (holding that minority stockholders’ remedy in a cash-
out merger is appraisal, and overruling Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 
1981), “to the extent that it purports to limit a stockholder’s monetary relief to a spe-
cific damage formula” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 704 (overruling the business 
purpose rule as announced in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and its 
progeny); see also Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Del. 1993) (abrogating the 
doctrine of interspousal immunity as “a relic from the common law that is no longer a 
viable concept and no longer meets the needs of modern society”). 
25 780 A.2d 245 (Del. 2001). 
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Moran v. Household International, Inc.26 in 1985 and did dilate somewhat 
on the doctrine of stare decisis: 
Although this Court has not had occasion in the recent past to elaborate 
on the doctrine of stare decisis, it is well established in Delaware jurispru-
dence.  Once a point of law has been settled by decision of this Court, “it 
forms a precedent which is not afterwards to be departed from or lightly 
overruled or set aside . . . and [it] should be followed except for urgent 
reasons and upon clear manifestation of error.”  The need for stability 
and continuity in the law and respect for court precedent are the princi-
ples upon which the doctrine of stare decisis is founded.  In determining 
whether stare decisis applies, this Court should examine whether there is:  
“a judicial opinion by the [C]ourt, on a point of law, expressed in a final 
decision.”  The doctrine of stare decisis operates to fix a specific legal re-
sult to facts in a pending case based on a judicial precedent directed to 
identical or similar facts in a previous case in the same court or one 
higher in the judicial hierarchy.27 
The importance of stare decisis is further highlighted by the 
Delaware courts’ role in defining the corporation law and in preserv-
ing stability and predictability in corporate jurisprudence.  Courts 
should tread carefully when setting out on a new jurisprudential path 
and should avoid freely overturning precedents once established.  
Thus, academic criticism of a court’s decisions may be more effective 
when tailored toward limiting the reach of decisions instead of calling 
for their overturn the moment they are released from the gate.  The 
2003 case of Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,28 which is discussed 
extensively below,29 offers a good example. 
I.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A.  Models of Corporate Governance 
A review of the law governing corporations should begin with con-
sideration of the policies behind the law as well as certain extralegal 
principles controlling and influencing the actions of corporations and 
their constituents.  What do we mean when we use the term “corpo-
 
26 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
27 Account, 780 A.2d at 248 (alterations in original) (citations omitted); cf. Gannett 
Co. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174, 1181-82 (Del. 2000) (citing with approval the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992), and analogizing that doctrine 
with the law of the case issue presented in Gannett). 
28 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
29 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of Omnicare. 
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rate governance”?  A number of definitions have emerged since that 
term became prominent in the United States during the 1980s.  In its 
broadest sense it is used to define the structure, relationships, norms, 
control mechanisms, and objectives of the corporate enterprise.30  The 
objectives of the firm are to benefit stockholders by attracting capital, 
performing efficiently and profitably, and complying with the law. 
What we are addressing here as corporate law is the law governing 
the internal affairs of corporations—that is, state law, often Delaware 
law.  Corporate law is related to—but is not perfectly coextensive 
with—corporate governance.  Enabling acts, such as the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (DGCL), are part of the corporate law.  
They create only a skeletal framework, however. 
The “flesh and blood” of corporate law is judge-made.  It is the 
common law formulation of principles of fiduciary duties articulated 
on a case-by-case basis.  But, in addition to these fiduciary principles, a 
variety of other norms, expectations, and aspirational standards influ-
ence the structure, relationships, control mechanisms, and objectives 
of corporations. 
At least one respected corporate scholar has observed that Dela-
ware’s common law process, which places case law at the forefront of 
corporate law, is the functional equivalent of judicial legislation.  Pro-
fessor Jill Fisch of Fordham Law School has concluded: 
Although the Delaware statute provides general guidelines about corpo-
rate formalities such as the scheduling of annual meetings and the re-
quired components of a corporate charter, the statute does not deal with 
the fiduciary principles that provide the foundation of corporate law and 
allow, under appropriate circumstances, judicial scrutiny of corporate 
decisionmaking . . . . 
 . . . . 
 
30 Professor Hillary Sale offers one definition: 
The term “corporate governance” is widely used to refer to the balance of 
power between officers, directors, and shareholders.  Academics often discuss 
it in the context of regulating communications and combating agency costs 
where corporate officers and directors have the power to control the com-
pany, but the owners are diverse and largely inactive shareholders.  Good cor-
porate governance, then, allows for a balance between what officers and direc-
tors do and what shareholders desire.  The term implies that managers have 
the proper incentives to work on behalf of shareholders and that shareholders 
are properly informed about the activities of managers. 
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 460 (2004) (footnote 
omitted). 
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 . . . Delaware’s judicial lawmaking . . . has a number of atypical char-
acteristics that cause it to resemble the legislative process.
31
 
 Because Delaware fiduciary duty law is judge-made, it is “far from 
clear and predictable” and therefore “demonstrates a degree of inde-
terminancy,” in Professor Fisch’s words.32  But importantly, any inde-
terminacy found in the fiduciary law does not outweigh the benefits 
produced by judicial lawmaking.  Professor Fisch observes that “Dela-
ware lawmaking offers Delaware corporations a variety of benefits, in-
cluding flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from undue political in-
fluence, and transparency.”33  I agree both that it is indeterminate and 
that this indeterminacy is good. 
In fact, criticism of Delaware fiduciary duty law because it is inde-
terminate is misplaced or disingenuous.  A flexible or indeterminate 
regime, such as we have had in Delaware, is distinct from a rigid codi-
fication system that prevails in many systems outside the United 
States.34  That is part of the genius of our law.35  Life in the boardroom 
is not black and white; directors and officers make decisions in shades 
of gray all the time.  A “clear” law, in the sense of one that is codified, 
is simply not realistic, in my view.  There can be no viable corporate 
 
31 Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1074-75 (2000) (footnotes omitted).  Even if the 
Delaware common law process resembles the legislative process in some ways, the 
Delaware courts do exercise restraint to avoid creating judicial legislation.  See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1385 (Del. 1996) (“If we were to engraft here an excep-
tion to the statutory structure and authority in order to accommodate Williams’ objec-
tion to this result, we would be engaging in impermissible judicial legislation.”); Nixon 
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1377 (Del. 1993) (“If such corporate practices were neces-
sarily to require equal treatment for non-employee stockholders, that would be a mat-
ter for legislative determination in Delaware.  There is no such legislation to that ef-
fect.  If we were to adopt such a rule, our decision would border on judicial 
legislation.”). 
32 Fisch, supra note 31, at 1063.  But see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:  How 
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1997) (arguing that 
“despite the fact-specific, narrative quality of Delaware opinions, over time they yield 
reasonably determinate guidelines”). 
33 Fisch, supra note 31, at 1064. 
34 See E. Norman Veasey, The Judiciary’s Contribution to the Reform of Corporate Govern-
ance, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 225, 239-40 (2004) (comparing the American corporate law 
regime with the systems in the U.K. and the E.U.). 
35 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993) 
(“The genius of American corporate law is in its federalist organization . . . .  Firms . . . 
can particularize their charters under a state code, as well as seek the state whose code 
best matches their needs so as to minimize their cost of doing business.”); E. Norman 
Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 393 
(1997) (“[T]he ‘genius of American corporate law’ is its state-oriented federalism and 
its flexible self-governance . . . .”). 
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governance regime that is founded on a “one size fits all” notion.  Fi-
duciary law is based on equitable principles.  Thus, it is both inher-
ently and usefully indeterminate, because it allows business practices 
and expectations to evolve, and enables courts to review compliance 
with those evolving practices and expectations. 
The judicial articulation of fiduciary duty law in Delaware is con-
stantly evolving and has developed over about eight or nine decades.  
It is the quintessential application of the common law process.36  Di-
rectors are fiduciaries, duty-bound to protect and advance the best in-
terests of the corporation.  When those interests conflict—or may con-
flict—with the personal interests of the fiduciaries, the fiduciaries’ 
interests must be sublimated to those of the corporation.  The evolu-
tion of fiduciary principles occurs not only because courts must decide 
only the cases before them,37 but also because business norms and mo-
res change over time.  Thus, concepts like “good faith” may acquire 
more defined content and doctrinal status over time as cases emerge 
addressing new business dynamics.38 
Delaware’s corporate law—in its judge-made mode—also provides 
advantages over a codified model to both stockholders and managers 
because of its balance and flexibility.  Indeed, Delaware’s emphasis on 
responsible corporate governance practices as a standard of conduct is 
intended to promote good decision making by directors, thereby ob-
viating the specter of judicial second-guessing.  Good governance 
practices permit the time-honored business judgment rule regime to 
operate with integrity by checking self-interest and sloth while permit-
ting valuable and prudent risk taking.  Consequently, there is no dis-
cernible movement in Delaware to develop a codified model, even 
while the Delaware legislature improves and clarifies the DGCL nearly 
every year, with the expert input of the Delaware Bar.39 
 
36 See Randy J. Holland, Law, Politics and the Judiciary:  Statutory Enactments and the 
Common Law, DEL. LAW., Fall 2003, at 22 (describing the relationship and interactive 
development of judicial common law and legislative statutes). 
37 See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 
1994) (“It is the nature of the judicial process that we decide only the case before 
us . . . .”). 
38 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 30 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 14) (“[A] general duty of good faith facilitates 
the development of specific new fiduciary obligations outside the scope of lack of care 
and lack of pecuniary self-interest in response to changing norms, conceptions, and 
practices.”). 
39 See E. Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2002) (discussing the “overarching global debate” over 
whether corporate laws should be mandatory or enabling). 
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Delaware corporate law is characterized by the constant effort not 
only to improve the statutory law but also to improve corporate juris-
prudence.  That effort expressly embraces the need for flexibility and 
stability, without rigidity.40  The goal in Delaware jurisprudence and 
legislation is similar to what the Toyota company has taken as its 
model.  That model is kaizen, which I understand to mean “continu-
ous improvement.”41  Kaizen comes to the fore here not only through 
the continuous improvement in the statutes and the articulation of 
judge-made law but also in the best practices of corporate governance 
that are being implemented every day by the directors and officers 
themselves—often encouraged by court dicta and speeches of judges 
and regulators.42 
In a 1992 speech in Delaware at the celebration of the 200th anni-
versary of the Delaware Court of Chancery, the Chief Justice of the 
United States, William H. Rehnquist, commented on the success of 
Delaware courts in crafting good corporate law: 
 Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the expertise 
of the Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the century, it has 
handed down thousands of opinions interpreting virtually every provi-
sion of Delaware’s corporate law statute.  No other state court can make 
such a claim.  As one scholar has observed, “[t]he economies of scale 
created by the high volume of corporate litigation in Delaware contrib-
ute to an efficient and expert court system and bar.”
43
 
As I see it, there are seven normal expectations that a stockholder 
should have of a board of directors.  Although others may apply in 
some situations, the stockholders expect at least that (i) the stock-
 
40 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1385 n.36 (Del. 1996) (“Directors and in-
vestors must be able to rely on the stability and absence of judicial interference with 
the State’s statutory prescriptions.”). 
41 See John Gapper, The Straight Route to Success, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at 17 
(defining kaizen and describing its importance to Toyota’s innovation). 
42 See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of Corporate Governance Issues, 
Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1014 (2003) (“Although, as judges, we give speeches and write articles 
raising academic issues and exhorting directors to adopt best practices, we do not 
reach out and make ex cathedra pronouncements on reformulating our jurisprudence 
or forecasting how certain fact situations should be decided.”); Thomas A. Roberts et 
al., Director Liability Warnings from Delaware, BUS. & SEC. LITIGATOR, Feb. 2003, at 1, 
available at http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/BSLFeb03/$file/ 
BSLFeb03.pdf (citing judicial speeches as signaling the court’s focus on corporate gov-
ernance issues). 
43 William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-
Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) (alteration in 
original). 
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holders will have a right to cast a meaningful vote for the members of 
the board of directors and have a right to vote on fundamental struc-
tural changes, such as mergers; (ii) the board of directors will actually 
direct and monitor the management of the company, including strate-
gic business plans and fundamental structural changes; (iii) the board 
will see to the hiring of competent and honest business managers; (iv) 
the board will understand the business of the firm and develop and 
monitor a business plan and will monitor the managers as they carry 
out the business plan and the operations of the company; (v) when 
making a business decision, the board will develop a reasonable un-
derstanding of the transaction and act in good faith, on an informed 
basis, and with a rational business purpose; (vi) the board will carry 
out its basic fiduciary duties with honesty, care, good faith, and loyalty; 
and (vii) the board will take good faith steps to make sure the com-
pany complies with the law. 
Stockholders also have expectations of the courts that are oversee-
ing the stockholders’ expectations of the board.  Stockholders look to 
courts to enforce fiduciary duties in highly textured fact situations by 
applying the general principles that underlie the relationship between 
the investors and the board of directors. 
As I see it, the courts have at least seven key obligations.  They are 
(i) be clear; (ii) be prompt; (iii) be balanced; (iv) have a coherent ra-
tionale; (v) render decisions that are stable in the overall continuum; 
(vi) be intellectually honest; and (vii) properly limit the function of 
the court. 
Stability, the fifth obligation stated above, is a stated goal of Dela-
ware Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In the 1996 case of Williams v. 
Geier, for example, the court stated: 
 In addition to the specter of impermissible judicial legislation, the re-
lief requested by [the stockholder-plaintiff], if granted, would introduce 
an undesirable degree of uncertainty into the corporation law.  Directors 
and investors must be able to rely on the stability and absence of judicial 
interference with the State’s statutory prescriptions . . . . [A]bsent a 
showing of inequitable conduct on the part of the board, compliance 
with the applicable corporate governance regime (be it statute or bylaw) 
will generally shield corporate action from judicial interference.
44
 
 
44 671 A.2d at 1385 n.36 (citations omitted); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 
1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993) (arguing that predictable decisions are required for fair 
contract enforcement); Am. Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 693 
(Del. 1957) (warning that undue court interference would “import serious confusion 
and uncertainty into corporate procedure”). 
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Note, however, the venerable Delaware jurisprudential doctrine 
that conduct that may be legally authorized may nevertheless be ac-
tionable as inequitable.45 
The tension between deference to director flexibility in decision 
making and the need for judicial oversight is often a defining ten-
sion.46  The complexity of the issues and the variety of highly textured 
fact situations require a delicate balance in fiduciary duty jurispru-
dence.47 
B.  Standards of Conduct 
As Professor Mel Eisenberg has written,48 and as the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act (MBCA) reflects,49 standards of conduct are dis-
tinct from standards of review.  Standards of conduct include conduct 
that is required of directors and aspirations for what is expected of di-
rectors.50  Standards of review, on the other hand, govern whether di-
rectors will be held liable or a transaction set aside as a result of par-
ticular action or inaction.51  This distinction is implied in Delaware 
jurisprudence and it is developed in speeches and articles,52 but is not 
 
45 See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) 
(“[I]nequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possi-
ble.”); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004) (same, quot-
ing Schnell). 
46 See Veasey, supra note 35, at 402 (describing the role of independent decision 
making and judicial oversight in corporate governance). 
47 E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 682, 694-95 (1998). 
48 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review 
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
49 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (MBCA) §§ 8.30-31 (2002). 
50 See Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 437 (“A standard of conduct states how an actor 
should conduct a given activity or play a given role.”).  In the context of professional 
counseling of boards of directors, I have found the 2004 version of the Corporate Direc-
tor’s Guidebook to be a very helpful framework in the quest for best practices.  ABA 
COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (4th ed. 2004).  
The Guidebook was produced by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American 
Bar Association’s Section of Business Law, which I am now privileged to chair. 
51 See Eisenberg, supra note 48, at 437 (“A standard of review states the test a court 
should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liabil-
ity or grant injunctive relief.”); Veasey, supra note 21, at 1453 n.29 (noting the distinc-
tion between standards of conduct and standards of review). 
52 Former Chancellor William Allen, Justice (then-Vice Chancellor) Jack Jacobs, 
and Vice Chancellor Leo Strine have ventured another useful definition: 
A judicial standard of review is a value-laden analytical instrument that reflects 
fundamental policy judgments.  In corporate law, a judicial standard of review 
is a verbal expression that describes the task a court performs in determining 
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well developed in the cases.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the standard 
of review is not perfectly coextensive with the standard of conduct. 
When considering standards of conduct one begins with the du-
ties and responsibilities of directors.  Directors must direct the man-
agement of the corporation.  They also have a vital oversight role in 
monitoring management without micromanaging operations.  They 
must carry out their responsibilities in accordance with principles of 
fiduciary duty.  Although the business judgment rule is a standard of 
review, these duties are embodied in the rule itself.  That is, directors 
are expected to act—indeed are presumed to act, unless the presump-
tion is rebutted—“on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”53 
Although Delaware is not a Model Act state, it is sometimes help-
ful to learn from the articulation of the corporate law in the MBCA.  
The MBCA is followed in varying forms by a majority of states, and it is 
kept up to date by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of 
Business Law of the American Bar Association.54  Section 8.30 of the 
MBCA articulates the standards of conduct for directors in a manner 
that I believe is generally consistent with Delaware jurisprudence.55  
 
whether action by corporate directors violated their fiduciary duty.  Thus, in 
essential respects, the standard of review defines the freedom of action (or, if 
you will, deference in the form of freedom from intrusion) that will be ac-
corded to the persons who are subject to its reach. 
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form:  A Reassessment 
of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1295 (2001); see 
also id. (“There exists a close, but not perfect, relationship, between the standard by 
which courts measure director liability (the ‘standard of review’) and the standard of 
behavior that we normatively expect of directors (the ‘standard of conduct’).”). 
53 This quotation is taken from the oft-quoted 1984 Supreme Court decision in 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  Whether good faith is a stand-alone 
fiduciary duty—along with the duties of care and loyalty—is a point of some debate.  
This point will be developed later in this Article, see infra Part II. 
54 Introduction to MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., at xxvii (1998); see also ABA Comm. 
on Corp. Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments Relat-
ing to Chapters 1, 7, and 8, 60 BUS. LAW. 341, 341 (2004) (proposing amendments to the 
MBCA). 
55 It provides in subsections (a) and (b) as follows: 
§ 8.30.  STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR DIRECTORS 
(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a 
director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasona-
bly believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
(b) The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when 
becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or de-
voting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with 
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When discharging their duties, directors shall properly inform them-
selves and act in good faith.  In Aronson, the court stated: 
 [Additionally], to invoke the rule’s protection directors have a duty 
to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material 
information reasonably available to them.  Having become so informed, 
they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.  
While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable 
standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judg-
ment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negli-
gence.
56
 
The basic responsibilities of the board of directors stem from the 
operative Delaware statute, which requires that “the business and af-
fairs of . . . [the] corporation . . . be managed by or under the direc-
tion of the board of directors.”57  The noun “direction,” like the verb 
“to direct,” is defined in the dictionary as a proactive concept, impli-
cating strategic control and goal orientation.  The very plain and 
forceful dictionary meaning of the noun “direction” is “guidance or 
supervision of action, conduct, or operations, . . . something that is 
imposed as authoritative instruction or bidding . . . an explicit instruc-
tion.”58  The meaning of the verb “to direct” is equally clear: 
[T]o cause to turn, move, or point undeviatingly or to follow a straight 
course with a particular destination or object in view; to dispatch, aim, or 
guide [usually] along a fixed path . . . to show or point out the way . . . to 
regulate the activities or course of . . . to guide and supervise . . . to carry 
 
the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate 
under similar circumstances. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (emphasis added).  Note that Delaware does not 
use the “reasonably believes” test.  Rather, Delaware case law rests on the test of “hon-
estly believes.”  There is a difference.  Compare E. Norman Veasey & William E. Man-
ning, Codified Standard—Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef?  An Analysis of the Model Act Stan-
dard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 919, 930-42 (1980) (comparing 
the MBCA’s reasonableness test with the rationality test under Delaware law), with S. 
Samuel Arsht & Joseph Hinsey IV, Codified Standard—Same Harbor but Charted Channel:  
A Response, 35 BUS. LAW. 947 (1980) (arguing that the reasonableness standard would 
not alter the business judgment rule).  Consider also section 4.01 of the ALI’s Principles 
of Corporate Governance, which states a “rationally believes” test.  Subsection (b) of sec-
tion 8.30 of the MBCA, in describing the duty of care, is an echo of a similar phrase in 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), that “directors of a 
corporation . . . are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and 
prudent [persons] would use in similar circumstances.”  Additionally, subsections (c), 
(d), and (e) of section 8.30 of the MBCA are reliance sections, consistent with title 8, 
section 141(e) of the Delaware Code. 
56 473 A.2d at 812 (footnote omitted). 
57 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
58 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 650 (3d ed. 2002). 
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out the organizing, energizing, and supervising of [especially] in an au-
thoritative capacity . . . .59 
The root “direct” in this statutory mandate has two components:  
(1) to determine policy in their decision making function and (2) to 
guide and supervise in the oversight function.  Thus, directors are not 
merely the group that hires and fires the CEO and is expected simply 
to advise management.  They must be proactive in directing the man-
agement. 
The marketplace is developing the expectation—that is, an extrale-
gal standard of conduct—that directors will engage in best practices.  
This expectation is, for now, primarily an aspirational standard of con-
duct.  Failure to adhere to the standard of conduct reflected in the as-
pirational standards of best practices may not necessarily result in liabil-
ity, as the Delaware Supreme Court made clear in Brehm v. Eisner :60 
 This is a case about whether there should be personal liability of the 
directors of a Delaware corporation to the corporation for lack of due 
care in the decisionmaking process and for waste of corporate assets.  
This case is not about the failure of the directors to establish and carry 
out ideal corporate governance practices. 
 All good corporate governance practices include compliance with 
statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties.  But the law of 
corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of those duties are 
distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance prac-
tices.  Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for 
boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal requirements of 
the corporation law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit stock-
holders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid 
liability.  But they are not required by the corporation law and do not 
define standards of liability. 
61
 
The interesting conundrum, going forward, is whether or not cer-
tain aspirations of best practices will become the norm.  If they do, it 
will become necessary to consider the extent to which the failure to 
adhere to certain norms will become liability-producing acts or omis-
sions.62 
I would note, as a matter of prudent counseling, that it is argu-
able—but not settled—that board conduct may be measured not only 
by the evolving expectations of directors in the context of Delaware 
 
59 Id. 
60 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
61 Id. at 255-56. 
62 See infra Part I.D. 
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common law fiduciary duty, but also by other standards.  The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act,63 the Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), and the listing requirements of self regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs) such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) may 
become relevant in state courts.  Even though there is no express pri-
vate right of action in the federal legislation or the SRO requirements, 
when and if these reforms are presented in a Delaware court as gov-
erning a board’s conduct, adherence to these reforms may be rele-
vant.  Thus, adherence to these requirements would be advisable as a 
best practice, whether or not expressly required as a matter of state 
fiduciary duty law.  Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine 
have, in fact, written an article suggesting, in part, that state courts, 
particularly Delaware courts, may be seeing Sarbanes-Oxley and other 
“2002 Reforms” issues.64 
C.  Standards of Review 
The standards of review determine whether a director may be 
held liable or a transaction set aside when the standards of conduct 
are not met.65  We begin with the business judgment rule. 
 
63 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
64 William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System:  Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 957 (2003). 
65 In fact, section 8.31 of the MBCA sets forth the standards of liability under that 
act, which has been adopted by a majority of states.  While the MBCA does not apply in 
Delaware, this provision is a helpful reference.  It provides, in pertinent part: 
§ 8.31 STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS 
(a)  A director shall not be liable . . . unless the party asserting liability in a 
proceeding establishes that: 
 . . . . 
 (2) the challenged conduct consisted or was the result of: 
  (i) action not in good faith; or 
  (ii) a decision 
   (A) which the director did not reasonably believe to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, or 
   (B) as to which the director was not informed to an extent the di-
rector reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances; or 
  (iii) a lack of objectivity due to the director’s familial, financial or busi-
ness relationship with, or a lack of independence due to the director’s 
domination or control by, another person having a material interest in 
the challenged conduct. 
   . . . . 
  (iv) a sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing 
oversight of the business and affairs of the corporation . . . 
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1.  The Business Judgment Rule 
The conduct of directors of Delaware corporations in their deci-
sion making role continues to be reviewed under the business judg-
ment rule, which is alive and well in Delaware corporate jurispru-
dence.  Because of the mandate that directors manage or direct the 
management of the business and affairs of the corporation, the focus 
of the business judgment rule remains on the process that directors 
use in reaching their decisions.66  The business judgment rule will 
normally protect the decisions of a board of directors reached by a 
careful, good faith process.67  The rule itself has been restated numer-
ous times.  In Brehm v. Eisner the Supreme Court provided the follow-
ing formulation: 
 The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and 
other cases.  See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“It is a presumption that 
in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed ba-
sis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
 
  (v) receipt of a financial benefit to which the director was not entitled 
or any other breach of the director’s duties to deal fairly with the cor-
poration and its shareholders that is actionable under applicable law. 
(b) The party seeking to hold the director liable: 
 (1) for money damages, shall also have the burden of establishing that: 
  (i) harm to the corporation or its shareholders has been suffered, and 
  (ii) the harm suffered was proximately caused by the director’s chal-
lenged conduct . . . . 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31.   
66 See, e.g., R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment 
Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1344 (1993).  Balotti and Hanks point out: 
It is in the effort to impose liability for decisions—as opposed to process—that 
plaintiffs’ efforts to hold directors liable for money damages have encoun-
tered the greatest difficulty . . . . A different rubric, however, should be em-
ployed to determine whether to impose liability for a judgment that later 
turns out to be erroneous than for an act that was not performed properly.  
Thus, the deference given to the judgments of the directors—i.e., the substan-
tive aspect of the business judgment rule—prohibits courts from overturning 
judgments of the directors. 
Id. 
67 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (explaining the defer-
ence courts give a director’s decision).  In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., the court ex-
plained: 
The business judgment rule is a presumption that directors are acting inde-
pendently, in good faith and with due care in making a business decision.  It 
applies when that decision is questioned and the analysis is primarily a process 
inquiry.  Courts give deference to directors’ decisions reached by a proper 
process, and do not apply an objective reasonableness test in such a case to 
examine the wisdom of the decision itself. 
695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) (footnotes omitted). 
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best interests of the corporation.”).  Thus, directors’ decisions will be re-
spected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independ-
ence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner 
that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their 
decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to con-
sider all material facts reasonably available.
68
 
In a recent article, Professor Stephen Bainbridge speaks favorably of 
the foregoing articulation of the rule and equates the business judg-
ment rule to a species of abstention doctrine.69 
This approach is consistent with the Delaware doctrine that the 
rule is a presumption that courts will not interfere with, or second-
guess, decision making by directors.  This is true unless the presump-
tion is rebutted or unless a more exacting standard of review, such as 
entire fairness, applies because of the nature of the transaction before 
the court.70  The business judgment rule applies not only to protect 
the decision (transactional justification) but also to protect directors 
from personal liability.  Sometimes the standard of review for transac-
tional justification purposes may diverge from the standard of review 
for personal liability purposes.  For example, when the business judg-
ment rule does not apply to protect directors because they did not act 
on an informed basis, they may be protected by a provision in the 
corporate charter exonerating them from liability,71 while the transac-
tion they approved may nevertheless be set aside due to their violation 
of the duty of care. 
The business judgment rule functions to protect the policies un-
derlying corporate law, including maximization of stockholder value.  
Stockholders benefit from a profitable company—one that can attract 
capital and one that has ever-expanding earnings and earning poten-
tial.  Stockholders expect a board that is not risk averse.  They also 
want a board that knows the business, and is smart, honest, and hard-
working.  Probably (and usually), they want a good percentage of the 
board to be independent. 
It is very much in the stockholders’ interest that the law not en-
courage directors to be risk averse.  Some opportunities offer the 
prospect of great profit at the risk of very substantial loss, while the al-
 
68 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66. 
69 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 91 n.45 (2004) (noting that in Brehm the “Delaware Supreme Court 
articulated a strongly abstention-oriented version of the business judgment rule”). 
70 See infra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of standard of review issues. 
71 For discussion of Delaware General Corporation Law section 102(b)(7) provi-
sions and their implications, see infra Part I.C.2.c. 
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ternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit.  A diversi-
fied investor often is willing to invest in seemingly risky alternatives 
that may result in loss because, for example, the losses in some stocks 
will, over time, be offset by even greater gains in others or be amelio-
rated by the stability of debt instruments. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Dan Fischel, two brilliant 
theorists of the Chicago school of thought, have captured well the pol-
icy rationale that supports the notion that courts must continually 
strive to stay out of business decisions and to keep the business judg-
ment rule alive and well, as I believe the Delaware courts have done.  
Consider the following passages: 
 Behind the business judgment rule lies recognition that investors’ 
wealth would be lower if managers’ decisions were routinely subjected to 
strict judicial review. 
 . . . . 
 . . . How can the court know whether a poor outcome of a business 
decision is attributable to poor management (inputs) or to the many 
other things that affect firms? 
 A decision is good to the extent it has a high expected value, although 
it may also have a high variance.  To observe that things turned out 
poorly ex post, perhaps because of competitors’ reactions, or regulations, 
or changes in interest rates, or consumers’ fickleness, is not to know that 
the decision was wrong ex ante.  Only after learning all of the possible 
outcomes, and the probability attached to each, could the court deter-
mine the wisdom of the decision at the time it was made.  Occasionally 
the decision will be a howler, making inquiry easy.  More often it will be 
hard to reconstruct possible outcomes.  Businesses rarely encounter 
“sure things.”  Often managers must act now and learn later; delay for 
more study may be the worst decision; the market will decide whether the 
decision was good.  Competition pares away the unsuccessful choices.  
Only in retrospect, observing which decisions were fruitful and which 
were not, can we say which was best.  Yet because failure does not show 
that the decision was inferior when made, a court lacks the information 
to decide. 
 Costs of decision ex post will be highest precisely when it was also most 
difficult to contract ex ante.  So when claims are made on the basis of the 
fiduciary principle—as opposed to a specific contract—courts are likely 
to lack essential tools of decision.  This means that ex post settling up in 
markets has a comparative advantage over courts at enforcing the fiduci-
ary principle except in the case of startling gaffes and large, one-shot, self-
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interested transactions.  It should be no surprise, then, to learn that the 
business judgment rule confines courts to exactly these rare cases.
72
 
Substantial academic literature has discussed the concept of 
“hindsight bias,” the human tendency to view decisions as having been 
obviously poor ones after having learned that the outcome was poor.73  
Hindsight bias is a hot topic in behavioral law and economics, as well 
as in the empirical work of certain psychologists and sociologists.  Psy-
chological research on hindsight bias strongly suggests the wisdom of 
the traditional Delaware approach, with its emphasis on protecting 
the substance of business judgments from after-the-fact scrutiny and 
condemnation, while allowing critiques based on disloyalty, lack of 
adequate process, and the like.74  There is also some risk that hind-
sight bias will color our assessments of what an acceptably good proc-
ess would have been or would have produced.  Fortunately, this risk is 
mitigated in Delaware by the reality that certain kinds of processes—
like use of special committees of independent directors who clearly 
have exclusive power to hire relevant advisors—can become custom-
ary and easily imitated, once they are widely thought to be good.  This 
problem sometimes arises (or is perceived to arise) under some of the 
federal securities laws.  Witness the pressure on the WorldCom and 
Enron directors to contribute part of the proposed settlements from 
their own personal assets.75  To be sure, these cases are aberrations.  
Nevertheless, directors should take heed of them, but not panic. 
Investor interests will be advanced if corporate directors and man-
agers honestly assess risk and reward, cost and benefit.  In their strate-
gic vision, directors should pursue with integrity the highest available 
risk-adjusted returns that exceed the corporation’s cost of capital. 
 
72 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 93, 98-99 (1991). 
73 See, e.g., DAVID G. MYERS, INTUITION:  ITS POWERS AND PERILS 89-93 (2002) (in-
troducing the phenomenon of hindsight bias). 
74 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 574 (1998) (observing that the law “must tolerate biased assess-
ments of liability or create some form of immunity for potential defendants,” and dis-
cussing the business judgment rule as an example). 
75 E. Norman Veasey, A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors, DIRECTORS 
MONTHLY, Feb. 2005, at 1.  But cf. In re Worldcom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1805, at *32-33, *49-51 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2005) (rejecting pro-
posed settlement by proportionately liable defendants while deep-pocket, jointly and 
severally liable defendants remain in the case; and suggesting that this result likely 
gives less protection for outside directors than was intended by the drafters of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). 
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But directors may tend to be risk averse if they must assume a sub-
stantial degree of exposure to personal risk relating to ex post claims 
of liability for any resulting corporate loss occasioned by a business 
decision gone bad.  They need not worry under Delaware law about 
mistakes of judgment—even “stupid” ones.  They should not worry 
about liability if they exercise loyalty to the good faith pursuit of the 
best interests of the corporation. 
Certain cases have given some pause to directors, practitioners, 
and academics, however.  For example, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc.,76 the plaintiffs challenged a cash-out merger on grounds of fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty, among other things.77  The Court of 
Chancery had held that the directors could not be liable for a breach 
of the duty of care unless the plaintiffs could prove that the corpora-
tion was harmed by the directors’ lack of care.78  That is, Chancellor 
Allen assumed for purposes of his decision that the directors had 
breached their duty of care,79 but also applied a “no harm, no foul” 
type of analysis.  He reasoned that there should not be liability unless 
the wrong caused an injury, which he apparently concluded it had 
not.80 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the directors had 
breached their duty of care and that the transaction, therefore, was 
subject to entire fairness review.81  The court observed that “[t]o re-
quire proof of injury as a component of the proof necessary to rebut 
the business judgment presumption would be to convert the burden 
shifting process from a threshold determination of the appropriate 
 
76 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
77 Id. at 349. 
78 See id. at 350-51 (“The Chancellor has erroneously imposed on Cinerama, for 
purposes of rebutting the rule, a burden of proof of board lack of due care which is 
unprecedented.”). 
79 Specifically, Chancellor Allen “entertain[ed] grave doubts” about whether the 
directors had met their duty of care, but he concluded that he need not decide the 
issue.  Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *8-9 
(Del. Ch. June 21, 1991). 
80 See id. at *56-57 (“[I]n an arm’s-length, third party merger proof of a breach of 
the board’s duty of due care [does not] itself entitle[] plaintiff to judgment.  Rather, in 
such a case . . . plaintiff bears the burden to establish that the negligence shown was 
the proximate cause of some injury to it . . . .”).  Chancellor Allen cited Learned 
Hand’s venerable decision in Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).  The Dela-
ware Supreme Court concluded that Barnes was inapposite.  See Cede, 634 A.2d at 370 
(stating that “[w]hile Barnes may still be ‘good law,’ Barnes, a tort action, does not con-
trol a claim for breach of fiduciary duty . . . [t]he tort principles of Barnes have no 
place in a business judgment rule standard of review analysis”). 
81 Cede, 634 A.2d at 367. 
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standard of review to a dispositive adjudication on the merits.”82  The 
court held that a “breach of the duty of care, without any requirement 
of proof of injury, is sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule”83 
and remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for review of the 
challenged transaction under the entire fairness standard.84 
Commentators have criticized this decision (sometimes called Cede 
and sometimes called Technicolor) on a number of points.  Professor 
Lyman Johnson has stated that it conflates the duty of care (a standard 
of conduct) and the judicial determination whether directors will be li-
able for that breach (a standard of review).85  He has also suggested 
that Cede’s holding that the entire fairness standard applies when the 
business judgment rule is rebutted by directors’ breach of the duty of 
care was unprecedented.86  Indeed, before the Cede decision entire 
fairness had not seemed to be the most fitting vehicle for addressing a 
breach of the duty of care.  Entire fairness, which incorporates ele-
ments of fair dealing and fair price, is traditionally tied to situations 
involving self-dealing—in other words, loyalty cases.87 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has suggested that this decision in-
jects a more substantive component into the business judgment rule, 
moving the rule away from its traditional role as a doctrine of judicial 
 
82 Id. at 371. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
787, 803 (1999) (“The Cede court not only rhetorically subsumed care (a pervasive duty) 
under the business judgment rule (a specialized judicial review policy), but also wrongly 
correlated the duty of due care with the informedness element of the business judgment 
rule.”). 
86 See id. at 799 (“[N]one of the authority cited in [Cede] supports the novel propo-
sition that, in a duty of care case, a director must carry the burden of proving the en-
tire fairness of a challenged transaction.  The court is far too careless and cavalier 
about this vital point.” (footnote omitted)). 
87 Bud Roth explains: 
Entire fairness review is a doctrine historically used to scrutinize a transaction 
in which a member of the board (or other fiduciary) has a conflict of interest.  
Such claims normally involve accusations that a director engaged in self-
dealing or personally profited from a transaction in a manner not shared with 
shareholders generally.  Never before Technicolor had the Supreme Court em-
ployed the entire fairness standard of review to examine a transaction that the 
trial court had expressly found was approved in good faith and untainted by 
self-dealing. 
Bud Roth, Entire Fairness Review for a “Pure” Breach of the Duty of Care:  Sensible Approach or 
Technicolor Flop?, 3 DEL. L. REV. 145, 161 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
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abstention.88  His analysis is based, in part, on the court’s conclusion 
that “Cinerama clearly met its burden of proof for the purpose of re-
butting the rule’s presumption by showing that the defendant direc-
tors of Technicolor failed to inform themselves fully concerning all 
material information reasonably available prior to approving the 
merger agreement.”89  Bainbridge observes: 
 In so holding, the Supreme Court effectively rejected any conception 
of the business judgment rule as a doctrine of judicial abstention.  The 
analysis began innocuously enough, with a fairly standard statement of 
the board of directors’ authority to manage the business and affairs of 
the corporation.  The court immediately went off the rails, however, by 
describing the business judgment rule as being intended “to preclude a 
court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a 
corporation.”  Contrast that formulation to Van Gorkom’s statement that 
the rule is intended to “protect and promote the full and free exercise of 
the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”  The contrast be-
tween these formulations is quite striking, with more than semantic im-
plications.  Technicolor’s formulation suggests far less judicial deference 
to the board tha[n] does that of Van Gorkom. 
 To be sure, the Technicolor court described the business judgment 
rule as “a powerful presumption” against judicial interference with board 
decision making.  Immediately thereafter, however, the court proceeded 
to eviscerate that presumption: 
Thus, a shareholder plaintiff challenging a board decision has the 
burden at the outset to rebut the rule’s presumption.  To rebut the 
rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evi-
dence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, 
breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, 
loyalty or due care.  If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evi-
dentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to protect 
corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make, and 
our courts will not second-guess these business judgments.  If the 
rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the 
proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of 
fact the “entire fairness” of the transaction to the shareholder plain-
tiff. 
 Notice how the court puts the cart before the horse.  Directors who 
violate their duty of care do not get the protections of the business 
judgment rule; indeed, the rule is rebutted by a showing that the direc-
 
88 See Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 87 (“[Cede] illustrates the modern trend to-
wards treating the business judgment rule as a substantive doctrine, expressing the 
scope of director liability, and permitting courts some room to examine the substantive 
merits of the board’s decision.”). 
89 Cede, 634 A.2d at 371. 
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tors violated their fiduciary duty of “due care.”  This is exactly backwards.  
As we shall see, the abstention doctrine approach to the rule prevents 
plaintiff[s] from litigating that very issue.  Put another way, the whole 
point of the business judgment rule is to prevent courts from even ask-
ing the question:  did the board breach its duty of care?
90
 
The Cede v. Technicolor decision, though anomalous doctrinally, 
may not make a big practical difference, because personal liability of 
directors solely for due care violations has largely become moot by 
reason of section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL.91 
2.  Other Standard of Review Issues 
a.  Levels of scrutiny 
The standards of review include various gradations of judicial 
scrutiny.  If the business judgment rule applies, courts will not second-
guess directors or even question whether a business decision is “rea-
sonable.”  But the takeover era of the 1980s, culminating in the water-
shed year of 1985, led to more and increasingly complicated standards 
of review.  For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has set forth 
differing review mechanisms to be applied in various contexts.  The 
various forms of enhanced scrutiny range from testing the reason-
ableness and proportionality of the directors’ resistance to a takeover 
under the Unocal 92 standard, to the “entire fairness” test under Wein-
berger,93 to the “best price on sale of control” standard under Revlon94 
and QVC,95 to the “compelling justification” standard for interference 
with a stockholder vote under Blasius96 and Liquid Audio.97 
 
90 Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 93-95 (footnotes omitted). 
91 See infra Part I.C.2.c.  The conduct at issue in the Cede case took place in 1982–
1983, before the 1986 enactment of section 102(b)(7). 
92 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985); see also 
Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 (Del. 1995).  The Unitrin gloss on 
Unocal is discussed infra Part III.A. 
93 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (holding that in a 
transaction involving conflicted insiders, those who are conflicted have the burden to 
satisfy the court that the transaction is entirely fair to stockholders or the corporation, 
both as to fair price and fair process). 
94 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1985). 
95 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 
1994). 
96 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
97 MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1128 (Del. 2003). 
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This phenomenon has been criticized by some scholars as creating 
a regime that is too complex.98  It is not practicable in this Article to 
analyze, rationalize, or offer a restatement of these complex levels of 
review.  That job would, indeed, need to be a complete article itself or 
part of a book. 
b.  Vicinity of insolvency 
There is a very challenging issue of whether (and to what extent) 
directors, in making their business decisions when the corporation is 
in the vicinity of insolvency, may be required to consider the interests 
of creditors—a different constituency from that to which their duties 
normally extend, namely stockholders.99  In his opinion in Credit Lyon-
nais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,100 then-
Chancellor Allen stated that “[a]t least where a corporation is operat-
ing in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the 
agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate 
enterprise.”101  The Chancellor then provided, in his famous footnote 
fifty-five, an example of how the possibility of insolvency can alter the 
incentives facing directors in their decision making processes.102  Thus, 
 
98 See Allen et al., supra note 52, at 1292-93, 1317-21 (criticizing the increasing 
number of standards of review in Delaware corporate law, and suggesting a mid-course 
correction that would leave only three standards of review).  But cf. Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor:  
A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1594 (1994) 
(analyzing QVC and Technicolor “as part of a movement in Delaware fiduciary law to-
ward a single, more unified standard, and away from doctrinal fragmentation”). 
99 Cf. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (stating that, when evaluating a takeover bid, the 
board may consider the bid’s “effect on the corporate enterprise,” including “the im-
pact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders”). 
100 No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
101 Id. at *108.  But in Adlerstein v. Wertheimer the court said: 
 While it is true that a board of directors of an insolvent corporation or one 
operating in the vicinity of insolvency has fiduciary duties to creditors and 
others as well as to its stockholders, it is not true that our law countenances, 
permits, or requires directors to conduct the affairs of an insolvent corpora-
tion in a manner that is inconsistent with principles of fairness or in breach of 
duties owed to the stockholders. 
No. 19101, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 13, at *35 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002) (footnote omitted). 
102 In that footnote, Chancellor Allen stated: 
The directors will recognize that in managing the business affairs of a solvent 
corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the 
right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may 
diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the em-
ployees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if 
given the opportunity to act. 
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when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency—whatever that is—
creditors may be considered to be in the pool of residual owners, and 
therefore become beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties owed to the re-
sidual owners.  Creditors’ inclusion in the pool need not imply that 
stockholders are thereby excluded, however.  Directors will normally 
have discretion to exercise their business judgment, provided they do 
so in good faith. 
The key here is that directors, in these and all circumstances, must 
act in the honest belief that they are carrying out the best interests of 
the corporate entity.103  In a recent Chancery decision, Production Re-
sources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc.,104 a creditor of NCT Group 
sought to have a receiver appointed for NCT under title 8, section 291 
of the Delaware Code, and also alleged certain breaches of fiduciary 
duty.105  The Court of Chancery largely denied a motion to dismiss the 
action, allowing the section 291 claims and some of the fiduciary duty 
claims to proceed.  In his decision, Vice Chancellor Strine stated that 
the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded: 
a suspicious pattern of dealing that raises the legitimate concern that the 
NCT board is not pursuing the best interests of NCT’s creditors as a class with 
claims on a pool of insufficient assets, but engaging in preferential treatment 
of the company’s primary creditor and de facto controlling stockholder 
(and perhaps of its top officers, who are also directors) without any le-
gitimate basis for the favoritism.
106
 
I cite Production Resources not because it announces anything new.  
Rather, it reaffirms what, in my view, has always been the law—that di-
rectors who make good faith, careful judgments in the honest belief 
that they are acting in the best interests of the corporation should not 
fear liability.107 
 
Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55. 
103 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that 
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed ba-
sis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.”), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000). 
104 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
105 Id. at 775. 
106 Id. at 800 (emphasis added). 
107 A memo from the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz supports this posi-
tion, stating: 
  In a welcome note of reassurance to directors of financially troubled com-
panies, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that director exculpation 
charter provisions adopted under Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) protect directors 
from due care/mismanagement claims brought by creditors who are accorded 
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As noted, the business judgment rule protects directors who, 
among other things, make decisions in the honest belief that they are 
acting in the best interests of the corporation.  This may mean that 
the directors’ judgment could shade toward rights of creditors if that 
course of action comports with the best interests of the corporate en-
tity.  Thus, it is important to keep in mind the precise content of this 
“best interests” concept—that is, to whom this duty is owed and when.  
Naturally, one often thinks that directors owe this duty to both the 
corporation and the stockholders.  That formulation is harmless in 
most instances because of the confluence of interests, in that what is 
good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively good for the 
stockholders.108  There are times, of course, when the focus is directly 
on the interests of stockholders.109  But, in general, the directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to the stockholders.  This pro-
vides a doctrinal solution to the incentive problem that is entirely con-
sistent with the emphasis on board governance, namely, that the 
board’s duty is to do what is best for the corporation.  This means 
that, as the corporation slides toward insolvency, the benefits of 
maximizing the value of the corporation will shift from stockholders 
to creditors, but, on this view, the duties of the board remain the 
same.  The obvious tension between the interests of creditors and 
those of stockholders is palpable and a vexing challenge for directors. 
 
standing to pursue fiduciary duty claims when the firm is insolvent.  More 
broadly, the opinion is an important dilation on the same court’s often-cited 
1991 decision in Credit Lyonnais addressing the degree of discretion afforded 
directors when the firm is in the “zone of insolvency,” and makes clear that 
there is no “new body of creditor’s rights law.” 
 . . . . 
 . . . Directors’ choices remain difficult ones, but under Production Resources it 
is clear that those choices, if made in the good faith exercise of business 
judgment as to the best interest of the firm itself, ought not give rise to any 
threat of personal liability at the behest of either stockholders or creditors. 
Memorandum from Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Delaware Speaks to Directors of Trou-
bled Companies (Dec. 1, 2004) (on file with author) (citation omitted). 
108 But cf. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 
2004) (explaining that the distinction between a direct and a derivative action turns on 
whether the corporation or the individual stockholders suffered the harm, thus ac-
knowledging that stockholders may suffer harms not affecting the corporation, or vice 
versa). 
109 See, for example, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 
34 (Del. 1994), and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1985), which teach that when there is a sale of control, the directors must seek to 
attain the best transaction reasonably available for the stockholders because the stock-
holders are leaving the old corporate entity to the control of others. 
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The Delaware Supreme Court has never directly addressed the vi-
cinity of insolvency issue, although one case involving the issue was 
appealed to the court in 2000.110  The court affirmed the case on the 
basis of the Court of Chancery’s opinion and expressly stated that it 
did not reach the issue of “whether or to what extent directors of a 
corporation said to be in the so-called ‘vicinity of insolvency’ owe fi-
duciary duties to preferred stockholders.”111  Thus, the questions of 
what is the “vicinity of insolvency” and how must directors carry out 
their fiduciary duties in that milieu are areas of future development in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of fiduciary duties and the busi-
ness judgment rule.  It is certainly an area where directors of troubled 
companies and their counsel face particular challenges and need ex-
pert counseling. 
c.  Exculpation and section 102(b)(7) 
As noted, the standard of review for transactional justification 
purposes may sometimes diverge from the standard of review for per-
sonal liability purposes.  For example, the court might set aside a 
transaction if the directors were grossly negligent, but the directors 
could be shielded from personal liability.112 
In the mid-1980s, the insurance market for directors and officers 
was very tight, and it was difficult to attract persons willing to serve as 
directors.  As a result, in 1986 the Delaware legislature adopted a stat-
ute, section 102(b)(7), that had the effect of permitting stockholders, 
in the certificate of incorporation, to exonerate directors from per-
sonal liability for gross negligence.113  Although a charter provision 
enacted under section 102(b)(7) would protect the directors from 
personal liability for gross negligence, the charter provision would not 
bar a court from setting aside a transaction that was the product of 
 
110 Kohls v. Kenetech Corp., No. 433, 2002 Del. LEXIS 217, at *1 (Del. Apr. 5, 
2002). 
111 Id. 
112 Compare Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (holding direc-
tors to be personally liable after the transaction in question was completed, and estab-
lishing gross negligence as the test, following dictum of Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984)), with Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 
273-76 (2d Cir. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction under New York law enjoin-
ing a lock-up option in a takeover battle where directors of the target violated their 
duty of care, even if the directors were not grossly negligent under the standard an-
nounced in Smith v. Van Gorkom). 
113 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
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gross negligence.  Importantly, section 102(b)(7) does not permit ex-
oneration: 
(i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or 
its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which in-
volve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 
174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director de-
rived an improper personal benefit.
114
 
It must be kept in mind that section 102(b)(7), like the indemni-
fication provisions of section 145 and the reliance provision in section 
141(e),115 is designed to have a remedial effect.  That is, those provi-
sions are designed to operate like the business judgment rule to pro-
tect directors and to encourage qualified persons to act as directors.  
For example, in the case of Stifel Financial Corp. v. Cochran,116 the Su-
preme Court noted this goal in the indemnification context: 
This Court has emphasized that the indemnification statute should be 
broadly interpreted to further the goals it was enacted to achieve . . . . 
The invariant policy of Delaware legislation on indemnification is to 
“promote the desirable end that corporate officials will resist what they 
consider unjustified suits and claims, secure in the knowledge that their 
reasonable expenses will be borne by the corporation they have served if 
they are vindicated.” . . . Beyond that, its larger purpose is “to encourage 
capable [persons] to serve as corporate directors, secure in the knowl-
edge that expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and in-
tegrity as directors will be borne by the corporation they serve.”117 
There has been some debate about how a section 102(b)(7) provi-
sion actually operates in litigation to exonerate directors.  The bottom 
line is that derivative due care claims seeking personal liability of di-
rectors can normally be dismissed on motion.  But the jurisprudential 
route leading to that result is somewhat tortured.  In 1999, in Emerald 
Partners v. Berlin,118 the Supreme Court stated that a director’s claim 
for exculpation from liability under section 102(b)(7) is “in the na-
ture of an affirmative defense.”119  This formulation led to confusion. 
Former Chancellor Allen, Vice Chancellor (now Justice) Jacobs, 
and Vice Chancellor Strine have suggested that treating a section 
 
114 Id. 
115 See infra Part II for discussion of the good faith components of section 145 and 
section 141(e). 
116 809 A.2d 555 (Del. 2002). 
117 Id. at 561 (quoting FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW:  FUN-
DAMENTALS § 145.2 (Edward D. Welch et al. eds., 2001)). 
118 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999). 
119 Id. at 1223. 
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102(b)(7) defense as an affirmative defense, as stated in Emerald Part-
ners, requires directors to prove that their alleged misconduct did not 
fall into any of the categories of conduct for which section 102(b)(7) 
does not provide exculpation, even if the plaintiffs have not alleged 
those types of breaches.120  They propose that it would be wiser to treat 
section 102(b)(7) as creating a statutory immunity, under which de-
fendants would be automatically exculpated for any duty of care-based 
claims if the statute applied.121  This seems sensible to me. 
I think that any theoretical awkwardness of the “affirmative de-
fense” concept will not cause ongoing concern in handling section 
102(b)(7) cases in view of later jurisprudence.  In Malpiede v. Town-
son,122 the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ due care claims because of the corpo-
ration’s 102(b)(7) exculpation provision.123  The Court of Chancery 
had also dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, the plaintiffs’ 
duty of loyalty and disclosure violation claims.124  Thus, in order to 
achieve exculpation in Malpiede, the directors were not required af-
firmatively to prove the lack of a breach of loyalty. 
The Malpiede court elaborated on the 1999 Emerald Partners deci-
sion by concluding that despite the notion that section 102(b)(7) 
might be viewed as an affirmative defense, certain language in Emerald 
Partners125 permits dismissal of a complaint upon invocation of the 
corporation’s 102(b)(7) provision if the complaint “unambiguously 
and solely asserted only a due care claim.”126  The court distinguished 
the 1999 Emerald Partners decision on the basis that it had proceeded 
to trial on matters including the section 102(b)(7) issue, while Mal-
piede involved only pleading issues.127  The court noted, however, that 
despite the description of the exculpatory defense in Emerald Partners 
as an affirmative defense: 
 
120 See Allen et al., supra note 52, at 1304-05 (“Imposing the burden to establish 
the exculpation defense upon the directors perversely requires them to disprove all of 
the duty of loyalty-related ‘exceptions’ to the defense, to be relieved of liability for due 
care claims.”). 
121 Id. at 1305. 
122 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001). 
123 Id. at 1079. 
124 Id. 
125 See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (“[W]here the 
factual basis for a claim solely implicates a violation of the duty of care, this Court has 
indicated that the protections of such a charter provision may properly be invoked and 
applied.”). 
126 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1093. 
127 Id. at 1094. 
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[T]he board is not required to disprove claims based on alleged breaches 
of the duty of loyalty to gain the protection of the provision with respect 
to due care claims.  Rather, proving the existence of a valid exculpatory 
provision in the corporate charter entitles directors to dismissal of any 
claims for money damages against them that are based solely on alleged 
breaches of the board’s duty of care.
128
 
In 2001, the Emerald Partners matter came before the Supreme 
Court for a third time.129  In the third appeal, the court considered 
“when it is appropriate procedurally to consider the substantive effect 
of a section 102(b)(7) provision, in a stockholder challenge to a 
transaction that requires a trial pursuant to the entire fairness stan-
dard of judicial review.”130  The Supreme Court’s 2001 Emerald Partners 
decision noted that the unusual procedural posture there required 
proof of entire fairness and made clear that it differed from Malpiede 
as follows: 
 The rationale of Malpiede constitutes judicial cognizance of a practical 
reality:  unless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of 
good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is unnecessary because a 
Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director defendants from pay-
ing monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of 
the duty of care.  The effect of our holding in Malpiede is that, in actions 
against the directors of Delaware corporations with a Section 102(b)(7) 
charter provision, a shareholder’s complaint must allege well-pled facts 
that, if true, implicate breaches of loyalty or good faith.131 
Of course, there are nuances and doctrinal anomalies here that 
cannot be analyzed comprehensively and with finality in this glimpse 
of a retrospective.  Indeed, it is probably a fair comment that reading 
Malpiede and the 2001 Emerald Partners decision together has “brought 
some clarity and introduced additional uncertainty.”132  Professor Ly-
man Johnson has written: 
 The supreme court clearly needs to re-address how the protection of 
section 102(b)(7) meshes with procedural burdens and existing stan-
dards of review.  This is important because of judicial efficiency concerns 
and because burdens and standards of review often are outcome deter-
minative.  Apart from that issue, the supreme court should address how 
the proposed concept of “due loyalty” fits into the existing procedural 
 
128 Id. at 1095-96 n.70. 
129 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001). 
130 Id. at 89-90. 
131 Id. at 92 (footnotes omitted). 
132 Lyman Johnson, After Enron:  Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 65 (2003). 
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scheme and standards of judicial review for addressing alleged fiduciary 
duty breaches.
133
 
I agree with Professor Johnson to this extent:  the jurisprudential 
path to achieve the remedial effect of section 102(b)(7) is winding.  
But I do not agree that further clarification should be a high priority 
for the Supreme Court.  I think Malpiede is clarification enough. 
D.  Evolving Expectations 
As we have seen, the statutory requirements of the DGCL and 
judge-made principles of fiduciary duty form the standards of conduct 
of directors.  They are expectations that stockholders and courts have 
concerning director processes.  A priori, these evolving expectations 
may be largely aspirational standards of conduct.  But in some circum-
stances, an egregious failure to adhere to certain evolving expecta-
tions could result in liability upon the application of the appropriate 
standard of review.  The phrase “evolving expectations” is not some-
thing that one finds explicated in the decisions of the Supreme Court.  
Rather, it is a shorthand term that I have used in speeches and articles 
in recent years to help me understand how the focus on director pro-
cesses has been sharpened over the years.134  It does seem obvious to 
me, nevertheless, that the expectations of director processes—both by 
stockholders and courts—are dynamic, not static.  They continually 
evolve as business realities and mores change over time.  The courts 
apply the quintessential common law process to those evolving expec-
tations. 
In recent years, expectations that boards will implement modern 
governance norms have been increasing.  For example, there is an 
evolving expectation in the standard of conduct that boards will set up 
and implement effective law compliance programs.  The now-famous 
Caremark decision in 1996 made this principle clear.135  Although 
Caremark was a Chancery decision—and the principle announced by 
the Chancellor was only dictum—the Delaware Supreme Court has 
 
133 Id. at 67-68 (footnotes omitted). 
134 E.g., Veasey, supra note 21, at 1451-54; E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance 
and Ethics in the Post-Enron Worldcom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 842 
(2003). 
135 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(describing two contexts in which “director liability for breach of the duty to exercise 
appropriate attention” may arise, including “from an unconsidered failure of the board to 
act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss”). 
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cited it136 and, indeed, it has taken on a (sometimes controversial or 
misunderstood) life of its own.137 
Developing case law outside of the board’s decision making proc-
esses implicates the oversight responsibility of the board of directors.  
Strictly speaking, the business judgment rule applies only to business 
decisions and does not apply in an oversight context.138  Nevertheless, 
directors’ decisions about how to set up mechanisms to monitor man-
agement involve directorial judgment, and it is the judgment of the 
directors on which investors rely. 
Representative Delaware cases in this area include Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.139 and Lutz v. Boas.140  Both cases were de-
cided in the 1960s, before the 1996 Caremark case that shaped the 
modern understanding of directors’ oversight responsibilities.  One 
case found no liability; the other imposed liability. 
In Graham, directors were held not liable to the corporation in a 
derivative suit when they failed to prevent junior officials from com-
mitting antitrust violations that allegedly damaged the corporation.141  
The court held that there was no liability because there were no “red 
flags” that the directors saw or should have seen.142  In Lutz, directors 
who virtually abdicated their responsibility through sustained inatten-
tion to their duties were held liable for what then-Chancellor Seitz 
found to be grossly negligent conduct.143  The case involved the failure 
of nonaffiliated (supposedly independent) directors of mutual funds 
 
136 See, e.g., In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 864 & n.29 (Del. 2003) (citing Caremark as an 
example of a “failure to supervise” claim); White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 551 & n.26 
(Del. 2001) (same). 
137 Although Caremark is established as a practical matter, represents a fixture in 
corporate governance, and is the centerpiece around which compliance programs and 
continuing legal education seminars are set, it has not won universal acclaim.  See 
Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In Re Caremark:  Good Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 691-92 (2004) (“Despite sound and lofty 
intentions, the consequences of Caremark have been disappointing . . . . an empty tri-
umph of form over substance.”). 
138 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the busi-
ness judgment rule applies to business decisions and “only in the context of director 
action”). 
139 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
140 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961). 
141 Graham, 188 A.2d at 131. 
142 See id. at 130 (“[A]bsent cause for suspicion, there is no duty upon the direc-
tors . . . to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”). 
143 Lutz, 171 A.2d at 395-96. 
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to carry out their oversight responsibility to monitor the fund manag-
ers.144 
In the 1996 Caremark case, then-Chancellor Allen discussed, in dic-
tum, the potential liability of directors in failing to carry out their 
oversight responsibilities regarding health care law violations of sub-
ordinates: 
 I am of the view that a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt 
in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting sys-
tem, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do 
so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director 
liable . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [I]n my opinion only a sustained or systematic failure of the 
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure 
a reasonable information and reporting system [exists]—will establish 
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.  Such a 
test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or system-
atic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is quite 
high.
145
 
Having a modern compliance system is a good, and, modernly, an 
expected, corporate practice.  Although one might not find this no-
tion in the Graham case, which was thirty-three years old at the time of 
Caremark, the need for an effective compliance system is not a new 
idea.  In 1980, seventeen years after Graham and sixteen years before 
Caremark, I wrote an article with my then-associate William Manning, 
in which we said that the 1963 Graham decision provided only “mini-
mal guidance.”  We referred to a 1978 statement of principles of the 
Business Roundtable of the “core functions” of the board:146  “Some 
recent lapses in corporate behavior have emphasized the need for 
policies and implementing procedures on corporate law compliance.  
These policies should be designed to promote such compliance on a 
sustained and systematic basis by all levels of operating manage-
ment.”147  We then noted “that the expected role of a director has 
grown to include the installation of legal compliance systems” and 
that this change “shows a natural development in the role of an ‘ordi-
 
144 Id. 
145 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970-71. 
146 Veasey & Manning, supra note 55, at 929. 
147 Id. (quoting The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly 
Owned Corporation:  Statement of the Business Roundtable, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2101 
(1978)). 
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narily prudent director’ since 1963, the year in which Graham was de-
cided.”148 
Hence, the oversight responsibility is a dynamic one.  That is not 
to say that Graham would not be decided the same way today on its 
particular facts.  No doubt, however, some of the language in Graham 
would differ if we looked at its facts through the prism of what is now 
over forty years of experience.149 
As noted in Caremark,150 the federal sentencing guidelines, which 
were not in existence in the Graham era, give a corporation credit for 
“an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law,” when 
the program is “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so 
that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal 
conduct.”151  These guidelines alone should be sufficient incentive for 
a board to have a law compliance system as a standard of conduct.  
Whether application of the standard of review will result in liability 
may, however, be another matter, depending on all the circumstances. 
The evolving expectations for directors may be manifested in con-
sidering whether or not directors have acted not only with due care 
but also in good faith or consistent with principles of loyalty.  The le-
gal determination whether directors have acted in accordance with 
these fiduciary principles may change as extralegal expectations for 
directorial conduct change.  We turn now to consider the role of good 
faith in Delaware law. 
II.  GOOD FAITH 
The good faith of directors has long been a part of Delaware law.  
It has now become a critical issue in the ongoing Disney litigation.  
 
148 See Veasey & Manning, supra note 55, at 930 (referring to the Graham court’s 
refusal to require the director-defendants to put into effect a “system of watchfulness” 
before they knew of any misconduct). 
149 For examples of how the evolving expectations of directors in the oversight 
area have recently been articulated, consider some recent federal and SRO develop-
ments.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, requires management to “establish[] 
and maintain[] . . . adequate internal control structure[s] and procedure[s].”  Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).  The New York Stock Exchange 
requires listed companies to abide by certain “corporate governance standards” and to 
have an internal audit committee.  N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 
303A.06-.07 (2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage= 
/listed/1022221393251.html. 
150 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969. 
151 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k) (2001). 
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There, the amended complaint alleged misconduct by directors and 
claimed that they did not act in good faith when they approved a lu-
crative contract for Michael Ovitz as president and then approved his 
“no-fault” termination fourteen months later at an alleged cost to the 
company of $140 million.152  That complaint survived a motion to dis-
miss.153  In denying the motion to dismiss and permitting the case to 
go to trial, Chancellor Chandler said: 
[The] facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant di-
rectors consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting 
a “we don’t care about the risks” attitude concerning a material corpo-
rate decision.  Knowing or deliberate indifference by a director to his or 
her duty to act faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct, in my 
opinion, that may not have been taken honestly and in good faith to ad-
vance the best interests of the company.  Put differently, all of the al-
leged facts, if true, imply that the defendant directors knew that they 
were making material decisions without adequate information and with-
out adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the deci-
sions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.  
Viewed in this light, plaintiffs’ new complaint sufficiently alleges a breach of the 
directors’ obligation to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation’s best in-
terests for a Court to conclude, if the facts are true, that the defendant directors’ 
conduct fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule.154 
It must be kept in mind that the Disney litigation—as the Supreme 
Court saw it in Brehm v. Eisner in 2000, based on the original and de-
fective set of pleadings—seemed to be primarily a due care case.155  We 
remanded, in part because it was not clear whether the directors 
 
152 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 261 (Del. 2000) (“[T]he question here is 
whether the directors are to be ‘fully protected’ (i.e., not held liable) on the basis that 
they relied in good faith on a qualified expert under Section 141(e) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278-
79 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[P]laintiffs’ new complaint suggests that the Disney directors 
failed to exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good faith attempt to 
fulfill their fiduciary duties to Disney and its stockholders.”). 
153 Disney, 825 A.2d at 289-90. “Gross negligence” is the standard of review that 
typically applies to duty of care claims in Delaware.  See Allen et al., supra note 52, at 
1299 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), as first applying the gross 
negligence standard to business judgment rule consideration of a claim for breach of 
the duty of care). 
154 Disney, 825 A.2d at 289 (emphasis in final sentence added). 
155 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255 (“This is a case about whether there should be per-
sonal liability of the directors . . . for lack of due care in the decisionmaking process.”).  
Curiously, potential exoneration of directors under section 102(b)(7) was not dis-
cussed in that phase of the case. 
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could claim the protection of section 141(e).156  That is, had they “re-
lied in good faith” on an expert in making their two decisions on the 
Ovitz compensation package?157 
On remand, the case, as repleaded, morphed into a “good faith” 
case.  In 2000 we had not thought of it as a “loyalty” case, there being 
no allegation of self-dealing.  But we suggested that there may be an 
issue whether the directors could correctly claim that they should be 
fully protected by relying in good faith on a qualified expert under 
section 141(e).158  Large questions now loom, in light of the Chancel-
lor’s 2003 decision:  (a) whether self-dealing is an essential element of 
a violation of the duty of loyalty; and (b) whether good faith is a free-
standing fiduciary duty.  There is a respected school of thought that a 
director has violated the duty of loyalty if the act or omission in ques-
tion is not in good faith in the sense the Chancellor articulated in the 
2003 Disney decision based on the amended complaint.  Thus, a pars-
ing of the protections of section 102(b)(7) and section 141(e) is im-
plicated.  The Chancellor’s 2003 decision holds that the allegations, if 
true, would not protect the directors under section 102(b)(7) because 
their decisions on the Ovitz matter were not made in good faith.159  It 
remains to be seen what facts will be found at trial and whether good 
faith reliance on a qualified expert under section 141(e) will play a 
significant part.160 
One must keep in mind that the Chancellor’s decision in Disney 
on the motion to dismiss is the law of the case.  That is, it is estab-
lished, unless the Supreme Court should rule otherwise, that if direc-
tors “consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,” 
 
156 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001) (providing protection for directors who 
rely in good faith on, among other things, the advice of experts when making deci-
sions). 
157 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 261 (explaining that “[a]lthough the [lower court] did 
not expressly predicate its decision on Section 141(e),” the directors are presumptively 
entitled to its protections); see also discussion infra text accompanying note 173. 
158 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 261-62; see also infra text accompanying notes 280-83. 
159 See Disney, 825 A.2d at 286, 289 (holding that acts or omissions not undertaken 
in good faith “do not fall within the protective ambit of § 102(b)(7)” and that plain-
tiffs’ complaint “sufficiently alleges a breach of the directors’ obligation to act honestly 
and in good faith”). 
160 As this Article goes to press, there has been no decision after the Disney trial 
testimony.  In fact, the case is being briefed.  Oral argument will follow, then the 
Chancellor’s decision and perhaps an appeal. 
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they have not acted in good faith and their conduct will not be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule or by section 102(b)(7).161 
The concept of good faith has been in our jurisprudence for a 
long time.  It forms part of the business judgment rule that applies to 
the directors’ decision-making process, and it is likewise part of the 
directors’ oversight responsibility. 
The business judgment rule is the foundation of our corporation 
law.  That rule teaches that courts will not second-guess directors’ 
business decisions and will not interfere with investors’ expectation 
that directors will take honest and prudent business risks to advance 
the economic well-being of the enterprise.  To carry out this entre-
preneurial theme that lies at the heart of Delaware jurisprudence, the 
concept of good faith is an immutable ingredient of the business 
judgment rule. 
Former Chancellor Allen described this theme succinctly and well 
in several decisions.  In the takeover case of J.P. Stevens & Co. in 1988, 
he wrote: 
 Stated generally, the business judgment rule . . . prevents substantive 
review of the merits of a business decision made in good faith and with 
due care.  These are, of course, good reasons to minimize such substan-
tive review. . . . “[B]ecause . . . there is great social utility in encouraging 
the allocation of assets and the evaluation and assumption of economic 
risk by those with . . . skill and information, courts have long been reluc-
tant to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been made 
in good faith.” 
 A court may, however, review the substance of a business decision 
made by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of as-
sessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment 
that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.162 
In dismissing a derivative suit in 1996 in Gagliardi v. TriFoods Inter-
national, Inc., he wrote: 
[T]o allege that a corporation has suffered a loss as a result of a lawful 
transaction, within the corporation’s powers, authorized by a corporate 
fiduciary acting in a good faith pursuit of corporate purposes, does not state a 
 
161 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., 
Inc. v. Elkins, No. 202228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 
2004) (applying the Disney “conscious and intentional disregard of their responsibili-
ties” standard in denying a motion to dismiss claims against certain directors in an al-
leged excessive compensation case). 
162  In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(second emphasis added) (quoting Solash v. Telex Corp., Nos. 9518, 9525, 9528, 1988 
WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988)). 
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claim for relief against that fiduciary no matter how foolish the invest-
ment may appear in retrospect.
163
 
 In the area of the directors’ oversight responsibility (as distinct 
from the context of business judgment in a board’s decision-making 
role), in my view, former Chancellor Allen’s Caremark decision is par-
ticularly significant: 
Indeed, one wonders on what moral basis might shareholders attack a 
good faith business decision of a director as “unreasonable” or “irra-
tional.”  Where a director in fact exercises a good faith effort to be informed 
and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should be deemed to satisfy 
fully the duty of attention.164 
So, too, has the concept of good faith been imbedded in the 
DGCL.  Three statutes are particularly significant. 
Section 141(e), which had been part of the DGCL even before the 
major 1967 revision, has long provided that a member of the board of 
directors “shall, in the performance of [the director’s] duties, be fully 
protected in relying in good faith upon [corporate records and re-
ports of management or board committees (other than those on 
which the directors sit)].”165  Protection for such good faith reliance 
now extends to reports of experts “selected with reasonable care by or 
on behalf of the corporation.”166 
Section 145, the indemnification section, was one of the major ad-
vancements of the 1967 revision.  Subsections (a) and (b) authorize 
corporations to indemnify directors as well as officers, employees, and 
agents under certain circumstances.  But indemnification is available 
only if the person to be indemnified “acted in good faith and in a 
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the 
best interests of the corporation.”167 
As noted above, in 1986 Delaware adopted section 102(b)(7) to 
protect directors from personal liability for gross negligence. 168  That 
 
163 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
164 In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
165 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). 
166 Id.  The 1967 revision was a major overhaul of the DGCL.  1 R. FRANKLIN BA-
LOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS (2004).  Since then there have been many statutory changes, but the 
changes in this statute have been in the nature of tinkering.  See generally 2 id. 
167 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (2001).  For the history of the indemnifica-
tion statute, see 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 166, §§ 4.22-4.29. 
168 See supra note 112 (citing Van Gorkom’s “gross negligence” standard). 
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statute permits a stockholder-approved charter provision that exoner-
ates directors from such liability, but not: 
(i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or 
its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve in-
tentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of [title 
8 of the DGCL]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director de-
rived an improper personal benefit.
169
 
One can parse each of these three statutes and analyze (or over-
analyze) exactly how the words “good faith” are presented.  One can 
also critique the quality of the legislative draftsmanship.  For example, 
in section 102(b)(7) “good faith” is combined in the disjunctive with 
concepts that “involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation 
of law.”170  Whatever may be the significance of this statutory structure 
other than arguably poor drafting, a director cannot be exonerated 
for an “act or omission not in good faith.”171 
Indeed, the implications of “good faith” in the section 102(b)(7) 
context now loom large primarily because of the Chancellor’s 2003 
Disney decision.172  Whatever happens factually in the Disney trial, the 
Chancellor’s “good faith” holding on the allegations of the complaint 
in denying the motion to dismiss is the law of the case unless reversed 
or modified by the Supreme Court. 
The section 141(e) analysis is part of the reason the Supreme 
Court remanded the Disney case to the Court of Chancery five years 
ago in Brehm v. Eisner.  The Supreme Court said: 
 To survive a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss in a due care case where an 
expert has advised the board in its decisionmaking process, the com-
plaint must allege particularized facts (not conclusions) that, if proved, 
would show, for example, that:  (a) the directors did not in fact rely on 
the expert; (b) their reliance was not in good faith; (c) they did not rea-
sonably believe that the expert’s advice was within the expert’s profes-
sional competence; (d) the expert was not selected with reasonable care 
by or on behalf of the corporation, and the faulty selection process was 
attributable to the directors; (e) the subject matter (in this case the cost 
calculation) that was material and reasonably available was so obvious 
that the board’s failure to consider it was grossly negligent regardless of 
the expert’s advice or lack of advice, or (f) that the decision of the Board 
was so unconscionable as to constitute waste or fraud.  This Complaint 
 
169 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (emphasis added). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278, 286, 289 (Del. Ch. 
2003). 
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includes no particular allegations of this nature, and therefore it was sub-
ject to dismissal as drafted. 
 . . . . 
 Plaintiffs will be provided an opportunity to replead on this issue.
173
 
The Court of Chancery’s recent decision in In re Emerging Commu-
nications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation174 is worth mentioning with respect 
to section 141(e), even though the court did not cite that statute.  
Some practitioners and directors have become concerned that, as a 
result of Emerging Communications, Delaware jurisprudence is moving 
toward a generalized heightened standard of liability for directors who 
have special expertise.  I do not share that view. 
Emerging Communications was a lengthy decision made after a full 
and complex trial.  The court’s many findings centered around the 
conclusion that the directors had failed to carry their affirmative bur-
den to show that a merger price and the process leading up to it were 
“entirely fair.”175  The merger price of $10.25 was far below the value 
of $38.05 that the trial judge found to be fair.176 
One of the directors, Salvatore Muoio, was held personally liable 
not only because he “was in a unique position to know” that the price 
was unfair, due to his special financial expertise in the relevant busi-
ness sector, but also because he was found to be not independent.177  
The court stated: 
 Hence, Muoio possessed a specialized financial expertise, and an abil-
ity to understand ECM’s intrinsic value, that was unique to the ECM 
board members . . . . Informed by his specialized expertise and knowl-
edge, Muoio conceded that the $10.25 price was “at the low end of any 
kind of fair value you would put,” and expressed to Goodwin his view 
that the Special Committee might be able to get up to $20 per share 
from Prosser.  In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon Muoio, as 
a fiduciary, to advocate that the board reject the $10.25 price that the 
Special Committee was recommending.  As a fiduciary knowledgeable of 
ECM’s intrinsic value, Muoio should also have gone on record as voting 
 
173 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 261-62 (Del. 2000) (citations omitted). 
174 No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (Jacobs, J., sitting by 
designation as Vice Chancellor). 
175 See id. at *43-137 (discussing whether the merger price was fair and a product 
of fair dealing).  “Entire fairness” is the standard applicable to mergers involving inter-
ested parties.  See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 
1994) (“Entire fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an 
interested merger.”). 
176 Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *42. 
177 Id. at *143-44. 
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against the proposed transaction at the $10.25 per share merger price.  
Muoio did neither.  Instead he joined the other directors in voting, 
without objection, to approve the transaction.
178
 
Although the court’s statement about Muoio’s expertise and spe-
cial knowledge must be read in light of the fact that he was found to 
have been not independent, that finding was in another part of the 
opinion and was not juxtaposed with the court’s statements about 
Muoio’s expertise.179 
For some observers, Emerging Communications has raised the ques-
tion whether Delaware courts, in determining liability, will consider—
more broadly and generally—a director’s qualifications or expertise, 
as distinct from her factual knowledge unique to a particular transac-
tion.  As noted, the court made no explicit reference to section 
141(e), but the court’s findings square with the idea that, because of 
his particular expertise and specific knowledge of the inadequacy of 
the merger price, this director could not have relied in good faith on 
the expert to secure the protection of section 141(e).180 
It would be a perversity of corporate governance goals, in my view, 
for the Delaware courts to announce a general rule that a director 
with special expertise is more exposed to liability than other directors 
solely because of her status as an expert.  Rather, the facts and proce-
dural posture should be key.  When purporting to rely on another ex-
pert in a transaction where a director knows that the expert’s opinion 
is questionable, the director could be at greater risk of liability than 
other directors.  This is not because of the director’s status as an ex-
pert.  It is simply that a director with such expertise cannot rely in 
good faith on another expert’s particular opinions under section 
141(e).  In a similar vein, the SEC made clear that a “financial ex-
pert”—expected of audit committees by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act181—is 
not subject to greater liability exposure simply by virtue of the direc-
 
178 Id. at *144 (citations omitted). 
179 See id. at *125, *128. 
180 See supra text accompanying note 166 for an overview of section 141(e)’s provi-
sions.  Cf. In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d. 628, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(reviewing a reliance defense under section 11(b)(3)(C) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
and noting that “reliance on audited financial statements may not be blind.  Rather, 
where ‘red flags’ regarding the reliability of an audited financial statement emerge, 
mere reliance on an audit will not be sufficient to ward off liability”). 
181 The Act does not by its terms require audit committees to have financial ex-
perts (ACFEs), but as a practical matter its requirement that any lack of an ACFE must 
be disclosed and explained will likely work to ensure that most audit committees do 
include ACFEs.  15 U.S.C. § 7265 (West Supp. 2004). 
  
2005] DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE 1992–2004 1447 
tor’s designation as an expert.182  That is, or ought to be, the Delaware 
law as well, in my opinion. 
Directors and their counselors should, of course, take heed of 
Emerging Communications.  But it is not a clear holding and it is not a 
Delaware Supreme Court decision.  Although we cannot know with 
certainty how the Supreme Court may decide this issue if it is ever pre-
sented to the court, the case could be read as a decision made in the 
narrow factual context of this particular trial record.183  In my view, 
this decision has not established a new standard of conduct or liability 
for directors.  Rather, it simply applied preexisting principles of law to 
the particular factual circumstances where the director, after trial, did 
not show that he relied in good faith on a valuation expert when he 
had actual knowledge that rendered the other expert’s opinion ques-
tionable. 
Standards of liability for directors should be uniform in the sense 
that one director should not be more vulnerable to liability than an-
other based on the director’s background, as distinct from the direc-
tor’s conduct.  Nevertheless, a director who has special expertise is 
expected to use it for the benefit of all.  That is a standard of conduct, 
not necessarily a standard of liability.  Such a director should not be 
able to rely in good faith—and thereby be protected from liability—if 
the director knows the expert’s view to be erroneous.  Whether a di-
rector will be found to have that knowledge is a question of fact in 
each case. 
The application of the good faith concept presents a troubling 
conundrum:  should good faith liability review apply to a business de-
cision in a single transaction or set of transactions, as in the Disney 
 
182 See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002,  68 Fed. Reg. 5109, 5117 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 
and 249) (“Our new rule provides that whether a person is, or is not, an audit commit-
tee financial expert does not alter his or her duties, obligations or liabilities.  We be-
lieve this should be the case under federal and state law.”).  Given the five demanding 
requirements for designation as an ACFE, see 15 U.S.C. § 7265(b), however, when the 
facts are reviewed for the ACFE’s good faith reliance on a financial opinion, the ACFE 
may be found liable.  Plaintiffs are likely to emphasize, in state or federal litigation, 
stockholders’ reasonable understanding and expectations of the ACFE, whose substan-
tial qualifications have been proclaimed in the corporation’s disclosure documents.  
What plaintiffs emphasize, however, may or may not be what the courts will embrace 
when liability issues are on the line. 
183 This case itself is not likely to come before the Supreme Court.  Although the 
decision of the Court of Chancery was released in May, more than six months later no 
order implementing the decision has been entered.  Speculation has it that the case 
may be settled.  Hence, there is not likely to be any appeal. 
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case?  Or should it apply only in the oversight cases of sustained inat-
tention, like Caremark or the old New Jersey case of Francis v. United 
Jersey Bank?184  The directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom were found to have 
acted in good faith in a transaction to sell the company, though they 
were found to be grossly negligent.185  When the alleged facts of Disney 
and the facts of Van Gorkom are compared, is there a significant differ-
ence in the conduct of the two sets of directors?  How does one define 
gross negligence and good faith, and how does one articulate where 
gross negligence ends and failure to act in good faith begins?  Is reck-
lessness or an “I don’t care” attitude the litmus test?  Is there such a 
concept as “severe recklessness”?186  One should keep in mind that the 
rule of law in the Chancellor’s Disney decision is “intentional and con-
scious disregard” of known responsibilities.187  I do not know what the 
Delaware courts will do when the final chapter is written in this trou-
bling area.  All I know is that I will not be on the court to help define 
and apply the concept of good faith or to distinguish it from gross 
negligence.  At this point, however, the job of wrestling these ques-
tions to the ground is beyond one’s attention span for this article. 
One dynamic of good faith that continues to play out is the con-
cern of directors and their counselors that directors’ exposure to per-
sonal liability has been ratcheted upward from where it was just a few 
years ago, because of a freshly energized principle of good faith, driv-
ing directors’ potential liability through a hole in section 102(b)(7).  
That is a concern, of course, but if I were a director I would not lose 
much sleep over it.  When all the facts of the Disney case are mar-
shaled in the Chancellor’s opinion later this year, there may be some 
added clarity to the expectations that boards of directors must meet. 
There has been much speculation on the likely outcome of the 
Disney trial.  I will not join the speculators or prognosticate whether 
the allegations of the complaint will be borne out.  Some commenta-
tors are already reading the tea leaves.  For example, Lynn Stout has 
remarked: 
 
184 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).  In United Jersey Bank, the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey found that a director’s negligence in attention to the affairs of the business violated 
her fiduciary duties.  Id. at 821-26. 
185 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
186 See Sale, supra note 30, at 488-94 (analyzing how “egregiousness” might be de-
lineated in the good faith context, including how a concept of “severe recklessness” 
might fit with other levels of scienter). 
187 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. El-
kins, No. 202228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *44-45 & n.56 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 
2002). 
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The Disney case is a hard one, due to a basic doctrine of corporate law 
called the business judgment rule.  This rule allows disinterested corpo-
rate directors to make foolish, even disastrous, decisions without being 
second-guessed by courts, so long as their process was reasonable and 
their decision “informed.”  The rule says, in effect, that it is the process, 
not the outcome, that matters. 
 This makes sense for several reasons.  First, the business world is 
complex, fluid and risky.  Even the most dedicated board will occasion-
ally make decisions that don’t pan out.  Second, it can be hard for ob-
servers outside a firm—shareholders, judges, or juries—to understand 
the many factors and considerations that go into a business decision. 
 The Disney case illustrates the perils of passing judgment from a dis-
tance and in hindsight . . . . 
 . . . [I]f the members of Disney’s board are held personally liable, as 
the lawsuit seeks, it will become more difficult to get good people to 
serve as directors. . . . 
 . . . [And] people who serve on boards will become reluctant to take 
even minor business risks . . . . 
 . . .[I]f the Delaware court decides to hang the Disney directors, it 
should hang them for process—not for poor results or difficult person-
alities.
188
 
Another modern dynamic at work on the issue of good faith in-
volves an intellectual debate concerning whether good faith is a free-
standing fiduciary duty, separate from the fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty.  The confusion regarding whether good faith stands as a sepa-
rate fiduciary duty can perhaps be traced to the Supreme Court’s Cede 
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Cede II )189 decision in 1993.  In Cede II the 
court declared that there is a “triad” of fiduciary duties—“good faith, 
loyalty [and] due care.”190  The “triad” concept has not been univer-
sally embraced.  Some members of the judiciary have weighed in on 
the debate over whether directors owe a triad of duties, suggesting 
 
188 Lynn A. Stout, Commentary, Don’t Hang the Disney Board Just Yet, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2004, at B9; see also Bruce Orwall & Chad Bray, Outcome of Ovitz Suit to Affect 
Liabilities of Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2004, at B3 (The decision “will have 
far-reaching implications for people who serve as corporate directors”). 
189 Cede II, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); see also Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 
A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989). 
190 Cede II, 634 A.2d at 361; see also Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument 
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (“The burden falls upon the proponent of a claim 
to rebut the presumption by introducing evidence either of director self-interest, if not 
self-dealing, or that the directors either lacked good faith or failed to exercise due 
care.” (citation omitted)). 
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that there really are only two fiduciary duties—loyalty and care.191  In 
contrast, other observers have argued that good faith has been and 
should be viewed as a separate duty.192 
Late last year in the final gasp of the Emerald Partners litigation, a 
panel of the Supreme Court, in an order affirming the Court of 
Chancery, cited the Chancellor’s decision in the Disney case.  In af-
firming then-Vice Chancellor (now Justice) Jacobs’s decision holding 
the merger involved in that case to be entirely fair, Justice Berger 
wrote for the court in Emerald Partners: 
 The Court of Chancery found several deficiencies in the merger ne-
gotiations, and we agree with its comment that “process laxity . . .  can-
not be condoned . . .” [citing Vice Chancellor Jacobs’ opinion].  Indeed, 
we find that the many process flaws in this case raise serious questions as 
to the independent directors’ good faith, e.g., the independent directors 
evidenced a “we don’t care about the risks” attitude by repeatedly failing 
to exclude Hall from their deliberative process and by giving Hall con-
tinuous direct and prior access to the valuation expert hired to advise 
the independent directors.
193
 
 
191 See, for example, Emerald Partners v. Berlin, in which Justice Jacobs (sitting as a 
Vice Chancellor) wrote: 
Good faith is a fundamental component of the duty of loyalty . . . . Confusion 
about the relationship between the fiduciary duty of loyalty and its good faith 
component is attributable in part . . . to the way that Section 102(b)(7) is 
drafted.  The structure of Section 102(b)(7) balkanizes the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty into various fragments, thereby creating unnecessary conceptual con-
fusion. 
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *138 n.133 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 28, 2003).  In In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 753 A.2d 462, 475 
n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000), Vice Chancellor Strine expressed the view that good faith is a 
subsidiary component of the duty of loyalty.  He also indicated that Cede II created the 
triad by misquoting/changing Barkan.  Id.  For another example, see Guttman v. 
Huang: 
A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the 
good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest. . . . 
 It does no service to our law’s clarity to continue to separate the duty of loy-
alty from its own essence; nor does the recognition that good faith is essential 
to loyalty demean or subordinate that essential requirement. 
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
192 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 38; Sale, supra note 30, at 464 (“[T]he Delaware 
Supreme Court now lists the duty as separate and on par with the other two. . . . This 
distinction is important.  As a separate duty, good faith can attach to situations beyond 
those invoking loyalty concerns and can grow to address its own category of govern-
ance issues.”). 
193 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 295, 2003 Del. LEXIS 639, at *2 (Del. Dec. 23, 
2003) (citing the Chancellor’s decision in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 
A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003)).  The Emerald Partners litigation is so old that three 
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Does this decision establish any Supreme Court precedent on the is-
sue of good faith?194  Stay tuned.195 
Is the question whether good faith is subsumed in the duty of loy-
alty or is a freestanding fiduciary duty along with loyalty and care an 
important one?  Directors who do not act in good faith in the honest 
belief that they are acting in the best interests of the corporation may 
be found to be disloyal.  Thus, loyalty issues may include not only self-
dealing (which is not necessarily implicated in all good faith issues), 
but also irresponsible, reckless conduct or an “I don’t care” attitude, 
not involving self-dealing.196  These latter non-self-dealing actions or 
failures to act would seem to be disloyal failures to act in good faith 
and in the best interests of the corporation.  Still the question remains 
whether the good faith standard of review should result in liability for 
a single transaction or only for a sustained and egregious failure to di-
rect the management of the corporation in good faith. 
Whether as an analytical matter acts or omissions not in good faith 
violate the duty of loyalty and whether good faith conduct is a separate 
fiduciary duty may be moot points.  The question is whether there is a 
violation of one fiduciary duty or another.  Does the correct intellec-
tual pigeonhole matter? 
Arguably, it is analytically preferable to treat good faith and loyalty 
as separate duties, in part because self-dealing is not required for a 
good faith violation.  It is clear, nevertheless, that directors must act in 
good faith.  No one disputes this truism.  It is also clear that “acts or 
omissions not in good faith” cannot be exempted from liability under 
section 102(b)(7) or indemnified under section 145.  Moreover, di-
rectors whose purported reliance on experts is not in good faith are 
not fully protected under section 141(e). 
 
members of the Supreme Court (Veasey, Steele, and Jacobs) were all disqualified by 
reason of previous involvement. 
194 See Veasey, supra note 21, at 1453 (discussing Disney, Emerald Partners, and Sar-
banes-Oxley as “evolving expectations of directors”). 
195 This brief order in the Emerald Partners case raises another question for contin-
ued attention.  By emphasizing that the transaction price was fair and satisfied “entire 
fairness,” did the court intend to signal that price trumps process and thereby eviscer-
ate Weinberger ?  See Jennifer Batchelor, Was the End of Emerald Partners a Gem for the 
Corporate Bar?, DEL. L. WKLY., Jan. 14, 2004, at 1 (asking whether the final order in Em-
erald Partners indicates that fair price will trump fair dealing, softening the entire fair-
ness standard). 
196 See In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 289 (“Instead, the facts alleged in the new 
complaint suggest that the defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded 
their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a ma-
terial corporate decision.”). 
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The real issue is understanding the definition, scope, and opera-
tional application of the amorphous concept of good faith.197  Good 
faith draws much of its content from the directors’ subjective state of 
mind.198  John Reed and Matt Neiderman have described good faith as 
follows: 
 The “good faith” standard, especially in the abdication context . . . 
acts almost as a bridge between the concepts of due care and loyalty, 
transforming what might otherwise be deemed certain violations of the 
former into violations of the latter, even in the absence of an adverse pe-
cuniary interest.  Indeed, as noted by the authors of one treatise, the 
duty of good faith is an “overarching element” of a director’s baseline 
duties of due care and loyalty.  Whether a given due care violation pre-
sents a question of bad faith and, in some cases, loyalty, appears to de-
pend on the magnitude and/or ongoing nature of the violation.  It is the 
magnitude or ongoing nature of the action(s) or inaction(s) that pro-
vides the indicia of what ultimately needs to be proven—i.e., the direc-
tor’s good faith or bad faith motivation (“state of mind”).
199
 
Professor Hillary Sale, who has concluded rather convincingly that 
good faith is a separate fiduciary duty, has suggested that good faith is 
defined by the motivations underlying fiduciaries’ conduct:  “[R]ather 
than relying on allegations of the fiduciaries’ status or conflict, bad 
faith focuses on the indifference or egregiousness with which fiduciar-
ies approached the substance of the transaction.”200 
Good faith is not entirely a subjective standard, however.  Profes-
sor Eisenberg, who also believes that good faith is a separate duty, has 
explained that good faith consists of both objective and subjective 
components.  For example, he suggests that in order to act in good 
faith, a director must honestly and sincerely believe that she is acting 
in the best interests of the corporation, but that such a sincere belief is 
 
197 Cf. John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to 
Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Ab-
dication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 
121 (2004) (“As Delaware cases and authorities addressing the meaning of ‘good faith’ 
make clear, however, the term cannot be generally defined, but is instead a creature of 
context.”). 
198 See id. (referring to the finding in Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 
No. 6085, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *46-47 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988), that the board 
members acted in good faith based on their “subjective state of mind” and proper mo-
tivation). 
199 Id. at 123 (footnote omitted). 
200 Sale, supra note 30, at 484; see also id. at 488 (“Good faith based liability, then, 
moves the bar from negligent behavior to deliberately indifferent, egregious, subver-
sive, or knowing behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the ac-
tors.” (citation omitted)). 
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not enough.201  In addition, there must be some objective basis, in the 
generally accepted norms applicable to business, for the director’s 
sincere belief that her conduct is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.202 
Professor Edward Rock has offered another explanation for the 
concept of good faith in Delaware corporate law.  Rock suggests that 
the term “good faith” essentially acts as a placeholder, about which 
the Delaware courts then “tell stories” to express norms that give con-
tent to the highly contextual concept of good faith.203  Those stories 
are then disseminated in various ways to the target audience—the di-
rectors and officers who must conduct themselves in accordance with 
the articulated norms.204 
Whether good faith is an objective standard, a subjective standard, 
or a placeholder, it means that directors must not act irrationally, irre-
sponsibly, disingenuously, or so unreasonably that no reasonable di-
rector would accept the decision or conduct.205  It demands an honesty 
of purpose and does not tolerate the disingenuous conduct of a direc-
tor who appears or claims to act for the corporate good, but who truly 
does not care for the constituents to whom she owes a fiduciary 
duty.206 
With all the discussion of good faith these days, should directors 
get out their worry beads?  Probably not.  Good faith has been in our 
law for decades and is not a new concept.  Thus, it should not now 
have any more sharp edges than it has always had.  It has come to the 
fore recently as a result of fresh insights into the expected processes of 
directors in modern times and because of more precise pleading.  The 
new realization is that the 1986 statute, section 102(b)(7), will not 
 
201 Eisenberg, supra note 38 (manuscript at 16). 
202 Id.  This objective component might more appropriately be understood as a 
requirement that objective indicators be used, as a matter of evidence, to assess the 
director’s real (i.e., subjective) state of mind.  Thus, if a court can discern no rational, 
objective basis for a director’s asserted belief that a decision was in the corporation’s 
best interest, the court can reasonably doubt the sincerity of the asserted belief. 
203 Rock, supra note 32, at 1063. 
204 Id. at 1063-64. 
205 See Veasey, supra note 21, at 1453 (“Generally speaking, lack of good faith may, 
in some circumstances, be inferred if a board abdicates its responsibility by not exercis-
ing its business judgment or its decision or conduct is irrational, irresponsible, or so 
beyond reason that no reasonable director would credit the decision or conduct.”). 
206 See Veasey, supra note 42, at 1009 (“[G]ood faith requires an honesty of pur-
pose and eschews a disingenuous mindset of seeming on the surface to act for the cor-
porate good, but not caring for the well-being of the constituents of the fiduciary.”). 
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permit exoneration for directors who do not act in good faith.  We 
will just have to see how it plays out in the Delaware Supreme Court. 
III.  MERGERS:  DEAL PROTECTION MEASURES 
A.  Background 
During the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court developed a juris-
prudence to deal with the extant hostile takeover environment, which 
seemed to confound the traditional business judgment approach.  
Unocal 207 represented the sea change in the takeover jurisprudence of 
the mid-1980s, although Van Gorkom,208 Moran,209 and Revlon,210 all de-
cided in that watershed year, 1985, were also landmark cases that live 
with us daily, well into the twenty-first century. 
The teaching of Unocal is that a target board, confronted by a 
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, may take action that is 
reasonable in relation to the threat.211  Moreover, the burden of going 
forward with evidence shifts to the board to demonstrate the threat 
and the reasonableness of the response in proportion to the threat.212  
The key departure here is that the business judgment rule (which pre-
sumes proper process and rationality) has been supplanted in these 
takeover situations by an objective test of reasonableness—not found 
in the business judgment rule.  This jurisprudential shift, according to 
the Unocal doctrine, is warranted by the “omnipresent specter” of self-
interest on the part of the target board in resisting the takeover.213 
In 1999, the Supreme Court decision in Unitrin214 provided a gloss 
on Unocal.  That gloss essentially says that when Unocal applies, the 
target board’s defensive actions may not be “coercive” or “preclusive,” 
and if the board’s actions pass those tests they will be sustained if they 
were within a range of reasonableness.215  I concurred in the Unitrin 
decision in its context, which related to defensive tactics of a target 
board seeking to forestall a hostile takeover.  The problems arose 
 
207 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
208 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
209 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
210 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
211 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit 
of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 954. 
214 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
215 Id. at 1386-87. 
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later, in my view, when the Unitrin concepts of “coercion” and “preclu-
sion” were applied by the court in other contexts, such as provisions 
designed to protect friendly mergers and acquisitions. 
Early in the 1990s, the Supreme Court confronted policy ques-
tions on deal protection measures for friendly mergers.  Shortly fol-
lowing Time-Warner,216 which was viewed by many as almost a “just say 
no” case,217 came Paramount v. QVC,218 in which the court distinguished 
Time-Warner, enjoining measures to protect a change-of-control 
merger in the face of a higher bid.219  In fact, in QVC we reached back 
to embrace Chancellor Allen’s analysis in Time-Warner to make it clear 
that the obligation to secure for the stockholders the best transaction 
reasonably available attaches on a sale of control and does not also re-
quire a break up of the corporation. 
In Time-Warner, the Chancellor held that there was no change of control 
in the original stock-for-stock merger between Time and Warner because 
Time would be owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders 
both before and after the merger . . . . 
 . . . Control of both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and 
changing market. 
 . . . But here, effectuation of the merger would not have sub-
jected Time shareholders to the risks and consequences of holders 
of minority shares.  This is a reflection of the fact that no control 
passed to anyone in the transaction contemplated . . . . 
 . . . . 
 The Paramount defendants have misread the holding of Time-
Warner. . . . 
 The Paramount defendants’ position that both a change of control 
and a break-up are required must be rejected.  Such a holding would 
unduly restrict the application of Revlon, is inconsistent with this Court’s 
decisions in Barkan and Macmillan, and has no basis in policy.
220
 
 
216 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
217 See Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups:  Voting, Selling, and Limits on 
the Board’s Power to “Just Say No,” 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1007-08 (1999) (discussing 
Time-Warner’s impact on corporate takeover jurisprudence). 
218 Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994). 
219 Id. at 46-48. 
220 Id. at 46-47 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 
10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (emphasis 
removed)). 
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The essence of QVC was that the directors are required to take rea-
sonable measures—not perfect measures—to seek the best transaction 
reasonably available for the stockholders when the merger would re-
sult in a sale of control.221 
The QVC decision also made it clear that when a court applies en-
hanced judicial scrutiny as the standard of review, the court is not im-
posing on the target board some improbable burden to justify its ac-
tions.  That is, when a standard of review other than business 
judgment is held to apply, that holding is not necessarily outcome-
determinative.  In my opinion, a Unocal review is essentially an objec-
tive, reasonableness review, as distinct from the minimalist rationality 
standard of the business judgment rule.222  Consider this language 
from QVC: 
 Although an enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the reason-
ableness of the substantive merits of a board’s actions, a court should not 
ignore the complexity of the directors’ task in a sale of control.  There 
are many business and financial considerations implicated in investigat-
ing and selecting the best value reasonably available.  The board of di-
rectors is the corporate decisionmaking body best equipped to make 
these judgments.  Accordingly, a court applying enhanced judicial scru-
tiny should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, 
not a perfect decision.  If a board selected one of several reasonable alter-
natives, a court should not second-guess that choice even though it 
might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt 
on the board’s determination.  Thus, courts will not substitute their 
business judgment for that of the directors, but will determine if the di-
rectors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of reasonableness.
223
 
It should be noted that Vice Chancellor Lamb recently breathed 
new life into this common sense doctrine in his decision in the MONY 
Group litigation.224 
 
221 See, e.g., id. at 49 (“We conclude that the Paramount directors’ process was not 
reasonable, and the result achieved for the stockholders was not reasonable under the 
circumstances.”). 
222 Whether or not and the extent to which an entire fairness review is reason-
ableness-plus, will be discussed in Part IX.  Also, one should note section 4.01 of the 
ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance, which makes a careful distinction between ra-
tionality and reasonableness, providing that the former characterizes the business 
judgment rule analysis. 
223 QVC, 637 A.2d at 45. 
224 See In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 676-77 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (holding that directors did not breach their fiduciary duty because their deci-
sions were within a range of reasonableness). 
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Time-Warner did not involve a sale of control because public stock-
holders would continue to be in control.  Thus, the court counte-
nanced the notion that, under Unocal, the target board could take 
into account its strategic vision for the future of the firm in such a 
merger.225  By contrast, in QVC the court concluded that the future 
strategic vision of the directors of the target board was irrelevant be-
cause the merger was not a “merger of equals” but would result in 
Paramount’s merger partner, Viacom, having unquestioned control in 
the end—without a control premium for public stockholders.  That 
meant Sumner Redstone, the majority stockholder of Viacom, would 
have unquestioned control.226  The Paramount board had not under-
taken any negotiations with QVC, the other suitor, or done a market 
check.227  They had simply, and blindly, locked up the merger with 
various deal protection measures that shut out QVC, the higher bid-
der.228 
Among the major issues left open by Paramount v. QVC were these 
two:  (1) What is a “sale of control”; and (2) under what circumstances 
will deal protection measures for mergers of equals pass muster?  The 
Court of Chancery was faced with the latter question in several cases 
in the late 1990s and the early part of this century.229  These cases 
never reached the Supreme Court, presumably for the general rea-
sons mentioned above.230 
 
225 See Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153-54 
(Del. 1989) (explaining that the Unocal analysis is flexible enough to allow the direc-
tors to consider the long-term, strategic benefits of a transaction and the likelihood 
that stockholders might misapprehend those benefits). 
226 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 (“Irrespective of the present Paramount Board’s vision 
of a long-term strategic alliance with Viacom, the proposed sale of control would pro-
vide the new controlling stockholder with the power to alter that vision.”). 
227 Id. at 37-41. 
228 The protective measures included a no-shop provision, a termination fee, and a 
stock option agreement.  Id. 
229 See generally ACE Ltd. v. Capital RE Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999) (Strine, 
V.C.) (considering the validity of a “no-talk” provision in a merger agreement); In re 
IXC Communications, Inc., S’holders Litig., Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (decision by then-Vice Chancellor, now Chief Justice 
Steele, crediting a market check and other factors supporting business judgment in 
deal protection measures); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyrus Amax Minerals Co., No. 
17398, 1999 Del Ch. LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (Chandler, C.) (considering 
the validity of “no-talk” and termination fee provisions). 
230 See supra text accompanying note 223. 
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B.  Omnicare 
In 2003, the Supreme Court faced the deal protection question in 
an unusual and highly controversial case:  Omnicare v. NCS Health-
care.231  Omnicare was highly controversial not only because it was a rare 
split (3-2) decision of the usually unanimous Supreme Court,232 but 
also because it was surprising that the majority of the Supreme Court 
reversed a well-reasoned decision of the Court of Chancery.233  I dis-
sented in Omnicare, and Justice (now Chief Justice) Myron Steele 
joined in my dissent and filed a separate dissent. 
The target board in Omnicare had thoroughly shopped the com-
pany, which was in financial distress, and seemingly had nowhere to 
turn but to the deal they made and protected with the merger part-
ner, Genesis.  The deal, as protected, was approved in advance of the 
stockholders’ meeting by two controlling stockholders with a clear ma-
jority of the voting power.  Moreover, the deal included a “force the 
vote” provision specifically authorized by a recent amendment to the 
DGCL.234 
As a result of the decision by the majority in Omnicare, challenged 
deal protection measures must be reviewed under Unocal 235 and Uni-
trin236 to determine whether the directors “‘had reasonable grounds 
for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness ex-
isted.’”237  The deal protection measures must also be “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed,”238 which requires a showing that (1) the 
measures are neither “coercive”239 nor “preclusive,”240 and (2) the de-
 
231 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
232 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20 (discussing the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s frequent unanimity). 
233 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939. 
234 Id. at 918; see also id. at 937 & n.80 (explaining that DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
251(C) (2002) now provides that a merger may be put to a stockholder vote even if the 
board no longer recommends the merger). 
235 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
236 Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
237 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). 
238 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
239 “A response is ‘coercive’ if it is aimed at forcing upon stockholders a manage-
ment-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer.”  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935; Unitrin, 651 
A.2d at 1387. 
240 “A response is ‘preclusive’ if it deprives stockholders of the right to receive all 
tender offers or precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting 
proxy contests or otherwise.”  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935; Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387. 
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fensive response was “within a ‘range of reasonable responses’ to the 
threat perceived.”241 
In Omnicare, the majority held that the deal protection measures 
were invalid and unenforceable.242  The deal protection measures in 
question were:  (1) a provision requiring that the board put the 
merger to a stockholder vote even if the board no longer recom-
mended the transaction;243 (2) voting agreements executed by two 
stockholders (also board members, but voting as stockholders) who 
held a majority of the voting power of NCS, agreeing to vote in favor 
of the merger; and (3) the omission of a fiduciary out clause.244  The 
court held that this combination of deal protection devices was unen-
forceable, stating: 
 Although the minority stockholders were not forced to vote for the 
Genesis merger, they were required to accept it because it was a fait ac-
compli.  The record reflects that the defensive devices employed by the 
NCS board are preclusive and coercive in the sense that they accom-
plished a fait accompli.  In this case, despite the fact that the NCS board 
has withdrawn its recommendation for the Genesis transaction and rec-
ommended its rejection by the stockholders, the deal protection devices 
approved by the NCS board operated in concert to have a preclusive and 
coercive effect.  Those tripartite defensive measures—the Section 251(c) 
provision, the voting agreements, and the absence of an effective fiduci-
ary out clause—made it “mathematically impossible” and “realistically 
unattainable” for the Omnicare transaction or any other proposal to 
succeed, no matter how superior the proposal.
245
 
The majority found the deal protection measures preclusive, coer-
cive, beyond a reasonable range of responses to the threat of losing 
the Genesis merger, and, therefore, invalid and unenforceable.  The 
dissent expressed the contrary view:  that the board had properly ex-
ercised its business judgment.246  Our view was that the business judg-
ment rule, rather than Unocal, should have applied, but even under 
the Unocal standard the board’s conduct was reasonable and should 
have been upheld, as Vice Chancellor Lamb had held.  This was par-
ticularly true because of the dilemma facing the NCS board in view of 
 
241 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935. 
242 Id. at 936. 
243 This provision was in accordance with section 251(c) of the Delaware corporate 
law.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2002). 
244 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 918. 
245 Id. at 936. 
246 Id. at 940-41 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting). 
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the specter of insolvency.247  We further expressed the hope that later 
decisions would confine this decision to its facts.248 
Omnicare does not preclude the use of deal protection devices in 
the future, although it raises questions about which deal protection 
measures will be upheld.  The issue thus becomes what types and 
combinations of deal protection measures will be valid and enforce-
able after Omnicare.249 
In the recent case of Orman v. Cullman,250 the Chancellor distin-
guished Omnicare and upheld a different set of merger protection de-
vices.251  The Orman decision addresses a number of issues left open by 
Omnicare, including the application of Omnicare to transactions involv-
ing a target corporation with a controlling stockholder group.252  Or-
man also suggests the continued viability of certain deal protection de-
vices, at least when used in the right combination and with the right 
limitations.253 
 
247 Compare the discussion concerning the vicinity of insolvency, supra Part 
I.C.2.b. 
248 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 946 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“One hopes that the 
Majority rule announced here will be interpreted narrowly . . . . [I]f the holding is con-
fined to these unique facts, negotiations may be able to navigate around this new haz-
ard.”); id. at 940 (emphasizing that courts must analyze cases in their factual context); 
id. at 941 (explaining how NCS would not have had any purchaser were it not for the 
lock-ups); Charles Hanson, Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare:  The Chief Justice Got It Right, 
CORP., Oct. 15, 2004, at 5 (noting that the dissent “recognized reality”).  Contrast the 
conduct of the NCS board with that of the Paramount board in QVC.  See supra pp. 
1455-57 (discussing QVC).  The NCS board performed its diligence well, including 
market testing.  Its conduct, sadly, was nevertheless enjoined because of what the Su-
preme Court found to be an absolute lockup. 
249 As Jay Knight predicts: 
 Future merger agreements will certainly avoid the inclusion of these three 
provisions.  However, the real issue is how much can two companies include 
in their agreement to add certainty to the deal.  Are two out of three provi-
sions acceptable?  Maybe a voting agreement and merger agreement with an 
included fiduciary out clause will survive this new rule. 
Jay H. Knight, Merger Agreements Post-Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.:  How the 
Delaware Supreme Court Pulled the Plug on “Mathematical Lock-Ups,” 31 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 50 
(2004) (footnotes omitted); see also  E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the 
Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163 (2004). 
250 No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). 
251 Id. at *31-32. 
252 See id. at *3 (describing General Cigar’s IPO prospectus notifying prospective 
investors of a controlling stockholder group). 
253 See id. at *35-36 (describing the validity of a fiduciary out, the stockholders’ 
rights to reject a deal on its merits, and lockup agreements). 
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Orman was a very unusual case and one that was not particularly 
well briefed on the plaintiff’s side.254  Although it may be interpreted 
as showing an inclination by the Court of Chancery to find reasonable 
ways to distinguish Omnicare, Orman cannot be seen as ushering in a 
definitive sea change, nor should it be seen as a trailblazing decision; 
rather, it was decided in a different contextual milieu that was quite 
unusual, as was Omnicare.255 
Nevertheless, Orman indicates a possible trend toward limiting the 
majority holding in Omnicare to its facts.  Whether and how far that 
trend will continue and what the Delaware Supreme Court itself will 
do, if given the opportunity, remain to be seen, leaving dealmakers 
and deal lawyers to proceed with caution.256 
It is not practical to offer specific examples of deal protection 
measures that might survive review after Omnicare, but I will suggest 
some principles that might guide an analysis of whether particular 
measures will pass muster.  First, the courts are likely to limit and not 
expand the reach of Omnicare.  I think most objective observers believe 
that the majority decision was simply wrong.  Second, practitioners 
should not count on the court to overrule the decision—not only be-
cause of stare decisis but also because, if the reach of the decision is 
limited, it will not become necessary or practical for the court to over-
rule it.  Third, corporate jurisprudence should not discourage merg-
ers—they are often good for business and are sometimes necessary.  
Reasonable deal protection measures are often necessary to achieve a 
deal.  Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court is practical and has exper-
tise in business law.257  A deal protection measure that makes good 
business sense should pass muster if it allows the board to follow a best 
practices process.  I caution, however, that a disingenuous attempt to 
use some transparently artificial measure that is too-clever-by-half in 
 
254 For example, the deal in Orman involved an eighteen-month lockout, and the 
preclusion concept adopted by the majority in Omnicare was not argued.  Also, there 
apparently was no evidence of coercion in the record. 
255 For additional analysis of the impact of the Orman decision, see Rod Howard, 
Norman Veasey & Frederick Green, Delaware Curbs Omnicare with New Lockup Ruling, 
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2004, at 19, 19. 
256 Id. at 21.  In the future, I hope that the courts will analyze the equities when 
addressing deal protection measures.  In the Omnicare case, the board’s actions were 
authorized by law and were not inequitable, in my view.  Equitable principles should 
intrude on lawful activity only when there is a breach of fiduciary duty.  The Omnicare 
majority found an unprecedented legal prohibition through use of the “coercion” and 
“preclusion” terms of Unitrin, which the dissent did not believe were applicable.  I can-
not figure out and articulate where or how the directors breached a fiduciary duty. 
257 Veasey, supra note 47. 
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order to try to get around Omnicare in a superficial way while main-
taining an ironclad lockup with no realistic wiggle room is inviting 
trouble. 
C.  Contract Rights 
Omnicare and the deal protection measures challenged in that case 
also raise questions about the contract rights of third parties in 
merger transactions.  For example, when a court sets about to deter-
mine the validity of deal protection measures based on the fiduciary 
relationship of the target board to the target’s stockholders, are the 
rights of the acquiring company under the merger agreement to be 
ignored or trumped in all cases by violation of those fiduciary duties? 
The court in QVC rejected Viacom’s argument that it had certain 
vested contract rights in its merger agreement with Paramount.  The 
court rested its decision on the fact that the Paramount board had 
adopted the defensive measures in violation of their fiduciary duties.258  
Nevertheless, this issue of the tension between third party contract 
rights and the target board’s fiduciary duties remains largely unre-
solved in the Delaware case law.  Professor Paul Regan has stated: 
Historically, the judicial impulse in cases challenging the validity of 
break-up fees, lock-ups and no-shops amidst a proposed change of con-
trol transaction has been to protect the interests of the target corpora-
tion’s stockholders (the “owners”) from potential lapses in fidelity by 
their duly elected directors, without much mention of the favored bid-
der’s contractual interest.  Indeed, courts tend to rely almost exclusively 
on common law fiduciary duty principles as the governing normative 
standards for resolving such disputes.  The contractual interests of the 
third party acquiror corporation that arise under a merger agreement or 
similar contract with the selling corporation are seldom evaluated.  Con-
sequently, whether such contractual interests warrant any protection in-
variably turns on whether the court is satisfied that the directors of the 
selling corporation have fulfilled their fiduciary duties to the stockhold-
ers.259 
In a very incisive article, Frank Balotti and Gil Sparks have sug-
gested that two competing theoretical frameworks currently cloud this 
subject in Delaware.260  They propose that under Van Gorkom,261 at least 
 
258 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 50-51 (finding that the “defensive measures were improp-
erly designed to deter potential bidders”). 
259 Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations?  A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate 
Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
260 R. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Deal Protection Measures and the 
Merger Recommendation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 467 (2002). 
  
2005] DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW & GOVERNANCE 1992–2004 1463 
in the context of changed circumstances, contract rights are primary 
and directors will be bound by the terms of the agreement they made, 
regardless of whether their fiduciary duties would require them to 
take different actions based on later developments.262  Conversely, they 
suggest that the decision in QVC,263 which “held that merger provisions 
which purport to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as 
to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties are invalid, unenforceable, and 
vest no contract rights in the merger partner,” places fiduciary duty 
above contract rights.264 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that fiduciary duties should 
trump supposed contractual rights whenever those duties are suffi-
ciently well defined and established by legal precedent that a merger 
partner ought to know that it is taking a legal risk by insisting on cer-
tain contractual provisions in a given context.  The more difficult is-
sue is determining when a particular judicial articulation of fiduciary 
duties, or of their concrete implications, is so new, and represents such 
a fundamental departure from prior formulations, that it would be un-
reasonable and unfair to apply it against third parties who in good 
faith obtained contractual rights before the decisions announcing the 
new rule.  But perhaps a contractual provision that treads on estab-
lished principles of fiduciary duty runs a reasonable risk of being in-
validated. 
In Omnicare, at least, the court need not have chosen between con-
tract rights and fiduciary duty if it had applied the appropriate stan-
 
261 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
262 Balotti & Sparks explain: 
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed this issue and ap-
peared to resolve the question squarely in favor of contract rights:  A board’s 
compliance with its fiduciary duties is judged at the time it approves a merger 
agreement, and a board’s ability to act subsequently in response to post-
contracting events is governed by the terms of the merger agreement, not by 
generalized concepts of fiduciary duty. 
Balotti & Sparks, supra note 260, at 467-68. 
263 In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court explained: 
 Viacom argues that it had certain “vested” contract rights with respect to the 
No-Shop Provision and the Stock Option Agreement.  In effect, Viacom’s ar-
gument is that the Paramount directors could enter into an agreement in vio-
lation of their fiduciary duties and then render Paramount, and ultimately its 
stockholders, liable for failing to carry out an agreement in violation of those 
duties.  Viacom’s protestations about vested rights are without merit. 
QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (footnote omitted). 
264 Balotti & Sparks, supra note 260, at 471.  Justice Steele cited the Balotti and 
Sparks article in his dissent in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 947 
n.118 (Del. 2003) (Steele, J., dissenting). 
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dard of review to the facts of the case.  As Balotti and Sparks observe, 
this tension generally arises because of changed circumstances after a 
merger agreement is made.265  The dissents in Omnicare emphasized 
the dire circumstances that the NCS board faced and asserted that the 
board’s compliance with its fiduciary duties should be assessed as of 
the time the board entered the merger agreement with Genesis.  In 
my dissent I emphasized that “[t]he essential fact that must always be 
remembered is that this agreement and the voting commitments of 
Outcalt and Shaw concluded a lengthy search and intense negotiation 
process in the context of insolvency and creditor pressure where no 
other viable bid had emerged.”266  My dissent continued: 
It is now known, of course, after the case is over, that the stockholders of 
NCS will receive substantially more by tendering their shares into the 
topping bid of Omnicare than they would have received in the Genesis 
merger, as a result of the post-agreement Omnicare bid and the injunc-
tive relief ordered by the Majority of this Court.  Our jurisprudence can-
not, however, be seen as turning on such ex post felicitous results. 
Rather, the NCS board’s good faith decision must be subject to a real-
time review of the board action before the NCS-Genesis merger agree-
ment was entered into.
267
 
Had the majority taken that approach, they would have found that the 
board did not breach its fiduciary duties at all, and both fiduciary and 
contract duties could have been satisfied by proceeding with the 
Genesis transaction. 
Under the approach the majority did take, however, it appears 
that less protection would be given to contract rights of third parties 
when operating in the fiduciary context of a merger, though the court 
did not explicitly address the issue.  We must await the next case in 
 
265 See Balotti & Sparks, supra note 260, at 467-68 (addressing the tension between 
contract rights and “the fiduciary duties of directors in responding to post-contracting 
events,” including the board’s ability to change its recommendation regarding ap-
proval of a merger agreement). 
266 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting). 
267 Id.  Justice Steele’s separate dissent reasoned: 
 Importantly, Smith v. Van Gorkom[] correctly casts the focus on any court re-
view of board action challenged for alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of 
care “only upon the basis of the information then reasonably available to the 
directors and relevant to their decision. . . .”  Though criticized particularly 
for the imposition of personal liability on directors for a breach of the duty of 
care, Van Gorkom still stands for the importance of recognizing the limited cir-
cumstances for court intervention and the importance of focusing on the tim-
ing of the decision attacked. 
Id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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which the court is faced with the tension between contract rights and 
fiduciary principles to see what framework the court will ultimately 
employ to resolve the issue.268 
IV.  DERIVATIVE SUITS 
Derivative suits will lie against officers and directors for injury to 
the corporation they serve.  Following the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, invalidating previous sequestra-
tion procedure to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants,269 the Delaware General Assembly adopted a form of long-
arm statute providing in substance that by agreeing to serve as a direc-
tor of a Delaware corporation, the director subjects herself to personal 
jurisdiction in the Delaware courts.270  Effective January 1, 2004, the 
General Assembly amended the statute to authorize in personam ju-
risdiction over officers as well.271  The amendment’s purpose was to fa-
cilitate jurisdiction over those who may be found to have been the di-
rect cause of injury to the corporation. 
During my term, four principal developments emerged in the case 
law in the area of derivative litigation:  (1) a general clarification of 
the jurisprudence surrounding the demand-excused, demand-
required dichotomy; (2) judicial encouragement of the use of a sec-
tion 220 demand for books and records to aid in framing pleadings 
when the plaintiff attempts to satisfy the particularity requirements of 
Chancery Rule 23.1;272 (3) clarification of the law delineating when a 
suit is derivative and when it is direct; and (4) development of the 
concept of the independence of a majority of the board for presuit 
demand purposes.  I will address each in turn.  The matter of inde-
pendence has a broader sweep in corporate law than its application to 
 
268 Cf. Regan, supra note 259 (proposing a model for, and the policy considera-
tions supporting, the synthesis of contract and fiduciary principles in this context).  
Nondirector officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, but the precise outlines 
of those duties have not been fully defined in the cases.  See Lawrence A. Hamermesh 
& A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule:  A Reply to Pro-
fessor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. (forthcoming 2005) (observing that the “legal landscape” 
concerning the duties and liabilities of non-director corporate officers has changed 
little since 1992); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Du-
ties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215 (1992) (discussing the duties and 
liabilities of nondirector corporate officers). 
269 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
270 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 2004). 
271 Id.; see also 74 Del. Laws 83 (2003) (amending the statute to include officers). 
272 DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1. 
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presuit demand in derivative litigation.  So, I will touch on independ-
ence in this Part and then address it more fully in the next section. 
A.  General Clarification of Demand 
In several cases, including Rales v. Blasband,273 Grimes v. Donald,274 
Brehm v. Eisner,275 and Malpiede v. Townson,276 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to explicate pleading requirements and court analysis, bal-
ancing the particularity requirement of Rule 23.1 with the desirability 
of giving the plaintiff her day in court—or at least granting some dis-
covery—if there are inferences from the complaint that make it inap-
propriate to dismiss a case on a motion to dismiss. 
B.  The Use of Section 220 Demands 
In a plethora of derivative cases, beginning with the 1993 case of 
Rales v. Blasband,277 the Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery 
have encouraged plaintiffs to use the “tools at hand” and to seek 
books and records under section 220 of the DGCL278 to improve the 
specificity of their pleadings.279  Two cases, discussed in greater detail 
below,280 serve as representative illustrations.  Brehm v. Eisner, in the 
first phase of the Disney litigation, affirmed the dismissal of a defective 
initial complaint, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to per-
mit plaintiffs to replead, encouraging them to take advantage of sec-
tion 220.281  After heeding that advice, they framed a pleading that 
 
273 634 A.2d 927, 937 (Del. 1993) (excusing demand in breach of fiduciary duty 
claim by stockholders). 
274 673 A.2d 1207, 1220 (Del. 1996) (affirming dismissal of stockholder derivative 
complaint involving CEO employment agreements). 
275 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see also infra text accompanying note 281 (discussing 
this case). 
276 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001); see id. at 1101 (affirming dismissal of shareholder 
fiduciary duty and due care claims). 
277 634 A.2d 927. 
278 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2001) (providing a right of inspection of 
books and records by stockholders). 
279 See Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 981 nn.65-66 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citing numer-
ous cases in which the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery have en-
couraged plaintiffs to use section 220 to improve their pleadings). 
280 See infra notes 442-48 and accompanying text (discussing the courts’ admoni-
tion to plaintiffs to use section 220 to develop the factual basis for their claims and the 
resulting improvement in the specificity of plaintiffs’ pleadings). 
281 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  This Supreme Court decision in 
the Brehm case held that the original complaint was conclusory, filled with “prolix in-
vective,” but suggested the possibility of process failures and questioned whether the 
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survived a motion to dismiss where the first complaint had not.282  The 
Chancellor in his decision duly noted the successful use of section 
220.283 
The other illustrative case is Beam v. Stewart,284 in which the Su-
preme Court affirmed the dismissal of a derivative action.  The plain-
tiff attempted to plead that presuit demand should be excused be-
cause a majority of the board members of Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia were not independent, solely because they were social 
friends of Martha Stewart.  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 
failed to plead sufficient particularized facts to excuse demand, noting 
that such failure may have been at least partially based on her failure 
to take advantage of section 220.285 
Other cases during the past twelve years have delineated the ex-
tent to which the Court of Chancery should allow plaintiffs to obtain 
books and records in aid of a derivative claim.286  There are many new 
 
directors relied “in good faith” on an expert under section 141(e).  Id. at 249, 261-62.  
Brehm was a case that explored traditional concern over alleged process failures, and 
did not represent a judicial intrusion into business decisions.  Though some have sug-
gested otherwise, the opinion was clearly not a reaction to Enron and other scandals of 
2001–2002, which occurred long after Brehm was decided. 
282 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 280 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
283 In Disney, the Chancellor observed: 
After the Supreme Court’s remand regarding plaintiffs’ first amended com-
plaint, plaintiffs used the ‘tools at hand,’ a request for books and records as 
authorized under [section 220], to obtain information about the nature of the 
Disney Board’s involvement in the decision to hire and, eventually, to termi-
nate Ovitz.  Using the information gained from that request, plaintiffs drafted 
and filed the new complaint, which is the subject of the pending motions.  
The facts, as alleged in the new complaint, portray a markedly different pic-
ture of the corporate processes that resulted in the Ovitz employment agree-
ment than that portrayed in the first amended complaint. 
Id. at 279 (footnote omitted). 
284 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). 
285 Id. at 1056.  The Chancellor in his opinion in Beam, and the Supreme Court on 
appeal, dilated at some length on the value of section 220 and their frustration with 
plaintiffs who do not use it and later complain that they did not have access to facts to 
plead with specificity.  Id. at 1056-57; see also White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 549 n.15 
(Del. 2001) (“We have emphasized on several occasions that stockholder ‘plaintiffs 
may well have the “tools at hand” to develop the necessary facts for pleading purposes,’ 
including the inspection of the corporation’s books and records under [section 
220].”) (citation omitted); Beam, 833 A.2d at 979, 980 n.63, 981-84 & nn.65-66 (citing 
specific instances where plaintiff could have used section 220). 
286 See, e.g., Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 118-19 (Del. 2002) (con-
sidering the permissible scope of a stockholder’s books and records inspection); Sec. 
First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 569-70 (Del. 1997) (explain-
ing that the Court of Chancery must tailor the scope of the inspection to the “proper 
purpose” for which the stockholder seeks books and records).  For an excellent analy-
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and developing cases in this area—both on the use of section 220 in 
aid of derivative suits and on the scope of section 220.  The statute it-
self has recently been liberalized.287  This is likely to be a continuing 
area of development in the coming years,288 and this development may 
lead to changes in boardroom processes, such as increased precision 
in board meeting records.289 
C.  The Direct/Derivative Dichotomy 
My last corporate opinion for the court before retirement from 
the bench last spring was Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.290  
This en banc unanimous opinion was designed to clarify the slippery 
distinction between a derivative claim and a direct claim.  The distinc-
tion is of critical importance because a derivative claim requires pre-
suit demand on the board or an excusal of demand as futile under 
Chancery Rule 23.1 and the abundant case law.  A direct action, 
whether individual or class, is not subject to any such requirement. 
Delaware jurisprudence had been confused by an amorphous 
concept that would permit the pleader to assert a direct claim if she 
could show “special injury.”291  In Tooley, the court said that its prior 
jurisprudence should be clarified and cases overruled if necessary to 
excise the concept of special injury.292  The court did not create a new 
test for distinguishing between direct and derivative actions, but 
rather jettisoned the special injury concept and undertook to clarify 
which of several extant concepts in its jurisprudence should be ap-
plied.293  The court stated the law to be applied in determining 
 
sis of the subject, see Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation:  
Section 220 Demands, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
287 See Radin, supra note 286 (discussing the 2003 amendments to section 220). 
288 See id. (“The law will continue to evolve, and the pendulum will continue to 
shift . . . as more and more shareholders test the limits of Section 220 . . . and as courts 
struggle to craft the proper balance between the rights of minority shareholders . . . 
and the rights of directors . . . .”). 
289 See id. (discussing the impact of changes in section 220 litigation on boardroom 
practices). 
290 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004). 
291 See id. at 1035 (describing the special injury test as “not helpful” and “confus-
ing”). 
292 See id. at 1038 n.21 (describing the court’s use of the special injury test in In re 
Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litigation, 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993), as a “lapse”). 
293 According to the court: 
The special injury concept . . . can be confusing in identifying the nature of 
the action.  The same is true of the proposition . . . that an action cannot be 
direct if all stockholders are equally affected or unless the stockholder’s injury 
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whether a particular claim is direct or derivative going forward as fol-
lows: 
 The analysis must be based solely on the following questions:  Who 
suffered the alleged harm—the corporation or the suing stockholder in-
dividually—and who would receive the benefit of the recovery or other 
remedy?  This simple analysis is well imbedded in our jurisprudence, but 
some cases have complicated it by injection of the amorphous and con-
fusing concept of “special injury.” 
 The Chancellor, in the very recent Agostino case, correctly points this 
out and strongly suggests that we should disavow the concept of “special 
injury.”  In a scholarly analysis of this area of the law, he also suggests 
that the inquiry should be whether the stockholder has demonstrated 
that he or she has suffered an injury that is not dependent on an injury 
to the corporation.  In the context of a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty, the Chancellor articulated the inquiry as follows:  “Looking at the 
body of the complaint and considering the nature of the wrong alleged 
and the relief requested, has the plaintiff demonstrated that he or she 
can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation?”  We believe 
that this approach is helpful in analyzing the first prong of the analysis:  
what person or entity has suffered the alleged harm?  The second prong 
of the analysis should logically follow.
294
 
This holding seems understandable.  In some cases the distinction 
is clear.  For example, a corporate waste claim is clearly derivative be-
cause it is the corporation’s assets that have allegedly been wasted.  A 
case that turns on a material misstatement in a proxy statement seek-
ing a stockholder vote on a merger is clearly a direct action.  But the 
application of Tooley to borderline cases may not be easy.  As always, 
courts will be confronted with applying the requisite inquiries care-
fully to the facts before them to reach the correct result. 
 
is separate and distinct from that suffered by other stockholders.  The proper 
analysis has been and should remain that stated in Grimes [v. Donald, 673 A.2d 
1207 (Del. 1996)]; Kramer [v. Western Pacific Industries, 546 A.2d 348 (Del. 
1988)] and Parnes [v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243 (Del. 1999)].  
That is, a court should look to the nature of the wrong and to whom the relief 
should go.  The stockholder’s claimed direct injury must be independent of 
any alleged injury to the corporation.  The stockholder must demonstrate that 
the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail 
without showing an injury to the corporation. 
Id. at 1038-39. 
294 Id. at 1035-36 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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D.  Director Independence 
Delaware does not have statutory or case law that imposes a “one-
size-fits-all” independence template for all purposes.  Characteristi-
cally, Delaware deals with board independence contextually, on a 
case-by-case basis.  In Beam v. Stewart, the court considered whether 
members of the Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia board were inde-
pendent for purposes of presuit demand.295  In analyzing the inde-
pendence issue, the court noted that the relevant questions are:  
“[I]ndependent from whom and independent for what purpose?”296 
The court answered those questions by holding that friendship 
and social relationships between the CEO target of the derivative suit 
and the outside directors did not—standing alone—rebut the pre-
sumption of independence for presuit demand purposes.297  In doing 
so, the court was careful to distinguish Vice Chancellor Strine’s deci-
sion in Oracle,298 in which he held, in quite a different context, that 
Stanford University connections between members of a special litiga-
tion committee (SLC) of the board and the CEO and other non-
independent directors prevented the SLC from carrying its burden of 
 
295 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1048-52 (Del. 2004). 
296 Id. at 1049-50 (“Independence is a fact-specific determination made in the con-
text of a particular case.  The court must make that determination by answering the 
inquiries:  independent from whom and independent for what purpose?”). 
297 The court presented the following description of the relationship necessary to 
make demand futile: 
 A variety of motivations, including friendship, may influence the demand 
futility inquiry.  But, to render a director unable to consider demand, a rela-
tionship must be of a bias-producing nature.  Allegations of mere personal 
friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insuffi-
cient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence. 
Id. at 1050.  Some argue that even outside directors cannot be trusted to act independ-
ently, since they hold a position as “professional colleague” within the corporate struc-
ture.  See Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Liti-
gation:  Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 534 
(1989) (describing the structural bias argument as a dubious critique of the ability of 
outside directors to be “neutral on questions of management misbehavior”).  The arti-
cle concludes in the context of derivative litigation: 
The structural bias argument asks us to believe that outside directors generally 
are more willing to risk reputation and future income than they are to risk the 
social embarrassment of calling a colleague to account.  There is no more rea-
son to believe this than there is to believe that independent accountants are 
easily suborned because they are indifferent to the loss of income from other 
professional engagements thereby put at risk. 
Id. at 535. 
298 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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proof of affirmatively showing its independence.299  Significantly, the 
Stanford connection seemed to have been unearthed in discovery and 
apparently had not been revealed in the SLC’s report.300  The Beam 
court observed that the burden of persuasion and the presumption of 
independence differ significantly in the demand excusal and SLC 
contexts.301 
V.  INDEPENDENCE IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
So the questions remain:  Independent from whom?  Independ-
ent for what purpose?  There were different presumptions, different 
burdens, and different underlying policies in the independence analy-
sis in the presuit demand context in Beam and in the SLC context in 
Oracle.  Despite the differences, the Supreme Court was careful to note 
in Beam that it did not need to decide whether a connection such as 
that found in Oracle would have been sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of independence for purposes of a presuit demand.302  While the 
inquiries and the underlying policies differ, it remains to be seen 
whether, based on the same relationships, the outcomes would differ 
in the two contexts. 
One of the most important aspects of director independence re-
lates to the use of committees.  Kahn v. Lynch303 and Kahn v. Tremont  304 
stand for the propositions that a special transactional committee:  (a) 
must be truly independent in its conduct and not merely appear to be 
independent because of the pedigree of its members; and (b) if it is 
designed to be a surrogate for minority stockholder bargaining with a 
controlling stockholder, it may shift to the stockholders the burden of 
proof in an entire fairness context.305  Moreover, in cases like McMullin 
v. Beran306 and Krasner v. Moffett 307 where the corporations use special 
transactional committees, the Supreme Court has determined that the 
 
299 Id. at 937-48. 
300 Id. at 929-35. 
301 Beam, 845 A.2d at 1054-55. 
302 Id. at 1055. 
303 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc. 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995). 
304 Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997). 
305 Consider also Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Oracle, distinguished in Beam, 
that a special litigation committee requires an even more searching analysis.  Oracle, 
824 A.2d at 939-42; see also Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985) (stating 
that a special litigation committee, especially a one-person committee, must be “like 
Caesar’s wife . . . above reproach”) 
306 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000). 
307 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003). 
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contextual analysis inherent in the independence determination is 
normally unsuitable for dismissal under Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). 
Today, the matter of director independence is a prevailing theme 
in corporate governance, if not always in corporate law.  The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act focuses on audit committee independence, while the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ have listing requirements 
with varying definitions of independence,308 as do organizations such 
as the Council of Institutional Investors.309  Many corporations have 
their own definitions.  Indeed, there is continuing media scrutiny of 
the application to particular directors of the expectation that a direc-
tor whose business or family has economic ties to the corporation is 
not independent as a general matter.310 
But for Delaware law purposes, there is no generalization or “one 
size fits all” analysis.  In the Brehm v. Eisner case in 2000, the Council of 
Institutional Investors as amicus curiae invited the Supreme Court to 
adopt a bright line rule defining what constitutes an independent di-
rector.  The court declined to do so because such a bright line rule 
would be antithetical to the Delaware contextual approach.311  Again, 
the inquiry should be:  independent from whom and independent for 
what purpose?  The result is that Delaware’s independence test may 
be more or less exacting than other tests, depending on the context.312 
 
308 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2004) (defining 
“independent director” for purposes of listing on the NYSE), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/about/listed/1022221393251.html 
(last accessed Feb. 17, 2005); NASD MANUAL Marketplace Rule 4200(a)(15) (defining 
“independent director” for NASDAQ listing purposes), available at http://nasd. 
complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=115900635 (last 
accessed Mar. 27, 2005). 
309 See Council of Institutional Investors, Independent Director Definition, at 
http://www.cii.org/dcwasciiweb.nsf/doc/council_indepdirectdef.cm (Mar. 25, 2004) 
(providing this organization’s definition of independence). 
310 See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller & Joann S. Lublin, In Boardrooms, “Independent” Is 
Debatable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2005, at C1 (reviewing corporate filings and suggesting 
that perhaps some directors who satisfy requirements for independence under NYSE 
and NASDAQ rules should not be considered independent). 
311 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 & n.30 (2000) (declining to impose the 
recommendations of the Council of Institutional Investors because they were not 
mandated by Delaware law, and because the court’s scope of review was limited to re-
viewing whether the particularized facts alleged in the complaint suggested a breach of 
the board’s fiduciary duties); see also Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003) 
(observing that the “independence of [a] special committee involves a fact-intensive 
inquiry that varies from case to case”). 
312 There is a distinction in Delaware law between the concepts of director inde-
pendence  and director interestedness.  Under the DGCL, an interested director is one 
who has a personal interest in the particular corporate matter on which her action is 
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VII.  DISCLOSURE ISSUES 
The duty of disclosure requires that in a proxy statement or other 
writing seeking action by stockholders or putative investors, the cor-
poration must meet disclosure requirements that are generally 
aligned with federal law.313  In Stroud v. Grace, the court stated the 
“well-recognized proposition that directors of Delaware corporations 
are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material in-
formation within the board’s control when it seeks stockholder ac-
tion.” 314  The court reaffirmed its preference for the materiality stan-
dard315 over the concept of “candor” that had “crept into” the case law, 
a concept that the court deemed to be “confusing and imprecise.”316 
When directors solicit a stockholder vote on a matter, such as a 
merger, the duty of disclosure under state law is somewhat diffuse.  It 
is usually embodied in judicial decisions, rather than being explicated 
in a statute.317  Disclosure requirements for public corporations are de-
 
requested.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (relating to contracts or transactions be-
tween a corporation and interested directors).  Delaware case law uses the concept of 
independence to define a director who may have family, business, or other relation-
ships with a person with a direct interest in a transaction.  See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 
A.2d 1040, 1049-50 (Del. 2004) (discussing independence for purposes of presuit de-
mand).  In contrast, recent amendments to the MBCA employ the concept of “quali-
fied directors” to embrace concepts of both interestedness and independence.  See 
Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 54, at 341 (2004) (adding a definition of “qualified 
director” and amending various sections to replace the interested director or inde-
pendent director concepts with that of qualified director). 
313 In Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993), the court observed: 
 The requirement that a director disclose to shareholders all material facts 
bearing upon a merger vote arises under the duties of care and loyalty . . . . In 
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., [493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985)], this Court adopted 
the materiality standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in TSC 
Industries v. Northway, [426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)]. 
Id. at 778. 
314 Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992).  Stroud was decided two days after 
I joined the court, but I obviously did not participate in the case. 
315 Id. at 85 (“The board is not required to disclose all available information. . . . 
[T]he materiality standard of TSC Industries [v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976),] re-
quires disclosure of all facts which would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available.” (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
316 Id. at 84. 
317 See, for example, the notice provision in the statutory merger section of the 
DGCL: 
The agreement . . . shall be submitted to the stockholders . . . at an annual or 
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement.  Due notice of 
the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of 
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tailed in the federal securities laws and SEC regulations.  There is very 
little detailed guidance for small corporations.318  Perhaps some day 
the legislature will consider a more detailed disclosure statute.319  Until 
then, the Delaware courts seem to be feeling their way along reasona-
bly well in identifying the parameters of the duties of disclosure when 
stockholders are asked to vote on proposals.320 
A number of cases during the past twelve years developed the law 
regarding partial disclosures.  In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, 
Inc., the court held that even though the materiality standard might 
not require that a particular category of information be disclosed, 
“once defendants traveled down the road of partial disclosure of the 
history leading up to the Merger and used the vague language de-
scribed, they had an obligation to provide the stockholders with an 
accurate, full, and fair characterization of those historic events.”321  
Then, in Zirn v. VLI Corp., the court again faced the partial disclosure 
issue and held that directors have a duty to avoid misleading partial 
disclosures.322 
 
stock . . . . The notice shall contain a copy of the agreement or a brief sum-
mary thereof, as the directors shall deem advisable. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 2004). 
318 See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
319 The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws (which I chair) has a task force co-
chaired by Justice Jack Jacobs and Stan Keller, which is considering whether the MBCA 
should be amended to provide more clarity in various sections where a stockholder 
vote is required, such as a merger or amending the certificate of incorporation. See, 
e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (2004) (requiring the board to submit “the 
amendment” to stockholders).  Although Delaware is not a Model Act state, the Dela-
ware bar’s Corporation Law Section, which drafts legislation for consideration by the 
Delaware General Assembly, may or may not undertake a similar study or consider any 
proposed Model Act amendment that may emerge from this study. 
320 See, e.g., Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80, 82 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding 
that in a second-step, short-form merger, fiduciary duty required disclosure of sum-
mary financial information beyond the disclosures that would satisfy the statutory 
mandate). 
321 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994). 
322 Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 1996); see also Malone v. Brincat, 
722 A.2d 5, 12 n.31 (Del. 1998) (noting Zirn’s holding against misleading partial dis-
closure, and stating that “[d]irectors are required to provide shareholders with all in-
formation that is material to the action being requested and to provide a balanced, 
truthful account of all matters disclosed in the communications with shareholders”).  
Consider also the following analysis from Williams v. Geier : 
Under Delaware law, it is undisputed that when a board of directors is re-
quired or elects to seek shareholder action, it is under a duty to disclose fully 
and fairly pertinent information within the board’s control . . . . The board 
could not couch these disclosures in vague or euphemistic language or in 
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In Arnold, Zirn, and other disclosure cases before 1998, the chal-
lenged disclosures had been made in connection with a request for 
stockholder action of some kind.  Another species of the disclosure 
law now forms part of the directors’ fiduciary duties where stockhold-
ers are not being asked to vote. 
In Malone v. Brincat,323 the plaintiffs challenged disclosures made 
in a context other than a request that stockholders vote or take some 
other action.  The case involved the reversal of a grant of a motion to 
dismiss where the plaintiffs alleged that the corporation and its offi-
cers deliberately misled existing stockholders by painting a rosy picture 
of the firm’s finances when they knew the information to be false, and that 
the corporation actually was in dire financial straits.324 
Even though the stockholders were not asked to vote, buy, sell, or 
take other action, the plaintiffs alleged that the disclosures fraudu-
lently lulled the stockholders into a false sense of security that led 
them to hold on to their stock.325  Thus, the court faced the issue of 
whether the fiduciary duty to disclose material information could be 
implicated in the absence of a request for stockholder action.326  It 
held that “directors who knowingly disseminate false information that 
results in corporate injury or damage to an individual stockholder vio-
late their fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner 
appropriate to the circumstances.”327  The court framed the question, 
however, as implicating the directors’ “more general duty of loyalty 
and good faith” rather than their duty of disclosure.328 
Despite its holding that the dissemination of misinformation al-
leged by the plaintiffs might support a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty, the court also found that the complaint failed to state a direct, 
derivative, or individual cause of action.329  The court disagreed “with 
 
terms that would deprive the stockholders of their right to choose.  The dis-
closures must be forthright and clear, and they were in this case. 
671 A.2d 1368, 1383 (Del. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
323 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
324 See id. at 7 (“The complaint alleged that the director defendants intentionally 
overstated the financial condition of Mercury on repeated occasions throughout a 
four-year period in disclosures to Mercury’s shareholders.”); see also id. at 8 (quoting 
the complaint as alleging that “the company has lost all or virtually all of its value 
(about $2 billion)”). 
325 Id. 
326 Id. at 9. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. at 10. 
329 Id. at 14-15. 
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the Court of Chancery’s holding that such a claim cannot be articu-
lated on these facts” and ordered that the “plaintiffs should have been 
permitted to amend their complaint, if possible, to state a properly 
cognizable cause of action.”330  Thus, the court affirmed the Court of 
Chancery’s dismissal of the complaint, but reversed the trial court’s 
decision that the dismissal should be with prejudice, thus allowing the 
plaintiffs to replead.331 
Malone merits mention because of its departure from the usual 
context of disclosure cases, in which investors have been asked to take 
some action.  In addition, it constituted a decision that allegations of 
intentional, material misrepresentation can survive a motion to dismiss 
if appropriately pleaded. 
This decision has engendered some criticism as expanding Dela-
ware disclosure law and encroaching on federal securities law.  The 
case should not be cause for alarm—it does not stand for any broader 
reading.  It is simply a pleading case.  That is, the court did not find 
that the facts supported a finding of fiduciary breach, but rather that 
such allegations might merit further investigation and factual devel-
opment.  In my view, it is axiomatic that directors who deliberately lie 
to their stockholders about material company finances have violated 
one or more of their fiduciary duties. 
Malone is also significant from a federalism perspective.  The court 
noted that both Delaware and federal law regulate directors’ disclo-
sure obligations.332  Because of the potential overlap of Delaware fidu-
ciary law and federal securities law in this area, the Malone court was 
careful to craft the directors’ disclosure duties so as to minimize intru-
sion into traditionally federal territory.  Specifically, the court reiter-
ated that “[i]n deference to the panoply of federal protections that 
are available to investors in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities of Delaware corporations, this Court has decided not to rec-
ognize a state common law cause of action against the directors . . . for 
‘fraud on the market.’”333  The court distinguished the Malone facts 
from that area of traditional federal regulation, however, by emphasiz-
ing that the plaintiffs had not traded their shares, and their claims 
therefore would not implicate federal securities laws because there 
 
330 Id. at 15. 
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 12-13 (citing Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467 (Del. 1992), in which 
the court refused to adopt fraud on the market as a cognizable claim and held that re-
liance must be proven for individual stockholders). 
333 Id. at 13. 
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was neither a purchase nor a sale of a security.334  Malone’s holding, 
carefully tailored to the facts as alleged in the complaint, prudently 
confined the reach of the case not only to the allegations of inten-
tional misdisclosure that misled stockholders but also to an area ap-
propriately governed by state law.  By doing so, it avoided overreach-
ing into areas regulated by federal law.335 
VIII.  CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY 
In Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.,336 the Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed a ruling by the Court of Chancery that a director had 
usurped a corporate opportunity that belonged to the corporation on 
the board of which he served.337  The court’s general statement of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine was relatively unremarkable,338 but the 
court’s discussion of the issue of presentation to the board merits 
mention. 
The court stated that the Court of Chancery had erroneously im-
posed a new requirement of presentation to the board by placing too 
much emphasis on the defendant director’s failure to do so.339  The 
court observed that a fair presentation to the board creates a “safe 
harbor” for the director, but that it is not a prerequisite to finding that 
the director did not usurp a corporate opportunity.  The court ex-
plained: 
 
334 Id. 
335 Cf. infra text accompanying note 472 (counseling that federal authorities 
should avoid overreaching into areas appropriately governed by state corporate law). 
336 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). 
337 Id. at 150. 
338 The court followed the classic statement of the doctrine in Guth v. Loft: 
[A] corporate officer or director may not take a business opportunity for his 
own if:  (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2) 
the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; (3) the corpora-
tion has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the 
opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a 
position inimicable to his duties to the corporation.  The Court in Guth also 
derived a corollary which states that a director or officer may take a corporate 
opportunity if:  (1) the opportunity is presented to the director or officer in 
his individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is not essen-
tial to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no interest or expectancy in 
the opportunity; and (4) the director or officer has not wrongfully employed 
the resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity. 
Broz, 673 A.2d at 155 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)). 
339 Id. at 157. 
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 The teaching of Guth and its progeny is that the director or officer 
must analyze the situation ex ante to determine whether the opportunity 
is one rightfully belonging to the corporation.  If the director or officer 
believes, based on one of the factors articulated above, that the corpora-
tion is not entitled to the opportunity, then he may take it for himself.  
Of course, presenting the opportunity to the board creates a kind of 
“safe harbor” for the director, which removes the specter of a post 
hoc judicial determination that the director or officer has improperly 
usurped a corporate opportunity.  Thus, presentation avoids the possibil-
ity that an error in the fiduciary’s assessment of the situation will create 
future liability for breach of fiduciary duty.  It is not the law of Delaware 
that presentation to the board is a necessary prerequisite to a finding 
that a corporate opportunity has not been usurped. 340 
At least one commentator has suggested that Broz demonstrates 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s willingness to focus on the good faith 
of directors and to trust the directors to choose the appropriate 
course of action.341  This approach reflects the broad reality that most 
directors do perform their duties in good faith and in keeping with 
legal requirements and best practices.  The Broz approach also strikes 
an appropriate balance between legal and extralegal controls on cor-
porate affairs. 
IX.  CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS 
A.  The Intersection of Fiduciary Duty  
and Stockholder Rights 
In 1996, the Supreme Court was asked to reconcile the corporate 
opportunity doctrine with the principle that stockholders, even con-
trolling stockholders, are permitted to vote their shares in their own 
self-interest.  In Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc.,342 the Eriksons, two control-
ling stockholders of CERBCO, who were also two of the four directors 
of the company, were approached about the possible sale of a subsidi-
 
340 Id.; see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 263 (Del. 2002) (noting 
that presentation of an opportunity to the board creates a safe harbor for an interested 
director); cf. Yiannatsis v. Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. 1995) (holding that ma-
jority stockholders in a close corporation breached their fiduciary duties when they 
failed to present a corporate opportunity to the corporation). 
341 See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape:  A Comparative Sketch of 
Directors’ Self-Interested Transactions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1999, at 243, 260-
61 (“Broz reflects a court willing to assume that, even in the absence of a formal presen-
tation and a formal meeting, disinterested directors will evaluate and react appropri-
ately to information they receive.”). 
342 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996). 
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ary company, CERBCO’s most valuable asset.343  Instead of presenting 
the offer to CERBCO, the Eriksons offered to sell their controlling in-
terest in CERBCO to the buyer.344  The case raised the question 
whether, by effectuating such a sale, the Eriksons as directors would 
breach their fiduciary duties by usurping an opportunity that be-
longed to CERBCO.345  Since the Eriksons had a right to veto a sale of 
all or substantially all of CERBCO’s assets under DGCL section 271,346 
their failure to present the opportunity to the company might not 
have caused any harm to the company because as stockholders the 
Eriksons could have prevented the sale in any event.347 
The Supreme Court stated: 
 We agree that in a particular setting these two precepts of corporate 
law may tend to pull in opposite directions, but the statutorily granted 
rights under § 271 cannot be interpreted to completely vitiate the obli-
gation of loyalty.  The shareholder vote provided by § 271 does not su-
persede the duty of loyalty owed by control persons, just as the statutory 
power to merge does not allow oppressive conduct in the effectuation of 
a merger.  Rather, this statutorily conferred power must be exercised 
within the constraints of the duty of loyalty.  In practice, the reconcilia-
tion of these two precepts of corporate law means that the duty of a con-
trolling shareholder/director will vary according to the role being 
played by that person and the stage of the transaction at which the 
power is employed.
348
 
Because the potential acquirer approached the Eriksons as direc-
tors, the court held the Eriksons were obligated to present the oppor-
tunity to CERBCO.  By failing to do so they breached their duty of 
loyalty.349  The court indicated that the Eriksons were entitled to act as 
stockholders and obtain a control premium, but only after presenting 
the opportunity to the corporation, withdrawing from further action 
on behalf of the company, and allowing the outside directors to nego-
tiate on CERBCO’s behalf.350  Nevertheless, because the subsidiary’s 
sale to the bidder would have constituted a sale of all or substantially 
 
343 Id. at 438.  The Eriksons were presumably approached in their capacity as di-
rectors.  Id. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. at 437. 
346 Section 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
271 (2001), requires majority stockholder approval of a sale of all or substantially all of 
a corporation’s assets. 
347 Thorpe, 676 A.2d at 437. 
348 Id. at 442 (citations omitted). 
349 Id. 
350 Id. 
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all of CERBCO’s assets under section 271, entitling the Eriksons to 
veto that sale, no transactional damages were available.351  The court 
required that the Eriksons disgorge the benefit they received from 
their dealings with the bidder and that they reimburse CERBCO for 
expenses it incurred in connection with the Eriksons’ actions.352 
The court has continued to refine the duties owed by controlling 
stockholders and the analytical paradigm that applies to their dealings 
with the companies they control.  In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,353 the 
court commented that its determination of the fairness of a transac-
tion might have been “entirely different” had the company used a 
special committee of independent outside directors in negotiating the 
transaction at issue.354  Following Weinberger, commentators focused on 
the legal effect of a properly functioning special committee of inde-
pendent directors.355  Some Delaware cases held that approval by such 
a committee shifted the burden of proof concerning entire fairness 
 
351 The court held that transactional damages were inappropriate despite the Erik-
sons’ breach of fiduciary duty, because: 
Section 271 must . . . be given independent legal significance apart from the 
duty of loyalty.  While the failure of CERBCO to sell East [the subsidiary] to 
INA [the buyer] is certainly related to the Eriksons’ faithlessness, that failure 
did not proximately result from the breach.  Instead the Eriksons’ § 271 rights 
are ultimately responsible for the nonconsummation of the transaction.  Even 
if the Eriksons had behaved faithfully to their duties to CERBCO, they still 
could have rightfully vetoed a sale of substantially all of CERBCO’s assets un-
der § 271.  Thus, the § 271 rights, not the breach, were the proximate cause of 
the nonconsummation of the transaction. 
Id. at 444 (citation omitted). 
352 Id. at 445.  Although the deal was not consummated, the Eriksons were ordered 
to disgorge $75,000 received from the bidder in connection with negotiations.  Id. 
353 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
354 Id. at 709 n.7. 
355 See, e.g., Jesse A. Finkelstein, Independent Committees in Interested Transactions, 21 
DEL. L. REV. 18, 18 (1994) (explaining to practitioners the implications of Weinberger 
for their clients); Geoffrey E. Hobart, Casenote, Delaware Improves Its Treatment of 
Freezeout Mergers:  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 25 B.C. L. REV. 685, 693 (1984) (discussing 
the impact that the Weinberger court’s guidelines will have on future parent-subsidiary 
freezeout mergers).  Over twenty years later, this issue continues to attract commen-
tary.  See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom:  
The Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389, 1389 (2004) (not-
ing that committees of independent directors have become so widely used over the 
past thirty years that they may now need their own attorneys); E. Norman Veasey, Sepa-
rate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors:  An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as 
a General Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413 (2004) (suggesting that the general counsel will 
generally perform most of the legal work required by the board, including the inde-
pendent directors); Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 
90 VA. L. REV. 2245, 2250 (2004) (discussing the ability of the sort of independent ap-
proval suggested in Weinberger to check the conduct of controlling shareholders). 
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from the defendants to the plaintiffs,356 while others held that ap-
proval by such a committee allowed for the application of the business 
judgment rule to the transaction in question.357 
The Delaware Supreme Court resolved the issue in the Kahn v. 
Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. cases.358  In those cases, the court 
held that the standard of review of a transaction involving a control-
ling stockholder standing on both sides of the deal remains that of en-
tire fairness.359  That burden may be shifted, however, where a proce-
dure, such as use of an independent committee or majority of the 
minority approval, approximates arms-length negotiation.360 
Despite the effects of the use of special committees or majority of 
the minority votes, the court has continued to express concern that 
controlling stockholders are in a unique position to exert inappropri-
ate pressure even on independent directors or stockholders consider-
ing the propriety of a particular transaction.361  Thus, controlling 
 
356 See, e.g., Rabkin v. Olin Corp., No. 7547, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *16-17 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990) (indicating that majority of the minority approval or negotia-
tion by a special committee can shift the burden of persuasion to plaintiffs, but that 
the standard of review remains entire fairness), aff’d, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990). 
357 For example, the Court of Chancery said: 
When independent directors understand the nature of their mission when 
negotiating a change of control transaction in which management or a con-
trolling shareholder is involved—to agree only to a transaction that is in the 
best interests of the public shareholders; to say no unless they conclude that 
they have achieved a fair transaction that is the best transaction available—
and where they pursue that goal independently, in good faith and diligently, 
their decision, in my opinion, deserves the respect accorded by the business 
judgment rule. 
In re First Boston, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10338, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 74, at *21-22 
(Del. Ch. June 7, 1990). 
358 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc. (Lynch I), 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); 
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc. (Lynch II), 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995). 
359 Lynch I, 638 A.2d at 1117. 
360 See Lynch II, 669 A.2d at 82-84, for a review of the burden-shifting paradigm 
established by the court in Lynch I, 638 A.2d at 1117. 
361 The court explained this concern in Kahn v. Tremont Corp.: 
 Entire fairness remains applicable even when an independent committee is 
utilized because the underlying factors which raise the specter of impropriety 
can never be completely eradicated and still require careful judicial scrutiny.  
This policy reflects the reality that in a transaction such as the one considered 
in this appeal, the controlling shareholder will continue to dominate the 
company regardless of the outcome of the transaction.  The risk is thus cre-
ated that those who pass upon the propriety of the transaction might perceive 
that disapproval may result in retaliation by the controlling shareholder.  
Consequently, even when the transaction is negotiated by a special committee 
of independent directors, “no court could be certain whether the transaction 
fully approximate[d] what truly independent parties would have achieved in 
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stockholder transactions remain as only one context, of many, in 
which fiduciaries must be cognizant of the apparent propriety of the 
transaction, meaningful process, and true independence. 
B.  “Going Private” Transactions 
The well-embedded entire fairness standard has not been applied 
to all transactions involving a controlling stockholder, leading to what 
some have described as a “possible incoherence”362 in the jurispru-
dence.  “Going private” transactions involve a controlling stock-
holder’s attempt to eliminate public stockholders, thereby transition-
ing the company to private ownership and affording certain practical 
benefits.363  A variety of methods may be used to take a company pri-
vate,364 but courts and commentators have devoted substantial atten-
tion to the similarities and differences between two of these methods. 
In a traditional long-form negotiated merger under Delaware law, 
the parties enter a merger agreement, and the board of directors of 
each corporation must review the agreement and recommend it to 
their respective stockholders.365  The stockholders of each party must 
then approve the merger by a majority of the outstanding shares.366  
Stockholders voting against a merger that ultimately wins approval by 
a majority of the outstanding shares thus may be involuntarily cashed 
out of the company. 
 
an arm’s length negotiation.”  Cognizant of this fact, we have chosen to apply 
the entire fairness standard to “interested transactions” in order to ensure that 
all parties to the transaction have fulfilled their fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration and all its shareholders. 
694 A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
362 In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 435 (Del. Ch. 2002); see also 
id. (describing the “disparity in treatment . . . [between] negotiated merger versus ten-
der offer/short-form merger”). 
363 Major reasons that companies go private include the desire to avoid regulatory 
requirements and expenses, to pursue long-term value maximization, and to reduce 
agency costs.  The effective closure of capital markets also gives companies less reason 
to be public.  See Joshua M. Koenig, Survey, A Brief Roadmap to Going Private, 2004 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 505, 509-11 (discussing reasons companies go private). 
364 See id. at 532 (describing the forms going private transactions may take) (citing 
Dennis J. White & Patricia A. Johansen, The Tide’s Turning for Going Private, BUYOUTS, 
May 26, 2003, at 24, 24-25); Jason M. Quintana, Survey, Going Private Transactions:  
Delaware’s Race to the Bottom?, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547, 568 (“Generally, there are 
four different ways to take a company private:  negotiated mergers, tender offers, asset 
dispositions and reverse stock splits.”). 
365 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b)-(c) (Supp. 2004) (requiring each board to 
adopt a resolution approving the merger and declaring its advisability). 
366 Id. § 251(c). 
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Long-form mergers may be more favorable than other methods of 
going private for reasons related to taxes and financing.367  More often 
than not, however, the downside of long-form mergers outweighs any 
potential advantages.  For instance, due to the multiple levels of ap-
proval required in a single-step, long-form merger, the process is often 
both costly and time consuming.368  In addition, as discussed more 
fully below, long-form mergers are subject to entire fairness review 
under Lynch II. 
An alternative to the traditional long-form merger is a two-step 
transaction composed of an initial tender offer followed by a short-
form merger.  Under Delaware law, once a tender offer results in the 
acquisition of at least ninety percent of the company’s shares, any re-
maining stockholders may be cashed out through a short-form 
merger.369  The short-form merger requires the approval of only the 
company’s board of directors, not the company’s stockholders.370  
Nevertheless, appraisal rights and disclosure duties attach in the short-
form model. 
In a tender offer, unlike in a long-form merger, each stockholder-
offeree may freely choose whether to tender her shares at the speci-
fied price.371  The decision whether to tender therefore is individually 
determined and allows for personal evaluation of investment objec-
tives and the merits of the proposed tender offer.372  Consequently, 
the Delaware courts historically have viewed tender offer responses by 
stockholders as voluntary transactions.373 
 
367 See Koenig, supra note 363, at 534 (explaining that mergers may be structured 
in ways that reduce or eliminate income recognition and initial financing require-
ments). 
368 See id. at 533-34 (describing the parties and procedures involved in a long-form 
merger). 
369 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (providing for short-form 
mergers). 
370 Id. § 253(a) (Supp. 2004). 
371 Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma:  Fostering Protections 
for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 
519, 526 (2003) (citing Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. 
Ch. 1987)). 
372 Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
373 Aronstam et al., supra note 371, at 526; see also, e.g., Solomon v. Pathe Commu-
nications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996) (noting that in the absence of coercion or 
materially false or misleading disclosures, a tender offer transaction is considered to be 
voluntary); In re Aquila Inc. S’holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002) (same); 
In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
June 19, 2001) (same). 
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The advantages of submitting a tender offer and following with a 
short-form merger include the speed with which the merger can be 
concluded.  The most notable advantage to the acquirer of the tender 
offer/short-form merger approach, however, is that Delaware courts 
reviewing such a transaction will apply a less stringent standard of re-
view if the transaction is challenged. 
While long-form mergers involving a controlling stockholder are 
subject to entire fairness review under Lynch II, in Solomon v. Pathe 
Communications Corp. the Supreme Court held that in the case of a 
voluntary tender offer used to obtain the ownership required to com-
plete a short-form merger under section 253, the appropriate legal 
standard for judicial review of the transaction is not that of entire 
fairness.374  The court noted that, unlike long-form mergers, properly 
executed tender offer transactions are voluntary from the minority 
stockholders’ viewpoint.375  The court stated that these voluntary 
transactions may become involuntary, however, despite their form and 
appearance, if one of several factors is present in the transaction.376  
Thus, instead of entire fairness, the court held that the correct inquiry 
in these types of transactions is “whether coercion is present” or 
whether “materially false or misleading disclosures to stockholders 
were made in connection with the offer.”377 
The Supreme Court further “reconcile[d] a fiduciary’s seemingly 
absolute duty to establish the entire fairness of any self-dealing trans-
action with the less demanding requirements of the short-form 
merger statute” in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp.378  In Glassman, 
the court held that “absent fraud or illegality,” a short-form merger 
effectuated under section 253 was subject to a simple business judg-
ment standard of review, not the more stringent entire fairness stan-
dard.379  Thus, Glassman confirmed that long-form mergers are subject 
to a different standard of review than are short-form mergers. 
Since Pathe and Glassman, courts and commentators have ex-
pressed concern that the divergent approaches to long-form mergers 
 
374 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996) (emphasizing the voluntariness of the tender offer 
as opposed to its alleged unfairness). 
375 See id. (noting that “in the case of totally voluntary tender offers . . . courts do 
not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular price”). 
376 Id. 
377 Id. 
378 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001). 
379 Specifically, the court held that “appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a 
minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger.”  Id. at 248. 
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and tender offer/short-form mergers may be inapposite because once 
a tender offer and short-form merger are consummated, the end re-
sult for the minority stockholders is of “little substantive difference” as 
compared with a long-form merger.380  Vice Chancellor Strine, in his 
decision in Pure Resources, followed the existing dichotomy, but sug-
gested a relaxation of the traditional Lynch rule applied in negotiated 
mergers. 
He wrote that “the lack of harmony” between the two strands “is 
better addressed in the Lynch line, by affording greater liability-
immunizing effect to protective devices such as majority of minority 
approval conditions and special committee negotiation and ap-
proval.”381  The Vice Chancellor’s suggestion in dicta is that to the ex-
tent negotiated mergers make use of these protections, these mergers 
should be afforded business judgment protection, as distinct from be-
ing subject to the stringent entire fairness analysis.382 
Under Vice Chancellor Strine’s suggested rubric, the Pathe stan-
dard would be modified in that an acquisition tender offer would be 
considered noncoercive only when “1) it is subject to a non-waivable 
majority of the minority tender condition; 2) the controlling stock-
holder promises to consummate a prompt [section] 253 merger at the 
same price if it obtains more than 90% of the shares; and 3) the con-
trolling stockholder has made no retributive threats.”383  According to 
Pure Resources, such considerations would “minimize the distorting in-
fluence of the tendering process on voluntary choice” and “recognize 
 
380 In re Siliconix, Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. June 19, 2001); see also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 435 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (suggesting that the Lynch and Pathe lines of cases “appear to treat 
economically similar transactions as categorically different simply because the method 
by which the controlling stockholder proceeds varies,” leaving a “disparity in treatment 
[that] persists even though the two basic methods (negotiated merger versus tender 
offer/short-form merger) pose similar threats to minority stockholders”). 
 Professor Guhan Subramanian has conducted an empirical study of the disparate 
consequences for minority stockholders of a tender offer and short-form merger as 
compared with a more traditional merger.  He concludes that controlling stockholders 
pay less to minority stockholders in tender offer freeze-outs than in statutory merger 
freeze-outs.  GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, POST-SILICONIX FREEZEOUTS:  THEORY, EVIDENCE 
AND POLICY (Harv. Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Pa-
per No. 472, 2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
corporate_governance/papers.htm. 
381 In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444. 
382 See id. at 444 n.43 (suggesting that “an easing of the Lynch rule” by “providing 
business judgment protection” to negotiated mergers would create “an incentive to use 
the negotiated merger route”). 
383 Id. at 445. 
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the adverse conditions that confront stockholders who find themselves 
owning what have become very thinly traded shares.”384 
Having two applicable standards of review available, rather than 
applying entire fairness review to all transactions involving controlling 
stockholders, leaves room for the fact-specific, contextual inquiries at 
which the Delaware courts are adept.  Where the business judgment 
rule can apply, the court can abstain from interfering with a transac-
tion that is effectively insulated from the potential taint of the control-
ling stockholder.  A rule subjecting all transactions involving control-
ling stockholders to entire fairness review, on the other hand, could 
give rise to substantial nuisance litigation. 
An answer to the question of whether the Supreme Court will 
modify its approach must, of course, await an appeal that presents the 
issue.  It seems unlikely, however, that the court will alter its well-
developed approach absent extraordinary circumstances.385  While 
some recent Court of Chancery cases, such as Pure Resources, have 
criticized the doctrinal dichotomy left by Lynch and Pathe, those deci-
sions have also demonstrated that the jurisprudence is workable and 
have elucidated the policies underlying the dichotomy.386 
X.  APPRAISAL AND VALUATION 
Appraisal actions under section 262 of the DGCL present Dela-
ware courts with the challenge of valuing shares of stock in corpora-
tions.387  Delaware courts have wrestled with their role as post-
transaction appraisers of the fair value of the company as a going con-
 
384 Id. 
385 See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the court’s approach to the 
doctrine of stare decisis). 
386 Some have argued that the full disclosure and lack of coercion required by re-
cent cases in the context of tender offers provide sufficient safeguards for minority 
stockholders.  See Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private “Dilemma”-–Not in Delaware, 58 
BUS. LAW. 1351, 1359 (2003) (“Perhaps the best example of the effectiveness of the 
protections provided in Delaware’s jurisprudence [in the tender offer context] is the 
fact that in [Siliconix] where those protections were present, the minority stockholders 
rejected the majority stockholder’s offer.”).  The argument suggests that recent cases 
such as Pure Resources have “addressed the apparent doctrinal tension between Solomon 
and Lynch” by providing clear, thoughtful analysis of the rationale and procedure for 
applying the divergent standards.  Id. at 1356; see also A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by 
Controlling Shareholders:  The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83, 84-
85 (2004) (asserting that the current framework is “likely to be positive for sharehold-
ers” and consistent with the DGCL as established by the legislature). 
387 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001) (providing appraisal rights for stock-
holders dissenting from a merger or consolidation). 
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cern at the time of the merger because of the availability of various 
appraisal methods. 
In the early 1930s, the Delaware courts distinguished between the 
“intrinsic value” of shares and the market value of those shares.388  In 
later cases, the Delaware Supreme Court further explained the con-
cept of value by defining a stockholder’s interest in a company as her 
pro rata share of a going concern.389  Thus, an underlying principle in 
appraisal valuation today is that a corporation must be valued as an 
operating entity. 390 
Before 1983, Delaware courts primarily used the Delaware Block 
Method to value corporations.391  The reliance on the Delaware Block 
Method as the exclusive method of appraisal equity valuation ended 
in 1983, when the Delaware Supreme Court held in Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc. that “a more liberal approach must include proof of value by any 
techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in 
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court . . . . Fair 
price obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors involving 
the value of a company.”392  Weinberger opened the door for modern 
finance valuation techniques such as discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis and comparative transaction analysis to be used as valuation 
tools in appraisal proceedings. 
Between 1992 and 2004, the Delaware Supreme Court decided 
several appraisal and equity valuation cases.  Those cases served to 
guide the Court of Chancery with regard to certain aspects of ap-
praisal and valuation cases, such as the acceptance and weighing of 
 
388 See Chi. Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934) (holding that the only 
way to restore value to defendant was to give him the “intrinsic value” of stock, rather 
than the market value). 
389 See, e.g., Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (“The basic con-
cept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid 
for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going con-
cern.”). 
390 Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000) (citing Cavalier 
Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989)). 
391 The Delaware Block, or weighted average, method of valuation estimates fair 
value through a weighted average of pre-merger market price, net asset value, and 
capitalized earnings valuation.  Id. at 555.  Delaware judges have significant leeway in 
determining the weight to be placed on each valuation factor depending on the par-
ticular facts of each case.  See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 143 (Del. 
1980) (“[T]he weighting of those assets with other available factors is left to the Court.  
As a result, appraisals involving different corporate structures have resulted in different 
weighting of factors for varying reasons.” (citation omitted)). 
392 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
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evidence, with the bulk of the appraisal analysis left to the trial 
court.393 
In Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the Court of Chancery must independently deter-
mine the value of the shares subject to an appraisal action, bringing 
the judge’s expertise to bear on that determination.394  In support of 
the task of independent valuation with which the Court of Chancery is 
charged, the Supreme Court in Gonsalves “continue[d] to commend” 
its suggestion, announced in Shell Oil, that the Court of Chancery may 
appoint a neutral expert witness to aid its objective and independent 
determination of value.395  Ultimately, the Court of Chancery has wide 
discretion to accept or reject the parties’ experts and their respective 
valuation frameworks.  Indeed, the judge need not adopt any meth-
odology in toto and may reject any methodology submitted by the par-
ties’ experts.396  The Court of Chancery may “select one of the parties’ 
valuation models or fashion its own.”397  The court must, however, 
carefully ensure through a rational and logical deductive process that 
the evidence supports the ultimate valuation conclusions in its deci-
sion.398  These decisions reflect the Delaware Supreme Court’s empha-
 
393 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1219 (Del. 1992) (refer-
ring to the “broad latitude” afforded to the “appraisal quest” at the trial court level, 
and acknowledging the Supreme Court’s “high level of deference” to the findings of 
the Court of Chancery); see also M.P.M. Enters. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 
1999) (stating that the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Chancery’s findings in an 
appraisal case with a “high level of deference”). 
394 701 A.2d 357, 360 (Del. 1997).  The court in Gonsalves explained that: 
[T]he deference standard . . . assumes that the court will employ its own ac-
knowledged expertise, which is essential to the appraisal task. 
 . . . The modern appraisal process presumes a sophisticated judge who ex-
ercises independence in determining the value of [the] corporation in a con-
tested proceeding. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The role of the Court of Chancery has evolved over time to the present re-
quirement that the court independently determine the value of the shares 
that are the subject of the appraisal action. 
Id. at 360-61. 
395 Id. at 362; see also Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1222 (stating that the Court of Chancery 
has the “inherent authority to appoint neutral expert witnesses” to aid the court in re-
solving the “clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value” often 
facing the court in appraisal cases). 
396 See M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 521-25 (Del. 1999) (reviewing 
the Court of Chancery’s gatekeeping role and holding that the trial court may accept 
or reject any witness’s proposed valuation methodology). 
397 Id. at 525-26. 
398 See id. at 526 (explaining that the Court of Chancery may fashion its own valua-
tion method or “adopt any one expert’s model, methodology, and mathematical calcu-
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sis on the benefit of active judicial attention to valuation in appraisal 
proceedings.399 
During my term, the Supreme Court addressed several of the fac-
tors that may be included in valuing the corporation in an appraisal 
action.  For instance, because the petitioner in an appraisal proceed-
ing is entitled to her share of the value of the corporation immedi-
ately before the merger, the court held that the appraised value cannot 
include the capitalized value of possible changes that may be made by 
new management.400  Likewise, “where the corporation’s going for-
ward business plan is to retain the same management, a dissenting 
shareholder seeking appraisal may not seek to attribute value to an al-
ternative cost pattern which may occur post-merger.”401  In addition, 
the court held that a discount normally applied to unmarketable, un-
registered shares and untraded shares would be improper at the 
stockholder level.402  The court has also held that, in the context of an 
appraisal to value a bank holding company, it is appropriate to in-
clude a control premium for majority ownership of the holding com-
pany’s subsidiaries to determine the holding company shares’ fair 
market value, irrespective of whether those subsidiaries were engaged 
in similar or different businesses.403 
The Supreme Court also provided guidance to the Court of 
Chancery in weighing the reliability of evidence.  In M.P.M. Enterprises 
v. Gilbert, the court held that “[v]alues derived in the open market 
through arms-length negotiations offer better indicia of reliability 
than the interested party transactions that are often the subject of ap-
praisals under § 262.”404  Of course, the court also noted that “the trial 
court, in its discretion, need not accord any weight to such values 
when unsupported by evidence that they represent the going concern 
 
lations, in toto, if that valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands a 
critical judicial analysis on the record”). 
399 Cf. Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 360-61 (discussing the legislative history of the mod-
ern appraisal statute and the benefits resulting from amending the statute to replace 
valuation by an appraiser with valuation by a sophisticated, independent judge). 
400 Id. at 363. 
401 Id. 
402 Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 557 (Del. 2000); see also id. (citing 
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 523-24, as holding that “after the entire corporation has 
been valued as a going concern by applying an appraisal methodology that passes judi-
cial muster, there can be no discounting at the shareholder level”). 
403 M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 524 (citing Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 
806-07 (Del. 1992)). 
404 731 A.2d 790, 796 (Del. 1999). 
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value of the company at the effective date of the merger or consolida-
tion.”405 
Despite the Supreme Court’s guidance regarding certain valua-
tion factors, the Court of Chancery remains faced with the substantial 
challenge of evaluating and applying the many other methods and 
factors that impact a valuation determination.  In many, but certainly 
not all, cases the court uses a DCF analysis of value.406  DCF valuation 
methodology is the most accepted valuation approach within the fi-
nancial community and has been widely employed by Delaware 
courts.407  DCF has received increasing academic criticism, however.408  
Almost invariably each expert witness adjusts the DCF model, which 
produces divergent valuation frameworks and often widely disparate 
per share values.  The court often faces two competing valuation 
frameworks and must endeavor to review the valuation analysis of 
both sides. 
In a recent decision, Chancellor Chandler articulated the diffi-
culty of the task before the Court of Chancery: 
 Although [section 262] requires this Court to determine “the fair 
value” of a share of Technicolor on January 24, 1983, it is one of the 
conceits of our law that we purport to declare something as elusive as the 
fair value of an entity on a given date, especially a date more than two 
decades ago.  Experience in the adversarial, battle of the experts’ ap-
praisal process under Delaware law teaches one lesson very clearly:  
valuation decisions are impossible to make with anything approaching 
complete confidence.  Valuing an entity is a difficult intellectual exer-
cise, especially when business and financial experts are able to organize 
data in support of wildly divergent valuations for the same entity.  For a 
judge who is not an expert in corporate finance, one can do little more 
than try to detect gross distortions in the experts’ opinions.  This effort 
should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter of intellectual honesty, 
as resulting in the fair value of a corporation on a given date.  The value 
 
405 Id. 
406 For a quantitative assessment of the various methodologies employed in ap-
praisal valuations, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of Modern Finance Theory in 
Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2003) (demonstrating that DCF is the most 
common, but only slightly so, method employed by courts to determine the fair value 
of the enterprise).  See id. at 5-13 for an explanation of DCF methodology. 
407 See Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. 18648-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (discussing the merits of DCF analysis). 
408 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products:  The Pretty Efficient 
Capital Markets Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551 (2003) (arguing for acceptance of an effi-
cient capital markets hypothesis by courts and a heavier presumption to market 
prices); Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941 
(2002) (arguing that courts should give more, even conclusive, weight to market evi-
dence when resolving valuation disputes in corporate law). 
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of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable val-
ues, and the judge’s task is to assign one particular value within this 
range as the most reasonable value in light of all of the relevant evidence 
and based on considerations of fairness.409 
Because of the complexity of valuation decisions, the Court of Chan-
cery produces thorough and analytical decisions that delve deeply into 
the mechanics of the valuation techniques employed, as well as the 
nature of the company and the business context in which the com-
pany operates.  Several recent Court of Chancery decisions illustrate 
the fact-specific nature of appraisal cases and the common sense em-
ployed by the Delaware courts in selecting appraisal methods. 
In Doft & Co., First Trust Corp. v. Travelocity.com Inc.,410 the court 
was asked to appraise the value of a minority interest in Traveloc-
ity.com, an online travel service.  The appraisal arose in the context of 
a short-form merger, in which the majority stockholder of Travelocity 
cashed out the minority stockholders at a price of $28 per share.411  
Travelocity’s and the stockholders’ experts each employed a DCF 
analysis combined with a comparable company analysis, using Expe-
dia, Inc., as the comparable company.412  The stockholders’ expert 
concluded a fair value of between $33.70 and $59.95 per share for the 
company and Travelocity’s expert concluded the company’s value as a 
going concern was between $11.38 and $21.29 per share.413 
Vice Chancellor Lamb concluded that the fundamental inputs 
(the projections of future revenues, expenses, and cash flows) used by 
the experts “were not shown to be reasonably reliable.”414  The court 
found that the management’s five-year projections, which generally 
are considered reasonably reliable, were not a “reliable basis for fore-
casting future cash flows.”415  The court’s conclusion was at least par-
tially based on the limited financial history of the company; the rap-
idly evolving market in which Travelocity operated; and the industry 
uncertainty created by the events of September 11, 2001.416  Rejecting 
 
409 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *5-6 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003). 
410 No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004). 
411 Id. at *13. 
412 Id. at *17-18. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. at *21.  The court noted that the utility of DCF depends on the validity of 
the data relied upon, and any method of valuation, including DCF, is “only as good as 
the inputs to the model.”  Id. 
415 Id. at *22. 
416 Id. at *22-23. 
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the DCF approach, the court relied on a comparable company analy-
sis417 between Travelocity and Expedia and arrived at a value of $32.76 
per share.418 
In In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, plain-
tiffs brought a joint appraisal action and a fiduciary duty action arising 
out of a two-step “going private” transaction between Emerging 
Communications, Inc., (ECM) and Innovative Communications 
Corp., LLC, companies both controlled by Jeffrey J. Prosser.419  Minor-
ity stockholders were cashed out at $10.25 per share.420  The parties’ 
experts both valued the company using the DCF method, with ECM’s 
expert valuing the company at $10.38 per share421 and plaintiff’s ex-
pert placing the company’s value at $41.16 per share.422  The four-fold 
divergence in the experts’ share price can be attributed to two vari-
ables in their calculations:  (1) defendant’s expert used projections 
prepared in March 1998, while plaintiff’s expert prepared projections 
using financials from June 1998;423 and (2) plaintiff’s expert used a 
discount rate (range) of 8.5% to 8.85% while defendant’s expert ap-
plied a discount rate of 11.5%.424 
 
417 The court noted that while a comparable company analysis is often employed 
with a DCF analysis, it may be used on a stand-alone basis as the circumstances warrant.  
Id. at *32 n.47. 
418 Id. at *48.  The court, however, subsequently reconsidered its opinion, ac-
knowledging that it used an inappropriate earnings input and that it incorrectly ad-
justed the earnings per share results, leading to a revised per share value of $30.43.  
Doft & Co., First Trust Corp. v. Travelocity.com Inc., No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84 
(Del. Ch. June 10, 2004). 
419 No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).  Defendants in-
cluded ECM, ECM’s board of directors, and Innovative, ECM’s majority stockholder.  
Id. at *5.  ECM provided telephone and cellular services in the U.S. Virgin Islands and 
had the unique position of significant tax benefits and a near monopoly in its market, 
factors which the court held rendered any comparable company analysis of marginal 
utility.  Id. at *43 n.36. 
420 Id. at *32-33. 
421 Id. at *40. 
422 Id. at *35. 
423 Id. at *45-58.  The June projections were prepared in the normal course of 
business as part of an application to ECM’s lender to secure financing and projected a 
substantially higher growth than the March projections.  Id. at *47.  In the context of 
the going-private transaction, however, ECM’s control group provided only the March 
projections to ECM’s board, the special committee, and its financial advisor, even 
though the June projections were available.  Id. at *46-47.  Thus, the committee and its 
advisors were mistaken in believing they had the most current projections available.  
The importance of the nondisclosure of the June 1998 financial projections in the de-
termination of this case cannot be understated because this fact affected not only the 
court’s appraisal analysis but its analysis in the fiduciary duty claim as well. 
424 Id. at *58-82. 
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The court carefully analyzed both valuations, the nature of ECM’s 
business, and the context of the merger transaction, and decided to 
rely on the June 1998 projections and a discount rate of 8.69%, yield-
ing a value of $38.05 per share.425  The court rejected the defendant’s 
plea to give weight to the trading price of ECM’s common stock prior 
to the merger, even though the defendant argued the stock traded in 
an efficient market and that market price was indicative of the stock’s 
fair value.426 
In Cede & Co. v. Medpointe, two institutional investment funds 
sought appraisal to determine the fair value of their shares of the 
stock of Carter-Wallace, Inc.427  The transaction had two components:  
an asset sale of the company’s consumer products division followed by 
a merger of the company’s healthcare division with Medpointe Capital 
Partners.428  Petitioners objected to the terms of the merger in which 
they would have received $20.44 per share.429  Their expert concluded 
that the fair value of Carter-Wallace was $37.16 per share, and defen-
dant’s expert concluded a fair value of $19.40 per share.430 
Both experts employed a DCF analysis, and the court stated that 
DCF was the preferred methodology, as “Carter-Wallace had enjoyed a 
long and relatively stable financial history, making the projections 
necessary for a cash flow analysis reasonably reliable.”431  The court 
analyzed and modified each expert’s valuation in reaching its conclu-
sion.  To begin, the court scrutinized the nature of Carter-Wallace at 
the time of the merger and concluded that the fair value of the com-
pany should be determined as after the asset sale.432  The court reiter-
 
425 Id. at *155. 
426 Id. at *85.  Among other reasons, the court decided not to give weight to ECM’s 
market price because the June 1998 financial projections were never disclosed to the 
market. 
427 Cede & Co. v. Medpointe Healthcare, Inc., No. 19354-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. Lexis 
124 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2004). 
428 Id. at *1. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. at *49-50. 
431 Id. at *60. 
432 Id. at *27-30.  The court calculated the fair value of Carter-Wallace at the time 
of the merger, after the asset sale.  In other words, the court considered whether the 
company should be valued as prior to the asset sale (with both divisions), or as the en-
tity that in fact merged (Carter-Wallace without its Consumer Products Division), but 
with any proceeds and/or liabilities from the asset sale.  Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298-300 (Del. 1996) (reversing the Court of Chancery’s valuation of 
Technicolor stock prior to the merger, finding that value added to the going concern 
through a merger “accrues to the benefit of all”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 713 (Del. 1983) (stating that “elements of future value, including the nature of 
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ated its preference for the use of management forecasts and rejected 
petitioners’ expert’s terminal value, even though it was more conser-
vative than the defendants’ expert’s, because it departed from man-
agement forecasts “without any significant reason.”433  Finally, the 
court adjusted the value of the healthcare division to account for the 
net inflows from the asset sale that took place shortly before the 
merger, to arrive at a value of $24.45 per share.434 
These recent Court of Chancery cases highlight the complex and 
contextual nature of valuation inquiries and demonstrate that no sin-
gle valuation approach will be universally accepted or receive the 
greatest weight in an appraisal proceeding.  Rather, the facts and cir-
cumstances determine the valuation paradigm.  A DCF valuation, al-
though widely accepted and perhaps even preferred for now, will not 
always be the best approach to valuation.  This is especially true in a 
context where the company has a limited financial history or lacks a 
reliable basis for forecasting future cash flows, where management 
projections are not reliable, or where financial projections are tainted.  
The courts have shown a strong preference for the use of manage-
ment’s financial assessment and will permit deviation from those pre-
dictions only upon compelling justification.435 
Complete disclosure of all material information before the con-
summation of the transaction is paramount.  Withholding financial 
projections or other material facts will be detrimental at the appraisal 
stage and may open the responsible parties to joint and several liabil-
ity for breach of their fiduciary duties.436  Thus, management should 
ensure the disclosure of all material financial and non-financial in-
formation valuations at the transaction stage. 
 
the enterprise . . . which are . . . not the product of speculation, may be considered” in 
determining a fair price). 
433 See Cede v. Medpointe, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *61 (expressing skepticism 
about litigation-driven adjustments to management’s financial forecasts). 
434 Id. at *75-77.  The court listed a “number of checks” on its numbers, including 
the arm’s-length nature of the negotiation, the comparable company analysis, and the 
stock’s trading history.  Id. at *77 n.107.  The court found these values to be helpful 
checks but neither singularly nor collectively dispositive.  Id. 
435 Id. at *61. 
436 In Emerging Communications, the fact that “highly material fact[s],” the June 
1998 projections, were withheld from the special committee and minority stockholders 
prevented the defendants from claiming that the burden of proof had shifted to the 
petitioners because neither the special committee nor the minority stockholders were 
held to have made “an informed vote” on the merger.  In re Emerging Communica-
tions, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *112 (Del. Ch. May 
3, 2004). 
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Valuation is a discipline that is complex and variable.  It is not an 
exact science.  Yet, there are some traditional, textbook approaches.437  
The laborious process of trying an appraisal case in the Court of 
Chancery, with its “battle of the experts” tendency, requires patience 
and an intellectually disciplined approach by the trial judge.  As one 
can glean by reading the recent Court of Chancery appraisal cases, 
there is much for bankers, M&A lawyers, and corporate officials (in-
cluding directors) to learn and apply in any major M&A transaction.  
It would be a wise step for the participants in such transactions to re-
view and analyze some of the cases as part of the diligence that should 
be brought to bear in pricing such deals. 
XI.  A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE 
A.  Is Delaware Law Changing? 
Are the winds of change blowing and gusting from the Delaware 
judges?  The metaphors in vogue today to describe the corporate 
scene are intriguing.  There is talk of storm clouds, revolution, transi-
tion, sea change, and the like.  To be sure, Enron, Worldcom, and 
other scandals, followed by Sarbanes-Oxley and changes to the Stock 
Exchange rules, were a startling wake-up call. 
The use of the phrase “wake-up call” here is not to suggest that 
corporate practitioners and judges had been asleep pre-Enron.  To 
the contrary, the movement toward best corporate practices was a 
definite trend in the 1990s, and somewhat before.  Corporate coun-
selors were advising many boards to clean up their structure and in-
tensify their diligence.438  This movement probably arose out of the 
environment of the 1980s when the takeover era produced financial 
changes and a refocusing of Delaware corporate jurisprudence.  So, 
while the jurisprudence and best corporate practices were developing 
in the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first century, the 
court suddenly faced a change in the landscape.  That change was not 
caused by judges or responsible corporate boards and counselors.  It 
was the result of the scandals mentioned above. 
 
437 See, e.g., ROBERT B. DICKIE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS 
VALUATION FOR THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (1st ed. 1998, 2d ed. forthcoming 2006). 
438 See, e.g., Joseph B. White & Paul Ingrassia, Eminence Grise:  Behind Revolt at GM, 
Lawyer Ira Millstein Helped Call the Shots, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at A1 (describing 
reform advice given by expert to outside directors of the General Motors Corporation 
beginning in the mid-1980s). 
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Some observers have asserted that the Delaware courts are not as 
stable and balanced as the Delaware judges think they are.  It has been 
suggested, for example, that the Delaware courts have a political 
agenda that has caused them to act as a weather vane, pointing where 
the winds of current events blow to the point that recent corporate 
cases have trended toward pleasing stockholders and federal regula-
tors at the expense of directors, and therefore second-guessing direc-
tors more than they had previously.439 
This is not a correct assessment of the Delaware courts.  Delaware 
courts do not have a political agenda that vacillates from time to time 
to favor one type of litigant over another.  Delaware courts today are 
not any more “pro-stockholder” and less “pro-director” or “pro-
manager” than they were in the past, or vice versa.  Sound bites some-
times refer to the Delaware courts as “business friendly.”  I would 
characterize the Delaware courts as objective business experts, without 
the bias that the word “friendly” might imply.  To be sure, the expec-
tations of director conduct have evolved over the years, including dur-
ing the post-Enron era, but that does not mean the Delaware courts 
have adopted a political agenda to favor stockholders over directors 
and managers or vice versa.  Rather, the evolution in business and so-
cial expectations and norms of directorial conduct may affect out-
comes in a common law system like ours by impacting the interpreta-
tion and application of such concepts as “good faith” and “best 
interests.” 
Kurt Heyman and Christal Lint have suggested that rather than 
demonstrating a new prostockholder bias, the recent Delaware deci-
sions actually reflect a clarification or refinement of “the role of equity 
 
439 See, e.g., Kurt M. Heyman & Christal Lint, Recent Supreme Court Reversals and the 
Role of Equity in Corporate Jurisprudence, 6 DEL. L. REV. 451, 476 & nn.155-57 (2003) (cit-
ing several commentators who either explicitly or implicitly argue that there exists a 
“new ‘post-Enron era’ in which directors’ conduct will be scrutinized more closely by 
Delaware courts”); Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 
113 YALE L.J. 621, 681 (2003) (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court “has made 
dramatic pro-shareholder moves over the past year” possibly as a result of the threat of 
federal preemption created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  Compare Brett H. McDonnell, 
Sox Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 526 (“[The reasoning of the majority in Om-
nicare] attempts to balance providing room for the board to make decisions with the 
right of stockholders to make the final decision concerning a merger.  The court’s 
rhetoric suggests less deference to boards and more concern for protecting share-
holder choice than is usual for this court.”), with id. at 526 n.111 (“[T]he facts in Om-
nicare are pretty odd, particularly the presence of a lock-up agreement with two con-
trolling shareholders, and the decision is a divided 3-2, unusual for Delaware.  It could 
therefore be that the case has limited precedential value.”). 
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in corporate jurisprudence.”440  Equity continues to hold an important 
place in our jurisprudence, and is the means by which social and 
business norms and mores can affect the outcomes of cases. 
The evolution in director expectations is a function of common 
law development.  Delaware courts remain balanced and objective, 
and the business judgment rule is alive and well.  The new regulatory, 
business, and adjudicative landscape does not mean that the Delaware 
courts have lurched in a new and menacing direction that should 
cause panic in the boardroom.441  The substantive law has not 
changed.  Any change in litigation outcomes has been the result of 
the fact that board processes have been brought under closer scrutiny, 
influenced by improved pleading by plaintiffs challenging board ac-
tion. 
Plaintiffs often achieve success when they invoke all the “tools at 
hand” to gain sufficient information that will allow them to state well-
pleaded allegations.  This is often accomplished by seeking certain 
specified corporate records.  For example, some plaintiffs have re-
cently—finally—heeded the Delaware Supreme Court’s and Court of 
Chancery’s repeated admonitions to pursue a section 220442 action to 
obtain facts that will allow them to plead their claims with sufficient 
particularity.443 
In the derivative litigation arising out of the Martha Stewart scan-
dal, the Delaware Supreme Court observed that the plaintiff’s failure 
successfully to plead demand futility might be attributed to her failure 
to pursue a section 220 books and records inspection before suing.444  
 
440 Heyman & Lint, supra note 439, at 479. 
441 Cf. id. at 476-78 (describing the “post-Enron theory” as not supported by the 
evidence). 
442 Section 220 of the DGCL permits stockholders to inspect corporate books and 
records for any “proper purpose” and provides for enforcement of that right by the 
Court of Chancery.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)-(c) (2001). 
443 See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1056 (Del. 2004) (stating that “[b]oth this 
Court and the Court of Chancery have continually advised plaintiffs who seek to plead 
facts establishing demand futility that the plaintiffs might successfully have used a Sec-
tion 220 books and records inspection to uncover such facts,” and referring to the 
Chancellor’s extensive citation of cases in which the courts had so admonished plain-
tiffs). 
444 See id. at 1057 (“Because [the plaintiff] did not even attempt to use the fact-
gathering tools available to her by seeking to review MSO’s books and records in sup-
port of her demand futility claim, we cannot know if such an effort would have been 
fruitless.”). 
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The court offered the Disney case as an example of how the plaintiff 
might better have proceeded.445 
In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court in 2000 reversed the Court 
of Chancery’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that the Disney board had 
committed waste by allowing Michael Ovitz to terminate his employ-
ment on a non-fault basis.446  The Supreme Court held that, while the 
plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege sufficient particularized facts to 
state a cognizable claim, they should be given the opportunity to re-
plead.447  The court suggested that facts gathered through a section 
220 suit might allow the plaintiffs to better support their allegations.448  
Accordingly, the plaintiffs obtained books and records as authorized 
by section 220 and filed an amended complaint.449 
The Disney case to this point teaches that plaintiffs who exercise 
their rights under section 220 may often proceed further in litiga-
tion—at least beyond the pleading stage.  Those who are able to plead 
particularized facts and survive a motion to dismiss, in turn, are more 
likely to obtain discovery and therefore ultimately succeed in proving 
their claims at trial.  If they then achieve a judgment in their favor, 
that “pro-stockholder” verdict is not necessarily the result of a pro-
stockholder shift in the law, but rather results from increased dili-
gence and better pleading by plaintiffs. 
In addition to improved pleading, certain cases permitting plain-
tiffs to survive dispositive motions create concerns that director expo-
sure to liability has increased.  These cases, however, should not be of 
great concern to directors when strong allegations—sometimes too 
strong to be proven at trial—are merely found by the Court of Chan-
 
445 See id. at 1056-57 n.51 (“Note in particular the discussion of the Disney case 
where the plaintiffs were permitted to replead, then used the Section 220 procedure, 
and the new complaint survived a motion to dismiss on the ground that presuit de-
mand was excused.”). 
446 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000). 
447 Id. 
448 In particular, the court stated: 
 Plaintiffs may well have the “tools at hand” to develop the necessary facts for 
pleading purposes.  For example, plaintiffs may seek relevant books and re-
cords of the corporation under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law, if they can ultimately bear the burden of showing a proper purpose 
and make specific and discrete identification, with rifled precision, of the 
documents sought.  Further, they must establish that each category of books 
and records is essential to the accomplishment of their articulated purpose for 
the inspection. 
Id. at 266-67 (footnotes omitted). 
449 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(recounting the procedural history of the case). 
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cery or the Supreme Court to have stated a cause of action.  Cases 
such as the Chancellor’s Disney decision and the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in Krasner v. Moffett,450 McMullin v. Beran,451 Malone v. Brincat,452 
and In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation453 fall into this cate-
gory. 
Brehm v. Eisner454 ushered in a new era of appellate review of deci-
sions of the Court of Chancery granting motions to dismiss.  Certain 
dicta in Supreme Court cases before Brehm, apparently beginning with 
Aronson v. Lewis455 in 1984, implied that appellate review in such cases 
would be deferential, not de novo.  That is, the court had stated that 
“in determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the proper ex-
ercise of its discretion must decide whether” the pleading survives Rule 
23.1.456 
Aronson’s discretionary standard led to a narrow, deferential scope 
of appellate review.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that 
made no sense because the justices could read the language of a 
pleading as well as members of the Court of Chancery, so in Brehm the 
court explicitly clarified the standard, holding: 
 The view we express today, however, is designed to make clear that 
our review of decisions of the Court of Chancery applying Rule 23.1 is de 
novo and plenary.  We apply the law to the allegations of the Complaint 
as does the Court of Chancery.  Our review is not a deferential review 
 
450 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003). 
451 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).  In McMullin, the Supreme Court held that the facts 
as alleged by the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of the duty of care if the directors 
failed adequately to inform themselves or determine whether the consideration of-
fered in a transaction involving a tender offer followed by a short-form merger was 
equal to or exceeded the company’s appraisal value as a going concern.  Id. at 922.  
The court also held that the plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of the duty of loy-
alty if the directors evaluated the transaction to accommodate the majority stock-
holder’s immediate need for cash rather than to maximize the value for all the stock-
holders.  Id. at 924-25. 
452 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
453 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
454 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
455 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254. 
456 Id. at 814 (emphasis added).  In Brehm, the court discussed this development by 
stating: 
Certain dicta in our jurisprudence suggest that this Court will review under a 
deferential abuse of discretion standard a decision of the Court of Chancery 
on a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss a derivative suit.  These statements, appar-
ently beginning in 1984 in Aronson v. Lewis, state that the Court of Chancery’s 
decision is discretionary in determining whether the allegations of the com-
plaint support the contention that pre-suit demand is excused. 
746 A.2d at 253. 
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that requires us to find an abuse of discretion.  We see no reason to per-
petuate the concept of discretion in this context.  The nature of our 
analysis of a complaint in a derivative suit is the same as that applied by 
the Court of Chancery in making its decision in the first instance.457 
That change is not particularly significant in itself.  But it does 
highlight what has been occurring generally in appellate review of the 
grant of motions to dismiss, judgment on the pleadings, and summary 
judgment.  It is often appropriate and expeditious for the Court of 
Chancery at the threshold to dispose on motion of a frivolous plead-
ing or one that plainly lacks merit either as a matter of law or because 
it is simply a sloppy or conclusory pleading.  That said, however, my 
instinct is that the rare reversals of the Court of Chancery usually fol-
lowed dismissal of a complaint on motion rather than a trial on the 
merits or a discretionary ruling on an injunction. 
Instead, the bulk of the reversals involved either a Supreme Court 
decision to follow a new jurisprudential course or what the Supreme 
Court understood to be a premature dismissal on motion.  In these 
latter cases, the court believed that a reasonable reading of the plead-
ings, in the light most favorable to the pleader (or nonmoving party), 
gave the pleader the benefit of the doubt to proceed to the next 
step—usually obtaining some discovery, even if narrowly circum-
scribed.458 
For example, in Krasner v. Moffett459 the court reversed a grant of a 
motion to dismiss a class action where the ultimate defense rested on 
the effect of action by an allegedly independent committee.  The 
court held that it was premature to grant a Rule 12(b)(6)460 motion 
while a number of issues—including independence and therefore le-
gal effect and burden of proof—could not be resolved on the face of 
 
457 Id. 
458 To the extent that the Delaware Supreme Court tends to encourage factual de-
velopment in cases rather than dismissal on dispositive motions under state rules of 
civil procedure, Delaware jurisprudence may reflect an interesting difference from 
federal courts’ treatment of motions under parallel rules of federal procedure.  See, 
e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 
(2003) (arguing that “notice pleading is a myth” because of federal courts’ widespread 
use of heightened pleading standards); Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judi-
cial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 91, 101 (2002) (discussing the reinvigoration in federal courts of summary judg-
ment as a method of resolving cases based on “concerns for efficiency and fairness” 
and with the purpose of allowing federal trial courts “flexibility in controlling their 
dockets by dismissing meritless claims”). 
459 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003). 
460 DEL. CH. CT. R. 12(b)(6). 
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the complaint.461  The court’s language in the decision is a typical re-
flection of the court’s concern about premature dismissals: 
 A complaint must survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if 
the plaintiff could ultimately prevail on the merits of their claims based 
on any reasonable set of facts alleged in the complaint.  The independ-
ence of the special committee involves a fact-intensive inquiry that varies 
from case to case.  Thus, we cannot assume at the pleading stage that the 
defendants will carry the burden of establishing independence.  Beyond 
that, it is premature to determine the legal effect—and the resulting 
standard of review—that would apply if a special committee that oper-
ated independently recommended a merger to the full board.  More-
over, we need not decide the legal effect of the affirmative vote of the 
members of the independent committee, who constituted less than a 
quorum, when voting with the full board to approve the merger.
462
 
The lesson on appellate review is twofold:  (1) in the case itself, 
the court will give the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences 
to determine if there is any reasonable ground to go forward to dis-
covery; and (2) in evaluating the case as a precedent where the Su-
preme Court has reversed a dismissal, one must bear in mind that the 
court has taken the pleading and all its reasonable inferences as true 
for purposes of the motion.463 
Rather than pointing in whatever direction happens to be most 
politically expedient at the time, Delaware law takes a bilateral ap-
proach to balancing corporate interests.464  In addition, as mentioned 
above, the Delaware Supreme Court exhibits a strong trend toward 
 
461 Krasner, 826 A.2d at 287. 
462 Id. at 286 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
463 As the court said in Santa Fe: 
 This case may very well illustrate the difficulty of expeditiously dispensing 
with claims seeking enhanced judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage where the 
complaint is not completely conclusory.  It is appropriate and consistent with 
the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding,” Chan-
cery Rule 1, that conclusory complaints without well-pleaded facts be dis-
missed early under Chancery Rule 12.  But that is not this case.  Here, there 
are well-pleaded allegations on the Unocal claim.  As the terminology of en-
hanced judicial scrutiny implies, boards can expect to be required to justify 
their decisionmaking, within a range of reasonableness, when they adopt de-
fensive measures with implications for corporate control.  This scrutiny will 
usually not be satisfied by resting on a defense motion merely attacking the 
pleadings. 
In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 72 (Del. 1995). 
464 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Pill:  Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 903-08 (2002) (arguing 
that bilateral devices—those that enjoy support from both stockholders and manag-
ers—“hold a privileged position in Delaware corporate law”). 
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consensus.  These two features help to ensure Delaware maintains its 
competitive edge in the incorporation race—an edge which would be 
lost were Delaware law to favor one corporate constituency over an-
other.465 
Directors are not required to be perfectionists in their processes 
in any context.  Nor are they guarantors of good results.  Delaware ju-
risprudence is clear that even when directors are expected to maxi-
mize stockholder value, all that the law requires is that they act rea-
sonably under the circumstances.466 
Commissioner Campos of the SEC, in the context of new federal 
rules, said virtually the same thing in a recent interview: 
 In looking at the business judgment rule, courts have long held that 
in making business decisions, directors must consider all material infor-
mation reasonably available and act in good faith.  Some directors are 
questioning whether a new set of expectations on directors will play a 
role in a court’s assessment of what information was “reasonably avail-
able” and whether the directors have “acted in good faith.”  But I firmly 
believe that Sarbanes-Oxley and the self-regulatory organization rules 
 
465 Kahan and Rock explain: 
The challenge for Delaware was to come up with a set of rules that, in con-
junction with adaptive devices, would leave both shareholders and managers 
sufficiently satisfied to avoid significant governance pressure on existing pub-
lic companies to reincorporate elsewhere, to avoid significant market pressure 
to induce companies to incorporate elsewhere at the IPO stage, and to avoid 
significant political pressure to pass a federal corporate law. . . . Delaware’s 
cautious approach—the contextual, two-steps-forward-one-step-back tendency 
of its case law, the fact that its takeover statute came late and was mild, and its 
encouragement of bilateral responses—can all be understood as responses to 
this challenge. 
Id. at 907.  Compare the following analysis by Cunningham and Yablon: 
Delaware’s need to avoid massive reincorporation by disgruntled corporate 
managers, on the one hand, and to recognize its important role in the func-
tioning of the capital markets and American economy, on the other, do place 
serious constraints on Delaware law and prevent it from tilting too far in ei-
ther a pro-management or pro-shareholder direction.  Delaware corporate law 
shows a persistent tendency to look for the middle way between rules that em-
power shareholders at the expense of management and rules that are overtly 
management protective.  Given that predilection, however, the Delaware 
courts are still free to choose from a variety of doctrinal possibilities that fall 
within the middle range of the manager-shareholder spectrum. 
Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 98, at 1617-18 (footnote omitted). 
466 See In re MONY Group Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 20 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[A] 
court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the directors 
made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”). 
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have not eroded the business judgment rule.  If directors act reasonably 
and in good faith, they will be protected from liability.
467
 
Finally, Vice Chancellor Strine made a similar statement in a 
speech in 2002: 
 I won’t pretend that directors don’t have a reason to be con-
cerned . . . . [But t]he legal reality today is identical to the legal reality a 
year ago:  Independent directors who apply themselves to their duties in 
good faith have a trivial risk of legal liability.  Let me repeat that:  If you 
do your job as a director with integrity and attentiveness, your risk of 
damages liability is minuscule.
468
 
I agree with both of these statements. 
B.  Federalism v. Federalization 
While noting in historical context the interesting events that have 
occurred since the turn of the twenty-first century, I have resolved not 
to take anything for granted, and I have expressed a need for vigi-
lance.469  Vigilance is needed because Delaware’s corporate preemi-
nence is more vulnerable to a pervasive federal encroachment now 
than it was before the turn of the century and certainly before the col-
lapses of Enron and WorldCom.  Keeping the fragile Delaware fran-
chise healthy is in the best interests of business lawyers and investors 
everywhere. 
The Delaware franchise is fragile largely because of encroaching 
federalization.  Professor Mark Roe has written that federalization of 
corporate law threatens Delaware’s franchise perhaps even more than 
competition from other states’ laws: 
[W]e live in a federal system where Washington can, and often does, 
take over economic issues of national importance. . . . That happened 
for securities trading during the Depression, takeovers in the early 1980s, 
and corporate governance after the Enron and WorldCom scandals.  
And if fundamental issues of corporate governance often move into the 
federal arena, then Delaware is not deciding all key corporate law mat-
ters. . . . [F]ederal power may make Delaware law. 
 
467 National Association of Corporate Directors, Questions for Commissioner Campos, 
DIRECTORS MONTHLY, May 2004, at 3. 
468 Leo E. Strine, Should I Serve?  Useful Considerations for Prospective Directors 
Deciding Whether to Join a Board and Incumbents Pondering Whether to Continue, 
Speech at the Director’s Education Institute at Duke University (Oct. 2003), in CORP. 
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 1-2. 
469 Veasey, supra note 249, at 163. 
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 . . . [T]he federal government does not threaten to take away Dela-
ware’s chartering business in its entirety . . . [but] Delaware players know 
that the federal government can take away their corporate lawmaking 
power in whole or in part, because it has acted often enough . . . . 
 Delaware’s competition in making corporate law thus comes not 
just—and at times not even primarily—from other states, but also from 
the federal government:  It comes from Congress and the SEC, not just 
California, Nevada, Ohio, or New York.  It comes from the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when that court interprets the scope of the securi-
ties laws . . . . And it comes from the New York Stock Exchange, which it-
self is often prodded to act by the SEC or Congress. 
 . . . Federal authorities reverse state corporate law that they dislike 
and leave standing laws that they tolerate.
470
 
One of the interesting and challenging facets of this phenomenon 
going forward is how—if at all—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the require-
ments of the Self-Regulatory Organizations (the New York Stock Ex-
change and NASDAQ), and the quest for optimum corporate prac-
tices will play out in Delaware courts.  Sarbanes-Oxley has many 
dimensions, one of which is an intrusion by the federal legislative 
branch into the internal affairs of corporations.  Internal affairs have 
long been thought to be the province of state law, while regulation of 
markets (through disclosure) has been thought to be largely (though 
not entirely) controlled by federal law.471 
Despite the limited but significant intrusion into internal corpo-
rate affairs by Sarbanes-Oxley and the listing requirements of the ex-
changes—the principal remedy of the exchanges is delisting—the 
only direct enforcement mechanism in the legislation is relegated to 
the SEC.  Neither the Sarbanes-Oxley statute nor the SEC rules pro-
vides for a private right of action.  In a culture where many corporate 
disputes play out in direct, class, and derivative suits, one wonders how 
the creativity of the plaintiffs’ bar will manifest itself under the federal 
regulations.  Many of us in Delaware believe these issues may play out 
to some extent in Delaware courts—and with no certain outcome.472  
Meanwhile, Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC rules, on a “one size fits all” ba-
sis, continue to add significantly to the costs of compliance. 
 
470 Roe, supra note 9, at 591-92. 
471 See Chandler & Strine, supra note 64, at 958 (characterizing Sarbanes-Oxley re-
quirements as “imping[ing] on the managerial freedom permitted to directors by state 
corporation law”). 
472 See, e.g., id. at 957 (“Delaware judges also anticipate being among the first gov-
ernmental decision makers to confront real-world disputes influenced by the 2002 Re-
forms.”). 
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Nevertheless, there is still a very large area where the state law of 
internal corporate affairs predominates.  The Delaware courts remain 
very busy with important and challenging litigation in many areas:  
mergers and acquisitions, derivative and class actions, alternative enti-
ties, bankruptcy, and intellectual property.  Delaware lawyers and law-
yers elsewhere are busy not only with the litigation itself but also with 
giving advice on Delaware law. 
If there is ever a significantly more extensive federal intrusion into 
internal corporate affairs, the degree of reasonable stability we have 
come to expect from Delaware judge-made law and legislation could 
be lost.  Most of the law that business lawyers understand comes not 
only from the quintessential Delaware common law principle of stare 
decisis—respecting time-honored principles of fiduciary duty—but 
also the fact that the ten Delaware judges of the Court of Chancery 
and the Supreme Court have the expertise and experience to deal 
promptly and reasonably predictably with complex business law cases 
in an international arena on a daily basis.473 
In my view, increased federalization will lead to more uncertainty 
by introducing new corporate concepts and compounding the prob-
lem that the introduction of such new concepts creates by calling on 
hundreds of busy federal district court judges from ninety-four sepa-
rate federal districts to interpret these new federal concepts.  Planning 
by business lawyers and prudent entrepreneurial risk-taking by direc-
tors and officers could become chaotic. 
Perhaps cooler heads will prevail, absent another crisis like Enron 
or WorldCom.  The movement toward best practices now sweeping 
American boardrooms, the continuous digestion process of the Sar-
banes-Oxley and SRO requirements, and the responsible state corpo-
ration law decisions may help those cooler heads to prevail.  The best 
way to demonstrate that federal intervention into the internal affairs 
of corporations is unnecessary and undesirable is for boards of direc-
 
473 The same is true with respect to state legislation.  Last year, the SEC floated a 
stockholder access proposal that now appears to be dead.  See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. 
Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2 (reporting that the 
Commission’s recent actions have been “seen as an unambiguous sign that an earlier 
proposal to open the proxies, or votes, to greater shareholder participation was 
dead”).  What is happening at the state level is significant.  The ABA Committee on 
Corporate Laws, through a task force headed by Peggy Foran and A. Gilchrist Sparks, 
III, is studying whether the MBCA’s current provisions allowing directors to be elected 
by a plurality of votes cast, MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (1999) should be amended.  
See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3); Phyllis Plitch, ABA Task Force Opens Door to Pos-
sible Board Vote Changes, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Feb. 4, 2005. 
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tors—guided by business lawyers—to continue what the Delaware 
judges have consistently encouraged:  the quest for best practices of 
due care, loyalty, good faith, and independence, mixed with a good 
dose of constructive skepticism and a demand for total understanding 
before taking action. 
C.  Best Practices 
Among the prime areas of best corporate practices are the trends 
toward director independence, executive sessions, and empowerment 
of directors to exercise their primacy in corporate governance.  The 
proper use of independent committees may hold the key to the future 
of best corporate practices.  Beyond the proper use of these commit-
tees under the comprehensive charters for each that many companies 
have developed, counseling directors to “do the right thing” is a 
proper function of the courts as well as counsel. 
The best advice as a general matter is that the most effective pro-
phylactic against liability is for directors to implement a pattern of 
best corporate governance practices.  That is not to say that directors 
who do not follow these good practices are necessarily vulnerable to 
liability.  But if they do have good corporate governance processes, 
those processes and the optics might help them in the eyes of a court 
or a regulatory authority.474  Some specifics I might offer include the 
following: 
• Be careful and thoroughly investigate the integrity and fi-
nancial position of a company before agreeing to serve as 
a director. 
• Embrace best practices in governance processes. 
• Appoint a strong independent board leader, whether a 
nonexecutive chair or a lead director. 
 
474 I recommend that directors and their counselors consult the excellent sum-
mary of best corporate practices found in the Corporate Director’s Guidebook, Fourth Edi-
tion.  The Guidebook is the product of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws.  Aspi-
rational standards of director conduct are not necessarily coextensive with the 
standards of judicial review.  ABA COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIREC-
TOR’S GUIDEBOOK (4th ed. 2004).  See also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 
2000) (“[T]he law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violations of those 
duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance prac-
tices.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993) (“[T]he standards of re-
view in corporate law pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct.”); see also 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.31 (1999) (defining the standards of director con-
duct in Section 8.30, but elucidating the standards of judicial review in section 8.31). 
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• Be certain that all directors are financially literate. 
• Be certain that the board has regular executive sessions. 
• Pay special attention to the board agenda—is the board 
focused on the right issues and is the board involved in 
making that determination? 
• Make sure you have a reasonably complete understanding 
of the company’s business, competitive environment, fi-
nancial controls, and financial disclosures.  The same is 
true of the need to have a thorough understanding of a 
particular transaction being considered for board action. 
• Pay special attention to the board’s information needs—
does the board have access to the information it needs, 
and is the board in control of determining what informa-
tion it needs? 
• Actively engage in board discussions and deliberations 
with healthy skepticism always and constructive criticism 
when called for. There is no such thing as a “stupid” ques-
tion. 
• Review board and committee minutes—and ask that they 
be circulated to all directors within a week for comments 
(not approval; that can wait)—to ensure they accurately 
reflect the matters considered, and capture the general 
extent and nature of the board’s discussions, delibera-
tions, considerations, decisions, and directions (not a 
transcript of who said what). 
• Insist that management keep track of and report progress 
on items that came before the board and resulted in 
board decisions or directions. 
• Take special care in reviewing registration statements.475 
• Make sure disclosures are clear and that you understand 
them; ask management for assurances and representa-
tions. 
• Ask independent auditors for assurances of the integrity of 
the reporting and their due diligence. 
• Understand what you sign. 
 
475 The news reports in January 2005 engendered much concern.  See E. Norman 
Veasey, A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors in Light of Current Events, Ad-
dress at the Annual Audit Committee Issues Conference (Jan. 19, 2005) (advising that 
directors should “take heed” of current events, such as the proposed Worldcom and 
Enron settlements, but should not panic). 
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• Beware of a CEO who manages to the market, or who tries 
unduly to manage the board. 
• Resist a culture of complacency when things look to be 
running well. 
• Rely in good faith on well-chosen experts. 
Best practices must be realistic.  Do not undertake to jump over 
an impossibly high bar of best practices.  Failure to follow your own 
guidelines is not a good optic in court. 
CONCLUSION 
As I suggested at the outset, this retrospective has bumped along 
the twelve-year landscape selectively and without being totally com-
prehensive.  If I ever get the time, I might consider expanding this 
piece into a book.  Of course, “time” is the operative word.  If it takes 
too much time to write the book, it will become—like some interstate 
highways—obsolete before it is finished.  That is because the law is 
dynamic.  The expectations of directors continue to evolve and busi-
ness issues move on. 
I am very sanguine about the role of the Delaware courts as this 
dynamism of corporate law and corporate governance plays out.  The 
Delaware courts are in good hands and they fit the mold of the seven 
obligations that stockholders and directors expect of courts:  (i)  be 
clear; (ii) be prompt; (iii) be balanced; (iv)  have a coherent rationale; 
(v) render decisions that are stable in the overall continuum; (vi)  be 
intellectually honest; and (vii) properly limit the function of the court.  
But I worry about the need to preserve principles of federalism relat-
ing to the internal affairs of corporations.  In my opinion, there has 
already been too much federal encroachment into state law that is 
supposed to govern internal affairs.  In my view, this encroachment is 
an intrusion on internal affairs that has exponentially increased the 
cost of reasonable corporate governance measures. 
My hope is that federal authorities either cut back on the en-
croachment that has already happened or at least refrain from ex-
tending the encroachment.  Despite some of the doctrinal anomalies I 
have discussed, Delaware law, in its dynamic, contextual, expert, and 
objective manner, strikes the right balance, and that should be re-
spected. 
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